During the last week of August my wife and I were sailing through the Galapagos Islands, six hundred miles off the coast of Ecuador. While in the Pacific, we were out of range of wi-fi for extended periods. Thus, I did not learn of the initial attack by Ukrainian forces at Balaklia until September 5, 2022, when our plane touched down in Ft. Lauderdale. Enthralled, I followed the developing operation during the course of the week. It became apparent that this was no slow grinding offensive, like the one that the Ukrainians were conducting along the Kherson front. Rather this was a lightning quick blitzkrieg in the style of the German Wehrmacht in early WWII, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) in 1967-1973 or the U.S. Army and Marine Corps in Iraq in 2003. Every day, I had to resist the temptation to write something, anything, to add to the litany of opinions flooding the internet regarding the remarkable display of Ukrainian operational skill. After all, first reports in war are rarely accurate. Nevertheless, when the Ukrainians reached the strategic railroad hub in Kupiansk on the west bank of the Oskil River on September 9, I began to jot down some thoughts for an article. By this point it was apparent that the attack had achieved a spectacular operational success. Not only did the Ukrainians achieve complete surprise and advanced 90 kilometers into the Russian rear, but the capture of Kupiansk also severed lines of communication to the Russian battle group attacking south of Izyum. However, when Ukrainian paratroopers attacked south and actually captured Izyum on September 10, the consequences of the counter-offensive began to acquire strategic and even political implications. An entire Russian battle group of the 1st Tank Army was threatened with encirclement south of Izyum, trapped against the Northern Donets River. Moreover, the ability of Putin to pursue his stated objective of “freeing” the Donbas was now seriously in doubt. Clearly, the Ukrainian armed forces had seized the operational initiative in the war and were in position to dictate the place and time of future offensives. Of greater significance was the revitalization of financial and military support to Ukraine by the United States and the West. Better to send weapons and funding to a proxy that is a winner, instead of one that is on the back foot. Most importantly, the political fallout from the developing disaster created negative resonance within Russia itself, targeting Russia’s center of gravity – popular support for Putin’s war. Even the pro-Putin Russian media was looking for scapegoats and howling for revenge. In response, on September 21 Putin exposed himself and his regime to political and existential peril by declaring a partial mobilization of former Russian military specialists. For the first time the people of Russia were to be directly exposed to the pain and hazards of war. Where this will lead is anyone’s guess.
Therefore, the full strategic fall-out from the Balaklia-Kupiansk operation has yet to be determined. It is still an open question whether the counter-offensive is a turning point in the war. Will Putin be able to survive the backlash against his mobilization order, which began sweeping Russia this week? It must be emphasized, that continued Russian control over large swaths of Kherson and Zaporozhzhia oblasts and the delta of the Dnieper River gives Vladimir Putin significant leverage in any peace negotiations. Therefore, ultimate Ukrainian victory still rests in the south, most likely at the strategic city of Melitopil.
Nevertheless, the speed, sweep and style of the Ukrainian counter-offensive warrants analysis. I discuss the factors that contributed to its success.
Preconditions for Success
For the initiated, Ukrainian military history is a bitter narrative of struggle against the odds, betrayal and defeat. It is only recently that the fortunes of war began to turn in favor of the Ukrainians. Thus, the Ukrainian victory in the Battle of Kyiv in March 2022 registers as the first clear cut victory by Ukrainian arms against Russia since the Battle of Konotop in 1659.[1] Even so, the operational masterpiece at Balaklia-Kupiansk raises the bar to new heights. It is one thing to defend, as in the Kyiv campaign, but an altogether different matter to attack in depth, as in the capture of Kupiansk and Izyum. When the Scottish strategic analyst Phillips Payson O’Brien labeled the counter-offensive a “masterstroke” in an article in The Atlantic, this was no hyperbole.[2] As I try to place this latest Ukrainian success in its proper historical context, I realize that what just happened stands in stark contrast with the past.
a. Deception and Misdirection on the Kherson Front
So how did the Ukrainians pull off this “masterstroke”? I will only mention in passing the Ukrainian disinformation campaign trumpeting a counter-offensive on the Kherson front. The early consensus among war correspondents and pundits is that clever messaging in the news media by the Ukrainian government and military tricked the Russian General Staff into shifting forces away from Balaklia to the Kherson front, leaving the area lightly defended without sufficient reserves. Supposedly, this weakened the sector to such an extent that Ukrainian forces were able to make a breakthrough north of the town at Verbivka and then race almost unobstructed to Kupiansk, 90 kilometers to the east.
I believe the above narrative to be an oversimplification. While messaging in the media was part of the deception plan to create the impression that a major Ukrainian offensive was coming on the Kerson front, other substantive measures by the Ukrainians led to the Russian decision to shift forces from the Balaklia sector to the south. Rather, the steady pressure of Ukrainian attacks at multiple points along the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia fronts in July and August convinced the Russian high command to shift forces to preserve the strategic gains that the Russian army seized early in the war.
In and of itself, the Russian decision to reinforce the south was sound. The Kherson and the Zaporizhzhia sectors are strategically the most important to Russia at this stage of the war. Where the Russian command fell short was in simultaneously continuing their offensive in the Donbas along the Siversk-Soledar-Bakhmut front, instead of shifting some of these attacking forces to protect the weakened Balaklia sector. It is obvious that the ongoing Russian offensive in Donetsk oblast is of secondary importance, which has been needlessly elevated to primary strategic status by Putin’s desire to seize the entirety of the Donbas for the purpose of enhancing his domestic political optics.
Although the operational importance of Kupiansk as a supply and communications center was commonly recognized by Russian commanders and pundits alike, the strategic domino effect of its prospective capture was just too indirect and counter intuitive. Not many were able to foresee the collapse of Russian forces in the Balaklia-Kupiansk-Izyum triangle, nor could they predict the political fallout from the disaster in Russia, culminating with Putin’s mobilization order. The definitive history of this war is yet to be written and the etiology of the Balaklia breakthrough has yet to be revealed. The recent Time article by Simon Shuster and Vera Bergengruen justifiably credits Valeriy Zaluzhny, the Ukrainian commanding general, and Oleksander Syrsky, the commander of Ukrainian forces east of the Dnieper River, for planning and executing the operation.[3] But whichever yet-to-be-named Ukrainian staff officer(s) came up with the idea or later advocated for its implementation exhibited a cognitive grasp of war that elevates military operations to an art form.
b. Intelligence Assessment, Operational Analysis and Operational Security
In other respects, the Balaklia breakthrough succeeded because of sound Ukrainian preparations. First, Ukrainian intelligence and operational analysis settled on an offensive along the Balaklia-Kupiansk axis as the one most likely to offer an achievable success. The Ukrainians were aware that this sector was lightly defended since June and realized that the strategically important Kupiansk railhead was potentially within reach. Thus, they kept open the possibility of attack in this direction, even if the Ukrainian army was not prepared to launch a major offensive at the time. But after absorbing the Russian offensive to seize Severdonetsk and Lysychansk in Luhansk oblast through July, the Ukrainian General Staff felt that they had weakened the Russians sufficiently to seize the initiative with an offensive before Winter. Newly trained Ukrainian brigades were beginning to come online, and Ukraine was beginning to gain the advantage in the number of infantry. The question was where to attack? Reportedly, their first choice was to attack in Zaporizhzhia oblast towards the strategic city of Melitopil but abandoned the idea after the Russians reinforced the sector with up to six battalion tactical groups (BTGs), some of which were withdrawn from the Balaklia sector. When the Russians weakened the Balaklia sector even further in August, it became the prime candidate for a counter-offensive.
Second, Ukrainian operational security has been astounding. To maintain the secrecy of the operation by so many participants takes great discipline. That Russian intelligence was unable to learn of the Ukrainian plan to attack Kupiansk from Balaklia is an intelligence failure of the first order and warrants further study.
c. Satellite Intelligence and Wargaming Support by American and British Allies
It goes without saying, that strategic satellite surveillance from the United States helped the Ukrainian General Staff to complete its intelligence assessment. When combined with excellent Ukrainian intelligence at the tactical level, particularly deep patrols by special forces and reports from local partisans, the Ukrainian command had a clearer picture of the changing battlefield than their adversary. The Ukrainians were encouraged by the U.S. military to share their intelligence, which enabled the Americans to wargame the intended Ukrainian offensives along the Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and Balaklia fronts. Supposedly, the attacks along the Kherson and Zaporizhzia fronts would have resulted in heavy losses, without guarantees for success. After further consultation with British experts, the Ukrainians were assured that the prospects for the Balaklia breakthrough were promising.
d. Operational and Tactical Surprise
I already mentioned that slow creeping offensives on the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia fronts created a deception and misdirection in the minds of Russian decisionmakers, which persuaded them to weaken Balaklia by shifting forces to reinforce the south. By creeping offensive, I mean a sequence of consecutive attacks with limited objectives along a broad front, intended to spread out Russian reserves and to gradually overwhelm defenses through attrition, especially by long distance bombardment of bridges, command and control centers and ammunition supply depots. Clever synchronization by the Ukrainians with their offensive on the Kherson front exploited this cognitive misdirection to achieve an operational surprise at Balaklia on September 6 – 400 kilometers away. Not only did the Russians thin out their forces in August, but the troops near Balaklia were in the process of rotating out to be replaced with third-rate recruits from the Donetsk and Luhansk National Republics (DNR and LNR), particularly at the point of the breakthrough of Russian lines northwest of Balaklia at Verbivka. Moreover, SOBR (Rosgvardia) internal police special forces units from the Bashkir and Samara regions were placed in reserve in the town of Volokhiv Yar. These had some armor but were not trained in large scale ground operations. The entire amalgamation maintained its positions for only two days before artillery fire, elite Ukrainian paratroopers and supporting tanks caused the Russian defenses to melt away, creating a hole for Ukrainian follow-on units to knife through into the Russian rear on light armored vehicles. Only to the south of Balaklia did the Russians place regular troops, in this instance the 7th guards motorized regiment from the 11th Corps, based in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. However, these were outflanked by the main Ukrainian attack northwest of Balaklia.
e. Local Artillery and Air Superiority
Furthermore, the Ukrainians established not only local artillery but also air superiority over the battlefield during their dash from Balaklia towards Kupiansk. Regarding artillery, the decisive factor was Ukrainian electronic jamming of communications between Russian drones and their artillery fire control centers. During the offensive, the Russians were blind to Ukrainian troop concentrations and directions of advance in real time, thus, impeding timely targeting. Too often, Russian drone surveillance video had to be downloaded and sent to higher headquarters for evaluation before targeting information was passed back to the artillery batteries. This exacerbated the top-down style of Russian command, which requires direction from the top, instead of local commanders exercising initiative and then notifying superiors of the latest developments. In contrast, the best Ukrainian brigades rely on integrated Starlink satellite telecommunication networks that connect drone surveillance video to ground forces, headquarters and artillery batteries simultaneously through computer tablets and hand-held planchettes. This makes artillery targeting information available in real time, subject only to prioritization by higher headquarters.
Where American aid created an absolute advantage was through the recent supply of AGM-88 high-speed radiation missiles (HARMS), that were supplied to the Ukrainian air force. HARMS missiles are used for the suppression of enemy air-defenses (SEAD), especially radars. The Ukrainians were able to add special pods underneath the wings of their MIG-29 fighter jets to utilize these special missiles to effectively suppress Russian radar stations throughout the Balaklia-Kupiansk-Izyum triangle. This blinded the Russians to the Ukrainian tactical air assets flying in support of advancing ground units. More importantly, the Russians were prevented from following the flight paths of Ukrainian drones, which were free to direct Ukrainian artillery with close to impunity.
Moreover, American and Western supplied high mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS) batteries, with their 80 kilometers range, were able to destroy supply depots, command centers, anti-air defense systems and bridges over the Oskil River at Kupiansk, Senkove and Horokhovatka. This made it difficult for Russian armor to retreat directly to the east over the Oskil River, forcing them to either run north for the Russian border or south into the bottleneck at Izyum.
f. Quality and Proper Mix of Forces for Exploitation
Finally, the Ukrainians were able to concentrate forces of sufficient quantity and quality to bring the offensive to a successful conclusion. One of the astounding aspects of the Balaklia breakthrough is that it was accomplished by a relatively small force of established regular brigades of the Ukrainian army, without the necessity of raising new formations or weakening other fronts by drawing experienced troops away to Balaklia. Most of the attacking formations consisted of airborne/air-assault, reconnaissance and special forces that had not been heavily engaged in previous battles, or which had time to regroup after being withdrawn from the front. It is also significant that some of the better Ukrainian mechanized and air-assault brigades were not involved in this operation, making them available for another offensive in 2022.
The actual breakthrough, exploitation and pursuit were executed by two BTGs of the 25th airborne brigade, the reinforced 3d BTG of the 80th air-assault brigade, two BTGs of the 28th mechanized brigade, two to three batteries of self-propelled artillery from the airborne/air-assault forces and the 26th and 44th artillery brigades, several tank companies from the 3d and 4th reserve tank brigades and a smattering of special forces (SOF), that included companies from the 3d and 8th special forces brigades of the army, the Dyke Pole SOF of the Ukrainian General Staff, the KRAKEN battalion and 10th special forces detachment of the military intelligence branch (HUR), the Alpha special forces unit of the counter-intelligence service (SBU), and companies from the SOF of the 1st special purpose and 3d national guard brigades. This force amounted to no more than 5,000 troops, 100 tanks, 300 armored fighting vehicles and personnel carriers, 36 self-propelled artillery systems and hundreds of fast all-terrain vehicles, like the American up-armored humvee and even commercially manufactured SUVs. The latter were armed with only heavy machine guns and were used primarily to transport special forces, that were used to race ahead as fast as they could, to sow confusion in the Russian rear. Thus, the makeup of the force was designed for speed and exploitation, with the knowledge that Russian reserves were few and far in between. The enemy armor was to be tackled by man portable anti-tank guided missiles and drone spotted artillery. The elite status of the attacking Ukrainian formations insured that the battalion and company commanders of the attacking columns were all experienced professionals with the confidence to exercise initiative, maintain lateral communications with their neighbors and to adjust on the fly. As the offensive developed, other Ukrainian units joined the operation in securing lines of communication, like the 103d and 113th territorial defense brigades, and the 14th mechanized brigade, which spearheaded the advance north of Kharkiv towards the Russian border.
The above-listed attacking force was formally attached to the Khortytsia strategic-operational group of forces, the headquarters of which is based in Dnipro, under the command of colonel-general Oleksander Syrskyi. However, the field commander of the actual force that executed the counter-offensive has yet to be revealed. The same goes for the commanders of the underlying brigades that pulled off the operation. The details of the actual operational-tactical decision-making process during the offensive by what were probably mobile brigade staffs in armored command vehicles will be eagerly studied by militaries everywhere.
The Breakthrough from Balaklia to Kupiansk
The initial attack began on September 5 south of Balaklia when the Dyke Pole SOF detachment and a platoon of tanks attacked in a northerly direction from the town of Husarivka and captured the fortified position “Moskva” at Bairak and Nova Husarivka, villages on the southern bank of the Northern Donetsk River. Despite suffering heavy casualties, the Ukrainian SOF picked up where they left off the following morning and crossed the river to attack the strongpoint called “Peter”, just south of Balaklia. The attacks of September 5-6 were intended to divert Russian tactical reserves away from the town of Verbivka, northwest of Balaklia, where the main breakthrough was made on September 6 by the 25th airborne and 92nd mechanized brigades, supported by attached tanks from the 3d tank brigade. As it turned out, initial opposition to the Ukrainian battalions consisted of the previously mentioned DNR and LNR formations, which melted away. As soon as the breakthrough was achieved, mobile special forces and a battalion from the 80th air-assault brigade streamed through the gap into the Russian rear in an easterly direction. The mopping up of isolated Russian forces in Balaklia was left to the Dyke Pole SOF and the KRAKEN battalion, which was completed by September 8. Concurrently, a second column further north consisting of the 103d and 113th territorial defense brigades also kicked off their attack on September 5 from the city of Chuhuiv heading east along the M03 road towards Shevchenkove.
After scattering the SOBR police special forces units of the Rosgvardia at Volokhiv Yar on September 7, the airborne and mechanized companies of the 25th and 92nd brigades brushed aside Russian forces at Semenivka and approached the key road junction at Shevchenkove. There they combined forces with battalions of the 113th brigade of the Ukrainian territorial defense advancing east from Chuhuiv and seized Shevchenkove against light resistance. Meanwhile, the 103d brigade of the territorial defense advanced in trace of the 113d brigade, to secure lines of communication from Chuhuiv. East of Shevchenkove companies from the 25th airborne and 92nd mechanized brigades proceeded to destroy the 288th Russian artillery regiment and routed elements of the 18th Russian motorized rifle division, based in the Kaliningrad enclave, which fled north and east. Proceeding east from Shevchenkove towards Kupiansk, the attacking force pushed back companies of the Russian 11th tank regiment, which arrived piecemeal along the M03 road in a counterattack that was tepid at best. Further south, companies of the 80th air-assault brigade and a company of the 4th reserve tank brigade made quick work of armored elements of the Russian 26th tank regiment at Slabunovka, before pressing onward to the Oskil River at Senkove, south of Kupiansk, which was reached on September 8. On their right wing, the KRAKEN battalion and the 1st special purpose brigade of the national guard captured Savyntsi and continued east towards the road junction in the vicinity of Vesele and Kunye. In turn, the 92nd mechanized brigade captured the western half of Kupiansk on September 10, preceded by the ubiquitous units of the SOF, which reached the outskirts of the city during the night of September 9. Due to the blown bridge over the Oskil River, the eastern portion of the city on the opposite bank remained in Russian hands. Regardless, Russian supply lines south to Izyum and east to Svatove were effectively interdicted and the operational objective of the initial breakthrough was achieved. Upon securing the western half of Kupiansk, the attacking force began consolidating its defenses along the Oskil River, both north and south. Moreover, artillery and ammunition began catching up to the attacking columns as lines of communication were secured. The Kraken battalion arrived to cross the Oskil Reiver into eastern Kupiansk by September 13.
Russian Response and Ukrainian Adjustments
Caught by surprise by the Ukrainian deception effort and the lightning-quick breakthrough, the Russian response was slow at first. The meager Russian reserves in the sector, mostly detachments of the 11th and 26th Russian tank and 488th motorized regiments, counterattacked piecemeal before they could concentrate. Consequently, they were spread out without coordinated artillery support as they rushed west to threatened areas along the east-west M03 road from Shevchenkove to Kupiansk and the P07 road from Volokhiv Yar to Izyum. Because of the suppression of Russian radar systems by the Ukrainian air force, Russian air support was sparse and uncoordinated. This led to meeting engagements between small unsupported platoon-sized Russian detachments and larger Ukrainian formations, which invariably outflanked the defenders and continued their attack east, leaving their destruction to follow-on forces. The Russian defense effort quickly transitioned into a rout, with many Russians abandoning their armor and artillery, to flee in stolen civilian vehicles, bicycles and on foot. The Ukrainians began to round up an increasing flow of prisoners, although most of the Russian defenders ran before Ukrainian forces could engage them with small arms.
When Ukrainian patrols reached the western outskirts of Kupiansk during the evening hours of September 9, the Russian General Staff reacted decisively. Realizing that the capture of the strategic railhead threatened the forces south of Izyum with envelopment and capture, the Russian command gave orders for these troops to abandon the Izyum pocket and to retreat across the Northern Donets River to the east. In fact, orders were given for all Russian forces north of Kharkiv to retreat over the Russian-Ukrainian border into Russia. While the order came too late to save the Russian forces between Balaklia and Kupiansk, it gave the forces south of Izyum time to begin a withdrawal. It was thought better to save these troops to fight another day, instead of letting them die defending in place, even if such a decision resulted in the loss of the strategically important town of Izyum. After all, the Russian manpower shortage in Ukraine left no margin for error when preserving combat power.
The Russian battle group south of Izyum was no ordinary troop formation. Rather, it consisted of 10,000 troops of the 1st tank army, which contained two of the most famous mechanized divisions of the Russian army, renown for marching in parades on Red Square - the 2nd Tamanskaya motorized and 4th Kantemirovskaya tank divisions. These had already been roughly handled by the Ukrainians near Kharkiv and Sumy in March. They were then reformed and sent back to Izyum to attack towards Sloviansk and Barvinkove during April-August, with little to show for their efforts except casualties and equipment losses. Thus, by early September they were shells of their former selves, albeit still dangerous.
Meanwhile, upon reaching Kupiansk, the Ukrainians made their first operational adjustment. The Ukrainian command expected that the large concentration of Russian forces from the 1st Tank Army would assume defensive positions north of Izyum. Given the relatively small force assembled by the Ukrainians for the counter-offensive, the Ukrainian command was wary of incurring heavy casualties and decided to continue attacking on an axis where Russian defenses were lightly manned. Therefore, orders were given to attack in a northerly direction towards the Russian border, to win back as much territory of Kharkiv oblast as possible. Sub-units of the 92nd mechanized brigade and special forces fanned out to the north of Kupiansk and took control of Velykyi Burluk, where they met light resistance. As the attack developed in the corridor between the Northern Donets and the Oskil rivers, the attacking columns were joined by a mechanized battalion of the 14th mechanized brigade, which advanced along the east bank of the Northern Donets River to the strategic railroad station at Vovchansk. Ukrainian forces north of Kharkiv were ordered to advance towards the Russian-Ukrainian border, which was secured by September 12. On September 13 the Russian strong point at Kozacha Lopan northwest of Kharkiv was abandoned to Ukrainian forces. 93% of Kharkiv oblast returned to Ukrainian control.
Meanwhile, American satellite intelligence and Ukrainian drone and tactical reconnaissance began reporting that instead of preparing to defend in place, Russian forces were escaping from the Izyum pocket and fleeing to the southeast via the bridges at the town of Oskil and pontoon bridges further south at Studenok. The Ukrainian command pivoted for the second time in two days and ordered airborne forces to seize Izyum. On September 10 one battalion each from the 25th airborne and 80th air-assault brigades, reinforced by tanks, began moving into the outskirts of Izyum via roads from the northwest and the northeast. Any remaining Russian forces were ruthlessly destroyed. In fact, what the Ukrainian battalions encountered mostly were large quantities of abandoned or damaged Russian heavy equipment, particularly self-propelled artillery. The 236th, 275th and 9th guards artillery regiments left most of their artillery pieces behind, before fleeing Izyum. Furthermore, scores of damaged Russian tanks that were being repaired in workshops in Izyum also fell into Ukrainian hands.
By September 11 the remnants of the 1st tank army escaped over the pontoon bridges on the Northern Donets at Studenok and retreated to the northeast towards the railroad junction at Svatove. These included depleted cadres of the 1st tank and 1st motorized regiments of the 2nd Tamanskaya division, the 12th and 13th tank and 423d motorized regiments of the 4th Kantemirovskaya division and the 252nd and 752nd motorized and 237th tank regiments of the 90th motorized division. Although Ukrainian forces positioned directly across from the 1st Tank Army south of Izyum advanced in trace of the retreating Russians, they were unable to prevent them from crossing the river. These included battalions from the Ukrainian 30th and 93d mechanized and the 81st and 95th air-assault brigades. The simple fact is that the suddenness and scope of the Russian retreat did not give the Ukrainians enough time to organize an attack to keep the 1st tank army pinned in place. Even so, the retreat evolved into a rout at times, which resulted in the abandonment of much armor and artillery.
Despite the speed of Ukraine’s counteroffensive, the remnants of the 1st tank army escaped the Izyum pocket. Even so, the failure to trap the 1st tank army against the Northern Donetsk does not detract from the operational achievements of the Ukrainian counter-offensive. The operation not only seized the vital logistics center at Kupiansk but, against expectations, captured the strategically important town of Izyum - without serious opposition from the Russians. Furthermore, it cleared Russian troops from 3,000 square kilometers of Kharkiv oblast, pushed Russian forces beyond the pre-war Ukrainian-Russian border and captured huge quantities of heavy weapons, ammunition, and high-tech equipment.
Although exact figures for casualties on both sides are still unavailable, early indications are that the successful operation was concluded at relatively small cost to Ukraine. Due to the surprise achieved during the breakthrough and subsequent rout, Ukrainian losses in killed and wounded amongst the attacking formations were probably around 500. Available information indicates that between September 6-11 the Ukrainian attacking force also lost 27 tanks, 31 infantry and armored fighting vehicles, two artillery pieces, five attack jets and one attack helicopter.
Russian casualties were heavier, although, not catastrophic. The situation reports of the Ukrainian General Staff for the period September 6-11 claim that Russian losses in killed and wounded reached 2,850, although, the number of prisoners was probably less than 1,000. However, the number of deserters and temporarily missing was in the thousands. There is more detailed information available about Russian equipment losses. Forbes magazine claims that between September 6-11, the Ukrainians destroyed over 90 Russian tanks.[4] So far, confirmed Russian tank losses during the counter-offensive amount to 60 destroyed, of which 30 were the more modern T-72B3s and T-80BVMs. The reputable site Oryx, which tabulates photo-documented armor losses in the Russo-Ukrainian War, claims that the Ukrainians also captured 97 damaged or abandoned tanks - more than enough to outfit an entire new tank brigade.[5] Some of these were discovered in repair shops in Izyum or abandoned south of Izyum during the hasty retreat by the 1st tank army. Reportedly, the Ukrainians also captured 75 BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles, 25 BMP-1 and BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, 106 towed artillery pieces, 36 self-propelled 155 mm artillery pieces, and 12 MLRS launchers.[6] British defense intelligence reports that the Ukrainians downed four Russian attack jets during the counter-offensive.[7] The number of captured tanks, armored vehicles and artillery pieces changes daily, more than fourteen days after the capture of Izyum, as more Russian equipment is added to the tally. A traditional Ukrainian quote in situation reports from the war of independence in 1917-1921 states that “trofeyi pidchysliayutsia.” Roughly translated it means “trophies are still being counted.” Such a phrase is apropos to the Ukrainian victory on September 11.
I attach a topographical map of the area of operations as of September 11. The unit symbols are in the NATO style, with Ukrainian forces depicted as rectangles in yellow with blue outlines and the Russian units as red diamonds with black outlines. Russian units that sustained damage or were disordered have khaki diagonal hatch marks passing through them. Totally destroyed units are outlined in khaki. The final location of the Ukrainian units involved in the counteroffensive and its consequences is based on the latest available information. The trail of depleted BTGs of the 1st Tank Army retreating northeast over the Northern Donets is visible in the bottom right. Invariably, later information that emerges will necessitate changes to the map.
I hope to comment on the strategic and political consequences of the Ukrainian counter-offensive at a later date. Perhaps its aftershocks will influence Russian domestic politics and result in a withdrawal from Ukraine, like the Tet Offensive did in the United States during the Vietnam War. But that is more wishful thinking than a realistic expectation. Likely, this war will continue well into 2023. Putin’s mobilization order will stave off a military collapse in the short term by shoring up Russian defenses in Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. But it is unlikely that the Russian army will be able to rearm sufficiently or implement the necessary reforms to resume major offensive operations by the Spring or even Summer of 2023. Regardless of the operational brilliance of the counter-offensive of September 6-11, Ukraine will have to force a decision in the south, preferably near Melitopil, if it is to win this war outright. Otherwise, it may be forced to make painful territorial concessions in a negotiated peace settlement. It is doubtful that the Ukrainians will be able to mount such an attack this year, because of strong Russian reinforcements in the Polohy sector and the approaching muddy season. But the Ukrainians have proved capable of springing a surprise at Balaklia. Perhaps Zaluzhny and Company have one more trick up their sleeve.
[1] A coalition commanded by Ukrainian Cossack Hetman Ivan Vyhovskyi defeated a Russian army commanded by princes Grigory Romodanovsky, Aleksey Trubetskoy, and Semyon Pozharsky near Konotop on the Sosnivka River during the Russo-Polish War of 1654-1667.
[2] O’Brien, Phillips Payson. Ukraine Pulled off a Masterstroke. The Atlantic, 09/12/2022.
[3] Simon Shuster and Vera Bergengruen, Inside the Ukrainian Counterstroke that Turned the Tide of the War. Time, 09/26/2022.
[4] Axe, David. A Hundred Wrecked Tanks in a Hundred Hours; Ukraine Guts Russia’s Best Tank Army. Forbes, 09/13/2022.
[5] Oryxpienkop.com
[6] Barash, Yuriy. Porazka v Ukraiini 1-oi tankovoii armii Rociii.; yak take mohlo statysia. Defense Express, 09/19/2022.
[7] http://ow.ly/cbMC50KMzPt