THE GREATEST OFFENSIVE [N]EVER LAUNCHED.
Ukrainian American Discord Over War Planning and the Undue Influence of Wargaming.
“We must attack where we should, not where we can.”
Valery Zaluzhny, Ukrainian commanding general.
In my periodic musings on the Russo-Ukrainian War, I focus on the military situation that is current at the time of posting. This time I digress to Ukraine’s operational victory in early September 2022, which followed the breakthrough of Russian lines at Balaklia in Kharkiv oblast. This led to the Ukrainian recapture of the logistics hubs at Kupiansk (September 10, 2022), Izyum (September 11, 2022), and Lyman (October 1, 2022), as well as the temporary rout of the vaunted Russian 1st Tank Army. The reason I return to the Balaklia operation is in response to recent articles in the Washington Post regarding discord between Ukrainian and U.S. officials in the Department of Defense (DOD) over the location, direction, planning, and execution of not only the recent summer counteroffensive in 2023 [1] but also the earlier Kharkiv counteroffensive in September 2022. [2] The author of the second article is Yaroslav Trofimov, chief foreign-affairs correspondent for the Wall Street Journal. He argues that “…the best chance to win the … war was lost” when the Americans nixed a Ukrainian proposal to counterattack in Southern Ukraine a year earlier - in 2022. Trofimov expounds on this topic in his excellent new book titled “Our Enemies Will Perish,” which was just published by the Penguin Press. [3] Based on access to Ukrainian president Wolodymyr Zelensky, commanding general Valery Zaluzhny, and other leading Ukrainian and American officials, he offers valuable insight into joint war planning during the first year of the war. It appears that wargaming was at the crux of the disagreements between Ukrainians and the Pentagon. Upon closer analysis, the variables for the wargames in 2022 and 2023 reveal inconsistent and self-contradictory assumptions.
a. Western Criticism of Ukraine’s Summer Counteroffensive in 2023.
Late in 2022 the presidential administration of Joe Biden agreed to support the Ukrainians in a major counteroffensive in 2023. In furtherance of the plan, the Americans and their European allies supplied Ukraine with 300 armored fighting vehicles, 100 tanks, and mountains of artillery ammunition. Moreover, The Americans and British undertook the training of nine new Ukrainian assault brigades that were to participate in the counteroffensive. American expectations were that it would commence by the beginning of May at the latest. U.S. planners in the Department of Defense (DOD) were concerned that the longer the Ukrainians waited, the Russians would only strengthen the echeloned defenses they had constructed in Southern Ukraine, known as the Surovikin Line.
After numerous delays, due to the ongoing outfitting and training of the assault brigades as well as muddy weather conditions, the Ukrainian summer counteroffensive was not launched until June 7. The attack was made along a 300-kilometer front on four axes of advance towards (1) Vasylivka, (2) Tokmak, (3) Novomlynivka, and (4) Bakhmut. (Map 1) The hope was to stretch Russian reserves along the entire front to enable a breakthrough at the focus of main effort aimed for Tokmak. Tokmak is a strategic logistics hub that sits along the only railroad line from Taganrog at the Russian border to Crimea. (Railroad line marked on Map 1 in black) It also controls traffic from another railroad line originating at the port of Berdiansk on the Azov Sea. The capture of Tokmak would have increased the stress on Russian logistics to Crimea exponentially, especially if traffic was simultaneously interrupted over the Kerch bridge connecting the peninsula with the Russian territory in the south. (The Ukrainian intelligence service (SBU)) seriously damaged the bridge on October 8, 2022 with a truck bomb) Furthermore, the capture of the town would have placed Russian road networks at Melitopil within the 80-kilometer range of precision rocket systems, like the American HIMARS and British Storm Shadow. (Road network marked on Map 1 in yellow)
Unfortunately, the initial Ukrainian mechanized attacks were stopped in their tracks by Russian echeloned defenses, minefields, attack helicopters, anti-tank missiles, and local counterattacks. Drone and satellite surveillance divulged the location of Ukrainian attacking columns in their assembly areas and made them vulnerable to precision artillery strikes before they even approached within range of direct fire weapons, like the Russian Vikhr and Kornet anti-tank missiles. Moreover, the initial mine-breaching operations proved too challenging for the inexperienced brigades that were formed just months before the counteroffensive. Furthermore, the number and quality of the mine breaching equipment proved inadequate. After four days of heavy losses in personnel and armored vehicles, Ukrainian commanding general Valery Zaluzhny called a halt to the battalion-sized mechanized attacks and ordered the assaulting brigades to revert to small unit dismounted infantry tactics. What followed was a four-month slog along flat and wide-open terrain that eventually seized the dominating high ground at the village of Robotyne. However, because the Ukrainian penetration was made on too narrow a front, the summer counteroffensive culminated around mid-October 2023 just south of Robotyne – 12 kilometers from the initial starting point. This was 15 kilometers short of the operational objective of Tokmak.
The Ukrainians were severally criticized by Western military analysts for (1) their inability to synchronize fire and maneuver at scale, (2) for abandoning an armored breakthrough too soon, after an initial rebuff, and (3) diluting their effort over multiple axes. Specifically, they were deemed incapable of employing NATO styled combined arms tactics at battalion level and above. [4] In other words, the Ukrainians were sequencing artillery barrages and small squad-sized infantry attacks that pushed Russian defenders back from their positions over short distance but did not break through the frontlines. The preferred NATO approach is to fire artillery while simultaneously advancing battalion-sized columns of armored vehicles through those same positions and deep into the enemy rear. An apt American football analogy is that the Russians were allowed to “bend-but-not-break” instead of being exposed to the “big play.” By failing to puncture enemy lines with larger formations the Ukrainians forfeited the opportunity to sow panic in the Russian rear and to foster a psychological collapse amongst the enemy units at the forward edge of the battle area. Ukrainian counterarguments regarding the difficulty of advancing over open terrain without air superiority against echeloned defenses that were preceded by deep minefields and supported by drone surveillance were ignored.
Furthermore, the Ukrainians were accused of being risk averse for failing to double down on the sacrifice of men and equipment following the initial breach. It is true that such an approach would have cost more lives in the short term, so went the argument, but would have eventually resulted in a lower casualty rate, after Russian defenses collapsed when Ukrainian troops penetrated deep into the enemy rear. The Ukrainian priority of saving lives to preserve its fighting force for defense against a future Russian offensive was seen as shortsighted. NATO’s obsession with maneuver and disdain for attrition blinded American and West European military professionals from taking a nuanced view of the operational art necessary to collapse prepared defenses by a peer opponent.
Finally, the Americans advocated for the Ukrainians to mass their combat power at a single point, aimed at Tokmak, instead of diluting it on three diversionary attacks. The Ukrainian insistence to counterattack at Bakhmut was especially seen as a waste of effort and resources. Rebuttals by President Zelensky regarding the political importance of the battle to both Putin and to the Ukrainian public fell on deaf ears. Moreover, the launch of diversionary attacks is classic Soviet operational art. The American penchant for overwhelming an adversary at the focal point of attack belies a style of war where one side is accustomed to having overwhelming technological and material superiority, particularly in the air. “Hey diddle, diddle, diddle… we’re coming up the middle” may be typical of a Woody Haye’s [5] American college football offense when playing a weaker opponent, but guile may be necessary to deceive the enemy at the point of attack when both sides are evenly matched.
As it turned out, the Ukrainians acceded to American demands regarding a concentration of forces, when they abandoned the attacks on the Vasylivka axis in July 2023 and Novomlynivka axis in August 2023. Nonetheless, at Zelensky’s insistence, the offensive towards Bakhmut continued. [6] Moreover, the Ukrainians opened a new line of attack to distract Russian defenders at Tokmak by launching amphibious landings from the west bank of the Dnieper. They were able to secure two lodgments on the east bank of the river, which are still being defended.
b. Wargaming the Ukrainian Counteroffensive in 2023.
Understandably, Ukraine’s Western partners were frustrated with the results of the summer counteroffensive of 2023. They provided the Ukrainian army with hundreds of armored vehicles and hundreds-of-thousands of artillery shells, but had little to show for it, except for the heavy attrition of Russian personnel and equipment, which the Russians managed to replace. The original confidence in the enterprise was based on the results of seven computer and table-top wargames that were played between American and Ukrainian participants at the American base in Wiesbaden, Germany beginning in March 2023. U.S. DOD experts designed the wargames to factor in the variables that supposedly reflected the tactical and operational situation in Southern Ukraine during the first half of 2023. The American wargames were followed by a wargame organized by the British army. According to the results of the eight wargames, Western military advisers believed that the counteroffensive could reach the Azov coast, perhaps within 60-90 days, if the Ukrainians massed all their armor and artillery at the decisive point. Specifically, the port city of Melitopil was believed to be within reach. By way of comparison, a CIA assessment was not as “gung-ho” as the DOD’s. It estimated that Ukrainian chances of achieving the objectives of the counteroffensive were no better than 50/50. CIA director William J. Burns predicted that the Ukrainian counteroffensive “…was going to be a really tough slog.” But because the CIA botched the prediction regarding the initial Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 – it gave Ukraine a mere three days before collapsing – the spy agency’s estimation was not given much weight. [7]
In retrospect, one must question the criteria and variables that were programmed into the DOD or British wargames. If these were based primarily on the American experience in the Iraqi campaigns of 1991 and 2003-2004, then they failed to reflect the reality on the ground in Southern Ukraine in 2023. The Ukrainians had to attack echeloned defenses without air support on a battlefield saturated with surveillance and attack drones and minefields the depth of which (500 meters) has never been seen before – even at the Battle of Kursk in 1943. The wargame specialists would have done better in prognosticating the Ukrainian Summer counteroffensive had they read historical accounts of breaching operations during the Battles of El Alamein (1942), Kursk (1943), and the breakout from Normandy (1944). The classic work by David M. Glantz titled the “Battle of Kursk” would have served nicely. [8] Or they could have played some of the more historically accurate commercial computer wargames, like Gary Grigsby’s War in the East or Panzer Command: Ostfront, to get an idea of how Russian defenses and minefields impede mechanized maneuver.
In the final analysis, the Western wargame models fell victim to the combined arms “maneuverist” myopia of NATO’s professional officer class. I could find no better description of how such a mindset got things wrong than the words of the respected military observer, retired U.S. Army lieutenant-colonel Amos C. Fox, who so aptly wrote, as follows:
“Blinded by a maneuver bias, the U.S. military advised the Ukrainian armed forces to conduct a maneuver-oriented counteroffensive against entrenched, fortified, and multidomain Russian defenses in depth along the contact line… with no assailable flanks present, Ukrainian forces attacked headlong into the face of Russian defenses with an inappropriate approach for the situation at hand.” [9]
c. Zaluzhny’s Insistence on a Counteroffensive One Year Earlier - in 2022.
The one individual who was not looking forward to the start of the summer counteroffensive in 2023 was Ukrainian commanding general Valery Zaluzhny. He was well aware of the obstacles that his army faced in assaulting the formidable defenses of the so-called Surovikin Line. After the offensive faltered, he lambasted his Western critics for failing to realize that “…this is not a counterinsurgency…this is Kursk.” [10]
It is true, that back in October 2022 Zaluzhny gave American Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin an extensive shopping list of military equipment as a prerequisite to launching the attack. [11] These included 300 tanks, 500 armored personnel carriers, vast quantities of artillery ammunition and modern F-16 fighter jets. Zaluzhny did not get everything he asked for, like the fighter jets, but the Americans gave him much of what he requested. But the equipment did not begin arriving in numbers until the Spring of 2023 and the new brigades needed time to master their new kit. Even then, the Ukrainian brigades received a superficial exposure to the basics of breaching minefields. In the meantime, the Russians continued to improve their fortifications along the approaches to Tokmak. Meanwhile, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky was operating under the mistaken assumption that the counteroffensive will be a repeat of the previous summer’s breakthrough at Balaklia. Moreover, Ukraine’s Western allies demanded action and they were paying the bill. Therefore, Zaluzhny had no choice. The attack had to be made.
There are two indications that Zaluzhny did not want to press his attack in the summer of 2023. One, he used newly organized brigades for the assault. The veteran Ukrainian brigades, particularly the elite air-assault brigades, were left to defend other sectors of the front where they would not be subject to the higher attrition of the counteroffensive. Two, Zaluzhny halted the costly mechanized attacks onto the Surovikin line after only four days. It is apparent from these measures that for him the preservation of Ukrainian combat power was the priority.
Paradoxically, Zaluzhny pressed for a counter-offensive in Southern Ukraine the previous year – in the summer of 2022. At the time, all that he requested from the Americans and Europeans was 90 artillery pieces and artillery ammunition. [12] However, the Biden administration turned him down and told him to attack elsewhere - in Kharkiv or Kherson. The ostensible reason for the denial of Zaluzhny’s request was the result of DOD wargaming of a Ukrainian prospective counteroffensive - in 2022. Supposedly, the results of the simulations indicated that such an operation would come at too high a risk because the Ukrainian attacking columns would expose their flanks to counterattack during the exploitation of the initial breach. [13] Doesn’t a NATO “maneuverist” approach factor in the risk of exposed flanks in return for the reward of a psychological collapse of the enemy’s forces that are bypassed by the exploiting columns? Apparently, privately the Americans had doubts that the Ukrainians had the operational experience and nous to launch a major offensive.
After his pleas for American support of a counteroffensive in Southern Ukraine were rejected, Zaluzhny turned his attention to Kherson and Kharkiv as axes of attack. By using the offensive on the west bank of the Dnieper towards Kherson as a decoy, Zaluzhny was able to entice more Russian troops away from the Kharkiv sector and onto the west bank of the Dnieper. As a result, part of the 106th and 98th Airborne Divisions of the VDV were relocated from the Donetsk area to the Kherson sector and to Melitopil. On September 5, 2022, with Russian attention diverted hundreds of kilometers to the west, a Ukrainian force organized around two BTGs of the 92nd Mechanized Brigade, two BTGs each from the 25th Airmobile Brigade and 80th Air Assault Brigade, and multiple units of special forces, launched the spectacular breakthrough at Balaklia. After an initial breach of lightly defended gaps in the front, the Ukrainians reinforced their force with BTGs from the 93d and 14th Mechanized Brigades to attack north towards the Russian border. By September 11, the 25th Airborne and 80th Air Assault Brigades raced 90 kilometers east into the Russian rear and captured Kupiansk and Izyum. Meanwhile, Ukrainian special forces fanned out in all directions to sow panic and disorder. Ukrainian trophies included over 2,000 Russian prisoners and 300 captured tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and self-propelled artillery pieces. For a detailed account of the operation, please read my article dated October 1, 2022, titled “The Balaklia-Kupiansk-Izyum Operation: Trophies Are Still Being Counted.” [14]
In hindsight, the results of the Balaklia operation cannot be scoffed at. When the Scottish strategic analyst Phillips Payson O’Brien labeled the Balaklia counter-offensive a “masterstroke” in an article in The Atlantic, this was no hyperbole.[15] Not only did the Ukrainians recapture over 1,200 square kilometers of lost territory, but they also eliminated the Russian threat to the twin cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, an important political objective that had tremendous propaganda value for Vladimir Putin, particularly with Russian voters. However, this was an operational victory, not a strategic one. On its own, it was not a war winner. Control of the Donbas mattered little to the survival of Ukraine as a thriving sovereign state. However, the recapture of Southern Ukraine was important to the reestablishment of a Ukrainian commercial waterway to the Black Sea and interdiction of Russian communications with Crimea. In the article titled “The Balaklia-Kupiansk-Izyum Operation: Trophies Are Still Being Counted” I wrote that despite the dash and style of the Ukrainian operation “…ultimate Ukrainian victory still rests in the south, most likely at the strategic city of Melitopil.” Zaluzhny was aware of this reality and would have preferred to attack in Southern Ukraine in pursuit of Ukraine’s strategic territorial goals. After having his proposal for such a counteroffensive rejected by the Americans, he must have had doubts whether a better opportunity would present itself in 2023. Recent indications are that he was skeptical of DOD computer projections for success in the summer counteroffensive of 2023.
d. Were Prospects Better for a Counteroffensive in Southern Ukraine a Year Earlier?
The strategic situation in Ukraine as of early July 2022 saw the Russians take the cities of Severdonetsk (June 23) and Lysychansk (July 3) and begin an attack towards the town of Lyman on the Siverskyi Donets River. This was 20 kilometers east of Putin’s key political objective of the twin cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, which were iconic symbols of the Russian struggle for the Donbas in 2014. Meanwhile, Russia’s 1st Tank Army was pressing south from Izyum, also towards Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Despite the territorial gains, the Russian army incurred horrendous losses during the first five months of the war – losses that it could ill afford. Please recall that the Russians invaded Ukraine with a relatively small force of less than 200,000 men, which was short on infantry, but heavy on armor. The battles for Kyiv, Kharkiv, Izyum, Mykolayiv, and Severdonetsk seriously depleted the ranks of Russia’s best brigades, particularly the elite vozdushno desantnye voiska (VDV) airborne troops.
The Ukrainians also suffered painful losses at Izyum and Severdonetsk in May-June 2022 due to the depletion of their pre-war stocks of Soviet artillery ammunition and resultant Russian superiority in artillery. At times 300 Ukrainians were dying in a single day. [16] However, the initiative began to turn in their favor in May 2022 after they began replacing their Soviet artillery with American M777 howitzers. This allowed them to transition to NATO artillery ammunition and fresh Western supplied stocks. By July 2022 the Ukrainians received long-range High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS). With a range in excess of 80 kilometers, these enabled them to wreak havoc on Russian supply depots and command centers. Ukraine began to recapture the initiative during the early summer months of 2022, setting the stage for a prospective counteroffensive, preferably in the south.
An analysis of both the pros and the cons of a prospective counteroffensive in Southern Ukraine in 2022 – one year earlier – follows below.
1. Ukraine Had a Manpower Advantage in 2022
In July 2022 the Ukrainians had a clear manpower advantage over the Russians and commanding general Valery Zaluzhny wanted to exploit it in a counteroffensive. At the time, the Russians had as few as 125,000 men remaining from the force that attacked Ukraine on February 23, 2022. [17] Meanwhile, the Ukrainians fielded a force of 200,000 in the regular armed forces and another 100,000 in the Territorial Defense Forces. Of these, approximately 250,000 were on the front lines at any given time. It is true that Russia began to redress the imbalance with Putin’s mobilization of 300,000 reservists on September 21, 2022, following the Balaklia debacle. Nevertheless, a counteroffensive in Southern Ukraine in 2022 instead of at Balaklia would have caught the Russians spread thin, since the newly mobilized Russian soldiers did not begin entering the fight until mid-October 2022.
2. 25,000 Front-line Russian Troops Were Isolated on the West Bank of the Dnieper River.
Not only were the Russians stretched thin across a 900-kilometer front, but 25,000 of their combat force was isolated on the west bank of the Dnieper River near Kherson, which was tenuously supplied by a mere three bridges. These were periodically interdicted by Ukrainian HIMARS rockets. Nonetheless, Putin insisted that Kherson be held. Otherwise, the only regional capital to fall into Russian hands at the outset of the war would revert to Ukrainian control. To fulfill Putin’s wishes, the Russians had to weaken their forces not only near Kharkiv but also in Southern Ukraine to reinforce the Kherson sector. Thus, the prospects of not only recapturing strategically vital territory in Southern Ukraine but also of cutting off a sizeable Russian force on the “wrong side” of the Dnieper River became a tantalizing temptation for Ukraine’s military leadership. After all, military commanders have dreamed of cutting off an enemy army on the wrong side of a water obstacle since the advent of battle. Historical examples of similar situations harkened back to Prussia’s Helmut Moltke trapping the French army on the wrong side of the Meuse River at Sedan in 1870 or the Israeli crossing of the Suez Canal in 1973 following the Battle of the Chinese Farm to cut off the 3d Egyptian army on the opposite east bank, away from its base of supply.
3. 50% of the Russian VDV Divisions Were on the Wrong Side of the Dnieper River
In the summer of 2022, the Russian General Staff had at its disposal an operational reserve of 30,000 of the elite vozdushno desantnye voiska (VDV) airborne troops. (A further 10,000 were either in the training pipeline or in Russia proper) [18] The Russians did not fully make up the losses that these troops suffered during the disastrous attack towards Kyiv in February-March 2022, as a portion of the reconstituted VDV were new recruits who had not been as extensively trained as the original pre-war contract professionals. Regardless, these highly mobile airborne units acted like rooks on a chess board that could quickly reinforce a point of attack or buttress a threatened sector on defense. The success of a Ukrainian counteroffensive in the south depended on how many of these elite units could be enticed away from the main axis of attack. While the Russians had the 56th, 108th, and 247th Air-Assault Regiments of the 7th Air-Assault Division (6,000) and the 45th Airborne Spetsnaz Brigade (3,000) on the west bank of the Dnieper, they could still call on three more divisions and four independent airborne brigades to reinforce either the Kherson or the Zaporizhzhia sector, depending on the situation.
When in August 2022 the Ukrainians ramped up their attacks along the periphery of the Russian lodgment on the west bank of the Dnieper River, the Russians reinforced the 7th Air-Assault Division by elements of the 11th Independent Airborne Brigade, the 51st Airborne Regiment of the 106th Airborne Division, and the 217th Airborne Regiment of the 98th Airborne Division. Thus, VDV troops on the west side of the Dnieper increased to 15,000. That amounted to 50% of VDV troops in the theater of operations. In the event of a sudden Ukrainian attack along the Tokmak axis the Russian reserves on the west bank of the Dnieper would have experienced difficulties in crossing back to the east bank over the three interdicted bridges. In a best-case scenario, the VDV would have had to make their way over the Dnieper in boats and barges without most of their armor and heavy equipment. In a worst case, the entire Russian front near Kherson could have dissolved in panic. (Please recall that the Russians gradually withdrew their forces from the west bank by November 2022, but they had time to organize the retreat in phases).
Meanwhile the reserves along the Tokmak axis were comprised of the 83d independent Airborne Brigade and the 155th and 177th Naval Infantry Brigades (combined strength of 9,000). Although, the Russians still had the entire 76th Air-Assault Division and elements of the depleted 31st Independent Airborne Brigade near Bakhmut along with the remaining regiments of the 98th and 106th Airborne Divisions in the area near Kharkiv and Lyman, these were 400 kilometers to the east. (Map 2) Therefore, it would take days before these reserves could relocate to the west by rail in their entirety. If the Ukrainians could pin them in place, even temporarily, with a diversionary attack towards the Ukrainian-Russian border east of Kharkiv or towards Kupiansk and Izyum, a main Ukrainian effort in Southern Ukraine would likely have made inroads to operational depth, at least to Tokmak.
4. In July 2022, the Russians Had Yet to Begin Construction of the Surovikin Line
In July 2022 the Russians were defending the approaches to Tokmak, and by extension Melitopil, by the same regiments of the 19th and 42nd Divisions that were in place a year later during the summer counteroffensive in 2023. At the time, both divisions were understrength (approximately 5,000 men each), consisting of two regiments each instead of three. Moreover, each regiment contained three battalions, instead of the 5-6 that were present in the summer of 2023. Although, admittedly, neither division had been seriously depleted during the earlier fighting in 2022 and was relatively fresh.
But the Russians had yet to construct the prepared defenses of the Surovikin line that proved almost impregnable a year later. All that was in place in July 2022 were earthen field works that had been thrown up by the infantrymen themselves. These were not contiguous echeloned defenses across the entire front, but mere strongpoints built around key towns and logistics hubs. Although the strongpoints were mutually supported by fire, there were gaps in the line that could be exploited. Also, minefields were not nearly as thick or deep and ubiquitous as in 2023.
No doubt, an assault of the forward positions of the Russian 19th and 42nd Divisions along the Tokmak axis would have presented serious challenges, even in 2022. The Ukrainian General Staff was aware of these. For instance, a reinforced company of the 1st Tank Brigade attempted a deep counterattack on May 14, 2022, at the village of Vyshneve west of the town of Polohy. The operation did not go well – over 10 Ukrainian tanks and armored vehicles were destroyed by Russian Kornet anti-tank missiles. [19] Nonetheless, the chances for a breakthrough were better than a year later. As stated previously, Russian defenses were not contiguous. Vyshneve was located several kilometers behind the line-of-contact. Therefore, the Ukrainian attacking column was able to find a gap in the front lines. If supported by superior artillery fire and sufficient reserves, a breakthrough was possible. The key was in thinning out Russian reserves and artillery support at the point of attack. That was much easier in 2022 when the Russians had less than 125,000 troops spread out along a 900-kilometer front stretching from Kherson to Kharkiv, than in 2023, when they had over 400,000 troops ensconced in their concrete bunkers in three defensive belts of the Surovikin Line with ample reserves in the rear.
5. The Experienced Ukrainian Brigades Had Yet to Experience Serious Attrition
One of the astounding aspects of the Balaklia breakthrough is that it was accomplished by a relatively small force of 5,000 primarily professional soldiers drawn from the established regular brigades of the Ukrainian army, without the necessity for raising new formations or weakening other sectors of the front. Most of the attacking formation consisted of airborne/air-assault, reconnaissance and special forces that had not been heavily engaged in previous battles, or which had time to regroup after being withdrawn from the front. It is also significant that some of the better Ukrainian mechanized and air-assault brigades were not involved in this operation, making them available for another offensive in 2022.
It goes without saying that the success of a counteroffensive in Southern Ukraine in 2022 depended on the inclusion of these older formations in the attack. The eight pre-2014 Ukrainian regular mechanized brigades (14th, 24th, 28th, 30th, 72nd, 92nd, 93d Mechanized, and 128th Mountain Brigades) could provide no more than one battalion tactical group (BTG) each that was capable of offensive operations. In July 2022, most of these brigades had at least one other BTG committed at the front. Thus, it would take an effort to rotate them out of the line to prepare for an offensive. With each BTG comprised of 900 personnel, the most that the Ukrainians could muster for a major offensive from their heavier brigades was 8,000 men. When you add the tank battalions of the 1st and 17th Tank Brigades, the attack force grew to 10,000 front line mechanized infantry and tankers. The Ukrainian brigades of more recent vintage that were raised after the war began were more suited for defending in place and were incapable of contributing to an offensive force. Of course, the five oldest elite airborne/air-assault brigades (25th Airborne, 79th, 80th, 81st, and 95th Air Assault Brigades) were capable of mustering two BTGs apiece (combined total of 10,000 men). But these were mounted in light armored vehicles only. When one added the multitude of special forces detachments from the army, National Guard, and the security services, Ukraine had at most 25,000 troops capable of going on the offensive in July-August 2022, half of which were under-armored. But that is roughly the same amount that was committed to the attack on the Tokmak axis a year later June 7, 2023.
Moreover, the troops that filled the ranks of the older brigades were far more experienced than the formations that constituted the Ukrainian 9th and 10th Corps that attacked towards Tokmak the following summer in 2023. The former also had more internal cohesion and esprit-de-corps since their training and combat experience traced its history to before the Russian invasion on February 23, 2022. Admittedly, a few battalions of the 17th Tank and 24th and 30th Mechanized Brigades suffered heavy losses during the battles in Luhansk oblast in April-May 2022. But most of the other older Ukrainian brigades had not been seriously degraded during the fighting during the first five months of the war and were generally close to their pre-war composition.
Most importantly, the majority of the pre-war brigade staff and battalion commanders in the established brigades had not been killed or wounded. Whereas the new brigades that were raised in 2023 had yet to coalesce and had staffs that were recently thrown together, the leadership in the older brigades was generally competent in conducting battalion and sometimes even brigade level operations. Evidence of good staff work can be seen in the performance of the battalions of the 92nd Mechanized, 25th Airborne, and 80th Air-Assault Brigades during the Balaklia breakthrough and exploitation in September 2022. The initiative exhibited by the battalion commanders of the 25th Airborne and 80th Air-Assault Brigades while racing to Kupinsk and Izyum stand out. The operation was executed by multiple infantry and tank companies in conjunction with artillery and even occasional air support, instead of limited to the two companies per brigade that were customarily observed in simultaneous action during the summer counteroffensive of 2023.
Following the Balaklia breakthrough in September 2022, many of the elite air-assault brigades were thrown into the meatgrinder of fighting near Lyman. By late 2022, many of the experienced mechanized units were sent to reinforce threatened sectors near Bakhmut, Vuhledar, and Avdiivka. By the summer of 2023 these were seriously degraded by continuous fighting. Particularly, losses amongst experienced battalion commanders and brigade staff officers were high. Furthermore, scores of surviving battalion commanders were reassigned to command new brigades when the Ukrainian army expanded rapidly in early 2023. Thus, Ukrainian leadership at the brigade and battalion level was severely diluted across the board in 2023, whereas it had been concentrated in the older brigades in the first half of 2022.
6. Older Ukrainian Armor and Kit in 2022
In the summer of 2022, the Ukrainian army was still predominately armed with upgrades of Soviet vintage T-64BV and T-72 AB tanks, and BMP-2 and BMP-1 armored fighting vehicles. By the summer of 2023, the assault brigades of the 10th Corps were armed with American Bradley M2A2 and German Marder armored fighting vehicles, and Leopard A2 and Challenger 2 tanks. Nonetheless, the more advanced Western armor was just as susceptible to Kornet anti-tank missiles as the older Ukrainian equipment. Furthermore, in 2023, Russian minefields were much more prevalent and took a toll on the Western supplied equipment. The only difference was that the Western armor was much better at protecting the crews and passengers inside. Therefore, casualties significantly decreased. Nevertheless, the Balaklia breakthrough in September 2022 was accomplished with Soviet era equipment. Therefore, the quality of armor was not the primary reason for an offensive to more likely succeed in 2023.
7. Ukrainian Deficiency in Artillery in 2022.
There is no doubt that the Ukrainians had less artillery and ammunition in 2022 than in 2023. In fact, Zaluzhny’s only pre-requisite for the offensive in 2022 was 90 pieces of additional Western artillery and the ammunition necessary to support a major offensive. That request was denied, for the reasons we shall discuss below in Section f.
8. Ukrainian Superiority in Drone Warfare in 2022
As the Ukrainian summer counteroffensive in 2023 slogged into the late summer, first party view (FPV) Russian drones began to exert significant influence over the battlefield. In many instances, these were the primary means of attacking Ukrainian armor and artillery. That was not the case in the summer of 2022. During the Balaklia operation and along the Kherson front in 2022, the Ukrainians had the upper hand in the early development of attack drones. The Russians had not transitioned to this new form of warfare until 2023.
9. Russian Air Superiority Was Constant Over Their Side of the Battlefield
Regardless of the year of attack, any deep penetration of the front by Ukrainian armor would have run into the effective range of missiles and bombs of Russian tactical fixed wing and rotary airpower, which would be able to fly under the protection of the umbrella of Russian anti-air missile defenses on its side of the front lines. It is unlikely that any Ukrainian columns exploiting a breakthrough would bring sufficient mobile short-range anti-air defense missile systems (SHORAD) to keep Russian tactical air at bay. The only solution would have required the Ukrainians to sneak some of their precious S-300 anti-air systems close to the front. However, these were necessary for the defense of Ukrainian cities from Russian ballistic missiles and long-range drones. As proven by events during the summer and fall of 2023, Russian K-52 attack helicopters were particularly vexing.
10. Comparing Prospects for Counteroffensives in 2022 versus 2023
I acknowledge that engaging in counterfactuals after the fact is a fool’s errand. Nevertheless, the likelihood of a different outcome in 2022 compels me to try. Let us begin by acknowledging some irrefutable facts. A Ukrainian counteroffensive in Southern Ukraine in August-September 2022 would have been launched against less formidable defenses along a 900-kilometer front from Kherson to Kharkiv that was defended by one-third as many Russian troops than those arrayed in the summer of 2023. Moreover, the Ukrainian attacking force would have been more experienced and better led than the one that assaulted the Surovikin Line the following year. Furthermore, 50% of Russian VDV reserves were isolated on the west bank of the Dnieper River by August 2022 - before the Russians were able to organize a gradual withdrawal onto the east bank, like they were able to accomplish under general Sergey Surovikin by November 2022. Finally, the Ukrainians had a manpower advantage in 2022.
It goes without saying, that in the event of an attack in Southern Ukraine in 2022, the Russian General Staff would have rushed part of the remaining VDV reserves from Kharkiv and Luhansk oblasts to the Tokmak axis. But without prepared defenses of the Surovikin Line in the rear, these would have been subjected to artillery fire during counterattacks in the open. Moreover, if the counteroffensive in 2022 could have been coordinated with a diversionary offensive either towards Izyum and Kupiansk or the Russian border east of Kharkiv, to pin some of the VDV reserves in place, together with an attempt to blow the Kerch bridge that connected Crimea with Russian territory in the south, the resulting confusion could have created the conditions for a major success.
Of course, the Ukrainian army had artillery parity with the Russians in the summer of 2023, whereas the Russians had a significant superiority in that regard the previous year. But general Zaluzhny requested 90 additional artillery pieces from the Americans. Had these been supplied in time, the Ukrainians had a much better chance of getting to Tokmak in 2022 than a year later.
Ultimately, success was dependent on a breach of the Russian forward defenses. That is easier said than done. After all, a concentration of Ukrainian forces in their assembly areas would have been picked up sooner than later by satellite and drone reconnaissance. Moreover, the assaulting Ukrainian forces in both 2022 and 2023 were not well versed in mine clearing techniques. Although, it is reasonable to anticipate that the experienced troops in 2022 would have prepared and performed better at such a task than the newly organized personnel the following summer. Had the Ukrainians been able to achieve a breakthrough in the first couple of days along a more porous front than in 2023, their airborne and air-assault battalions had every chance of racing deep into the Russian rear, as far as Melitopil. Moreover, based on their performance at Kupiansk and Izyum, the Ukrainian special forces would have sown panic and disorder in the Russian rear as far as the bridge to Crimea at Henchinsk and the Russian rear near the Dnieper River.
In July 2022, after the Biden administration denied his request for 90 artillery pieces for a counteroffensive in Southern Ukraine and told him to attack elsewhere, general Zaluzhny argued that “We must attack where we should, not where we can.” [20] We will never know for certain whether he was correct. But the war would have likely been in an altogether different place, had he tried.
f. Was DOD Wargaming in 2022 an Excuse for Managing Fears of Nuclear Escalation?
When one compares the ostensible conclusions of DOD wargaming of the situation in Southern Ukraine in 2022 and 2023, one finds numerous mutual contradictions. Supposedly, the Ukrainians did not have the skill to attack an outnumbered and lightly entrenched enemy in 2022 with veteran troops, whereas in 2023 they were expected to reach the Azov Sea in 60-90 days with inexperienced brigades against a heavily entrenched foe that was three times as numerous as the preceding year. In 2022 Zaluzhny was refused 90 artillery pieces for a counteroffensive towards Melitopil because the Ukrainians would dangerously expose their flanks during a breakthrough, whereas in 2023 they were expected to advance 80 kilometers into the Russian rear, with even larger Russians reserves waiting to counterattack their flanks than in 2022. Granted, in 2022 the Ukrainian army was short of artillery and ammunition and was equipped with outdated armor of Soviet vintage. But, when the Ukrainians were given American and German equipment in 2023, they were expected to knife through Russian defenses with ease. Was the difference between 2022 and 2023 determined by superior Western weaponry? Or was it superior NATO training of the nine new Ukrainian assault brigades, which consisted of only 6-8 weeks, with very little battalion level training, let alone offensive maneuvers at the brigade level? Moreover, there was almost no NATO training in breaching minefields.
I believe that the evidence indicates that wargame results can be manipulated to support a prevailing political predisposition of the decision makers. In 2022, the overwhelming focus of the Biden administration was on preventing Putin’s use of the nuclear option in the event of military embarrassment. Thus, the rejection of Zaluzhny’s proposed counteroffensive. Whereas by 2023 Putin had retreated from numerous “red lines” for nuclear escalation. Moreover, President Joe Biden was approaching an election year and support for funding of the Ukrainian war effort in 2024 was uncertain. Thus, the priority shifted to launching a victorious counteroffensive in Southern Ukraine as soon as possible.
Yaroslav Trofimov writes in his book “Our Enemies Will Perish” that following the Ukrainian capture of Kupiansk and Izyum and subsequent push for Lyman:
“…fears of a Russian nuclear escalation reached their highest point that week. According to U.S. intelligence estimates, Putin was likely to consider a nuclear strike under three scenarios. One was a major attack on Russia proper, especially with NATO involvement. Another was the possibility of losing physical control over Crimea. And the third, according to a senior Pentagon official, was a Ukrainian battlefield victory “that would completely and totally shatter the Russian military, such that the Russian state would sense an existential threat.” [20]
If the Biden administration feared a nuclear shot across the bow from Putin after the Balaklia operation, imagine the stomach-churning anxiety that would have afflicted American leadership had Zaluzhny’s brigades managed to reach Melitopil and Ukrainian special forces fanned out south towards Crimea and west towards the Russian rear near the Dnieper River? I acknowledge that the number one priority of an American president is to safeguard the American people from the threat of a nuclear conflagration. Thus, a “better safe than sorry” approach to the Russo-Ukrainian War is logically justifiable. However, had the United States supported Zaluzhny’s proposed counteroffensive in 2022, the results could have been spectacular.
In the summer of 2022 the geography of Southern Ukraine was calling out for an counteroffensive that could have trapped tens of thousands of Russian forces in a sack south of the Great Bend of the Dnieper River and against the bottlenecks created by the isthmuses and bridges to Crimea. The relatively short distance from Orikhiv to Melitopil (80 km) offered an opportunity to sever the “land bridge” to Crimea while 50% of the Russian VDV divisions were isolated on the west bank of the Dnieper. (Map 2) These were pre-conditions for a victory for the ages, on a level with Hannibal at Cannae 216 B.C., Napoleon at Ulm 1805, Moltke at Sedan in 1870, the Wehrmacht in France 1940, the Red Army in Operation Bagration (Destruction of the German Army Group Center) in August 1944, and the Anglo-American closing of the Falaise Pocket around German Army Group B in Normandy, also in August 1944. But we will never know because war is not a computer wargame that can be manipulated by changing the variables. It has to play out in real time on the ground. However, we do have the written record of military history - not as a guide - but as a tool. We would serve ourselves well by rereading it.
[1] Miscalculations, divisions marked offensive planning by U.S., Ukraine. Washington Post. December 4, 2023.
[2] Yaroslav Trofimov. How the best chance to win the Ukraine war was lost. Washington Post. January 9, 2024.
[3] Trofimov, Yaroslav. Our Enemies Will Perish. (Penguin Press: New York, 2024) pp. 240-241.
[4] Michael Kofman, Rob Lee, Franz-Stefan Gady, Konrad Muzyka. "Initial Impressions from a Visit to Ukraine’s Front Lines.” November 16, 2023, War on the Rocks. Russia Contingency.
[5] Head football coach at the Ohio State University from 1951 to 1978. For those who are not old enough, he was fired after punching an opposing player from Clemson University on the field during the 1978 Gator Bowl.
[6] Michael R. Gordon, Gordon Lubold, James Marson, Vivian Salama. U.S., Ukraine Clash Over Counteroffensive Strategy. WSJ, August 24, 2023.
[7] Miscalculations, divisions marked offensive planning by U.S., Ukraine. Washington Post. December 4, 2023.
[8] Glantz, David A., House, Jonathan M. Battle of Kursk. (Univ. of Kansas Press: 1999).
[9] Fox, Amos. Setting the Record Straight on Attrition. War on the Rocks. January 30, 2024.
[10] Michael R. Gordon, Gordon Lubold, James Marson, Vivian Salama. U.S., Ukraine Clash Over Counteroffensive Strategy. WSJ, August 24, 2023.
[11] Miscalculations, divisions marked offensive planning by U.S., Ukraine. Washington Post. December 4, 2023.
[12] Yaroslav Trofimov. How the best chance to win the Ukraine war was lost. Washington Post. January 9, 2024.
[13] Kate Bo Lilis, Natasha Bertrand. U.S. war-gamed with Ukraine ahead of counteroffensive and encouraged more limited mission. CNN, September 1, 2022.
[14] Yurko_Max. The Balaklia–Kupiansk-Izyum Operation. “Trophies are Still Being Counted.” Substack, October 1, 2022.
[15] O’Brien, Phillips P. Ukraine Pulled off a Masterstroke. The Atlantic, September 19, 2022.
[16] Trofimov, Yaroslav. Our Enemies Will Perish. (Penguin Press: New York, 2024) pp. 223.
[17] Yaroslav Trofimov. How the best chance to win the Ukraine war was lost. Washington Post. January 9, 2024.
[18] Jorgen Elfving. Russian Airborne Troops and Their Role on Tomorrow’s Battlefield. The Jamestown Foundation, April 2021; David Axe. Russia Formed a Fifth Airborne Division. It Wasn’t Ready for the Drone and Artillery Apocalypse. Forbes, December 6, 2023.
[19] Yuri Butusov. censor.net. January 28, 2023. https://censor.net/ua/resonance/3470252/yak_stabilizuvaty_front
[20] Yaroslav Trofimov. How the best chance to win the Ukraine war was lost. Washington Post. January 9, 2024.
[21] Trofimov, Yaroslav. Our Enemies Will Perish. (Penguin Press: New York, 2024) pp. 278-279.