ZALUZHNY’S LAMENT.
a. How to Return the Fog of War and Reintroduce Coup D’oeil [1] Onto the Battlefield?
On November 1 Ukrainian commanding general Valery Zaluzhny turned again to his favorite sounding board, the news publication the Economist, to post a warning regarding the current trajectory of the war in Ukraine. [2] Ominously, he pronounced that the latest advances in drones, sensors, electronic warfare, and landmines have severely hampered the ability of modern land armies to maneuver, especially the Ukrainian army, which is trying to advance without air support against an entrenched adversary. The new technology robs both sides of the opportunity to exploit the element of surprise, since any attempt to concentrate an attacking force behind the front lines is quickly detected and subjected to precision fires.
Zaluzhny’s rereading of a long-forgotten treatise from 1941 by Soviet general Pavel S. Smirnoff regarding the breaching of prepared defenses in World War I, helped him reach this conclusion. [3] Smirnoff posits that the proximity of opposing armies locked in technologically imposed trench warfare robs both adversaries of the opportunity to exploit a tactical breakthrough because of the inability to surprise the adversary at the operational level.
Thus, Zaluzhny prognosticates that “[t]here will most likely be no deep and beautiful breakthrough” that leads to sweeping maneuver at operational depth into the Russian rear. He concludes that only the application of new technologies in original combinations, some of which are only in the early stage of development, can break the tactical gridlock and reintroduce maneuver into the war. “We need the gunpowder that the Chinese invented” he says. Specifically, he lists (1) air superiority, (2) much-improved electronic warfare, (3) counter-battery capabilities, (4) new mine-breaching technology, and (5) the ability to mobilize and train reserves outside of Ukraine’s borders as the necessary ingredients to shift the war back in Ukraine’s favor.
Primarily, Zaluzhny pins his hopes on drone technology as an alternate form of air support to unlock the tactical riddle facing the attacker on the modern battlefield. He is of the opinion that the introduction of F-16 fighter jets won’t turn the tide in Ukraine’s favor because of the increasing range of Russian S-400 anti-air missile systems. However, the general alludes to a combination of manned aircraft that control tethered swarms of attack drones together with decoy drones to overwhelm opposing air defenses as one of the potential combinations that can solve the current conundrum.
Moreover, Zaluzhny concedes that improved electronic warfare is the key to defeating enemy drones, especially the first-person view (FPV) kamikaze variety, which have recently started to influence the ground war. Also, electronic measures can be used to deflect Russian 500 kg FAB glide bombs that have become a serious threat during the recent months of the war. Technological advances are also required to increase the ability to locate and target enemy artillery, mostly through the increase of ground radar units that triangulate the location of artillery fire. Regarding new mine-clearing technology, the Ukrainian commander suggests radar sensors to locate minefields and using water cannons or the thrust from the exhausts of old jet turbines to detonate mines, together with smoke screens to protect sappers and demining equipment from enemy observation while they go about their dangerous business.
Russian Electronic Warfare Vehicle
In effect, Zaluzhny pines for the “good old days” when opposing armies were unable to “see what was on the other side of the hill” and therefore, remained blind to each other’s intentions. Thus, they had to rely on rudimentary intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to get, at best, a partial picture of the tactical situation. In such a happy “natural state”, only the truly gifted, the “Great Captains”, through their exercise of the intuitive ingredient of coup d’oeil, could cut through the fog-of-war and make the incisive decisions to unleash sweeping maneuver into the adversary’s rear. [4] In theory, effective electronic warfare, which blinds the enemy by disabling drones, may be able to accomplish Zaluzhny’s hopes, if only temporarily. Clearly, neither side in the Russo-Ukrainian war has yet to reach such a state of technological development.
Whether Zaluzhny’s latest article in the Economist was sanctioned by Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky or whether Zaluzhny is going rogue, trying to push back on Zelensky’s unrealistic expectations for Ukraine’s counteroffensive, is a topic beyond the scope of this article and this author’s expertise. Suffice to say, Zaluzhny is (1) dispelling any delusions about a short conflict and reminding the Ukrainian people that this will be a long war, (2) reassuring the Ukrainian army that he is seeking to limit unnecessary loss of life, and (3) making a plea for advanced Western weaponry while reassuring Western partners that this war can still be won. Regardless, Zaluzhny’s essay will be exploited by those voices that are calling for an immediate ceasefire. In time, a negotiated peace short of total victory may also be Zaluzhny’s objective. But for now, the general is trying to maintain credibility with his people as he calls for more sacrifice, while concurrently offering a blueprint forward.
b. Technology versus Organizational Concept.
By focusing on new technology, Zaluzhny is giving up on conceptual organizational solutions, like traditional combined arms, as a way forward in this war. This is contrary to the view of many Western military analysts, who believe that the Ukrainians were simply not flexible and adroit enough in synchronizing their attacks to breach Russian defenses. Specifically, the criticism was that the Ukrainians were not sophisticated enough to apply NATO-prescribed combined arms at battalion level and above. [5] In his article, Zaluzhny retorts that he pushed the counter-offensive forward for as long as possible, replacing brigade commanders who appeared too soft and rotating units that began to falter. Nonetheless, the ability of Russian drones and precision fires to inflict casualties on the attacking Ukrainian mechanized columns made combined arms tactics ineffective. He also pointed out that the tactical nature of the combat along the Tokmak axis changed dramatically during the four months from June to November. For instance, FPV “kamikaze” drones began inflicting even more losses on armor, artillery, and personnel during this period, to the point where they became one of the primary threats on the battlefield. This made the use of armor at the front impossible during daylight hours and forced even greater dispersion among the small infantry units during infiltration attacks along enemy tree lines. Analysts Michael Koffman, Lee Evans, Franz-Stefan Gady, and Konrad Muzyka, who just returned from a field trip to Ukraine, confirm Zaluzhny’s observations about the increased need to disperse attacking formations. Moreover, during a podcast on November 20, Michael Koffman and Lee Evans agreed that since their last field visit in July 2023 the Ukrainians improved their capability to synchronize infantry attacks in real-time with mortar and artillery support, as well as observation and attack drones, through the use of satellite communications that tie together subordinate units via apps like Kropyva, that can be downloaded onto smartphones and computer tablets. [6] [7] However, these tactics occurred at no higher than platoon level, since the increased lethality of Russian precision fires forced the Ukrainians to disperse their forces to a greater level than before.
Ukrainian Kropyva Artillery Targeting and Command-and-Control App
Zaluzhny’s conclusions revive an old debate regarding whether high-tech weaponry or organizational concept is the key to breaking a tactical impasse. These trace their genesis to the diametrically opposed responses to the positional stalemate of World War One – the Allied tank versus the German stormtrooper. The tank was a technological solution; the stormtrooper an organizational concept.
German Storm Troopers in 1918
Zaluzhny reminds his reader that neither the tank nor storm troop tactics were entirely effective during the Great War and that it took until World War II when both approaches were fused with airpower and wireless radio to create true combined arms, the Blitzkrieg. Similarly, Zaluzhny warns that current technological trends and countermeasures in yet unforeseen combinations may need time to catch up with the current limitations on command-and-control in the face of the increasing speed of opposing “kill chains”, which observe and target each other in real-time.
“Just like in the first world war we have reached the level [of] technology that puts us into a stalemate,” writes Zaluzhny. This is an unpleasant development for a strategic commander locked in a conflict against a more numerous and asset-rich opponent. He knows that the prospects for Ukraine in a long-drawn-out war are not good. Given Russia’s greater manpower potential and much larger war-manufacturing capacity, Ukraine is at a disadvantage. It is dependent on Western weapons and munitions to prolong the struggle. With the recent political impasse in the U.S. Congress regarding voting on further aid and growing opposition to continued support for Ukraine among conservative Republican representatives and their constituents, it is difficult to gauge the extent of future American support. While it is in the interest of NATO members to bridge the gap, while America sorts out its politics, European unity in the face of Russian aggression is always fraught with uncertainty. Thus, in the face of the above headwinds, Zaluzhny must place his hope in technology.
c. Manpower
Ukraine’s deficits in state-of-the-art technology mask a much more fundamental problem – manpower. Zaluzhny alludes to this issue in his fifth suggestion regarding how to solve today’s tactical impasse. He calls for tightening current loopholes in Ukrainian law, which enable the well-connected to avoid or defer military service. Furthermore, he emphasizes that new waves of recruits must be trained on foreign territory, since otherwise, the Russians are capable of targeting training bases with long-range rocketry.
Despite suffering up to 72,000 dead and 120,000 seriously wounded in this war [8], Zaluzhny states that Ukrainian manpower levels appear sufficient for now. Open sources support the position that Ukraine has far more than the 420,000 soldiers that Russia has in Ukraine at present. [9] According to the 2023 annual report by the Military Balance, the Ukrainians currently have 250,000 in the ground forces of the regular army, 350,000 in the local reserve brigades (Territorial Defense), 90,000 in the National Guard, and 50,000 in the Border Patrol, almost 750,000 ground forces in total, not counting the air force, navy, intelligence services, and strategic rocket forces. [10] In fact, there are preliminary reports that five new units, the 150th through the 154th Mechanized Brigades, consisting of a further 15,000 servicemembers, are already in the process of formation. Although, these are being outfitted with U.S. Humvee vehicles only, since there are not enough infantry fighting vehicles or armored personnel carriers to go around. [11]
However, numbers can be deceiving. The offensive combat power of a mechanized brigade depends on the esprit de corps of its mechanized infantry battalions, each of which is supposed to have about 500 men. However, most brigades outfit only two of their three mechanized battalions with the armor and heavy equipment necessary to conduct offensive operations. Moreover, most Ukrainian mechanized battalions can muster no more than one assault company, the shturmova rota, made up of the younger and more aggressive fighters, who are willing and physically capable of assaulting entrenched positions. These assault companies typically number no more than 100 men. The loss of even 50 of these soldiers can make the remainder of the battalion incapable of offensive operations. Thus, despite still mustering over 400 infantrymen, the battalion may be fit for defensive purposes only, like holding trench lines that the assault company just captured. Of course, the elite airborne and air-assault brigades, as well as special assault units, like the 3d, 5th, 47th, and 92nd Assault Brigades, are capable of mustering first-rate fighters in all the companies of their battalions. Nonetheless, the intensity of this conflict will eventually tap out Ukraine’s pool of military-aged recruits, requiring the forced mobilization of older men, who do not have the stamina and agility for offensive infantry combat. Even now, the current average age of Ukraine’s soldiers is over 40 years old. [12]
Zaluzhny expresses amazement at Russia’s ability to absorb casualties. He concedes that despite suffering over 300,000 casualties in 20 months of combat, of which at least 150,000 have died, the Russians keep feeding replacements into the line on all fronts. Russian killed-to-wounded ratios are barely two-to-one, namely, one killed for every two wounded, since battlefield first aid and medical evacuation are not a priority. (Ukrainian killed-to-wounded ratios are closer to four-to-one). However, the dead-to-wounded ratio is trending down for both sides, since ambulances and armored vehicles are increasingly targeted by first-person view (FPV) kamikaze drones. Thus, more wounded must be evacuated by stretcher over longer distances, increasing the death rate, as these bleed to death before reaching aid stations. In Zaluzhny’s opinion, any other army would have given up after such a large loss of life. In that vein, he openly questions his conclusion in 2022 that the way to end the war was to kill as many Russians as possible to sway public opinion against Vladimir Putin’s war. [13] It seems that the Russian cultural trait to fatalistically embrace death for the Motherland exceeded his expectations. Regardless, the Ukrainians have no choice but to continue destroying Russian manpower. Putin’s fear of ordering another general mobilization remains Russia’s most immediate vulnerability. 20 months into the war, the conflict has left the more affluent ethnic Russian population of Moscow and St. Petersburg still untouched. If the Muscovites and Peterites are forced to feel the bite of war personally, they may no longer be so blasé about it and will likely vent their anger at the regime.
FPV Kamikaze Drone Operator
Please recall that the Russians invaded in February 2022 with less than 200,000 men. This gave the Ukrainians an early manpower advantage, which they were able to exploit in defeating the initial attacks towards Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Mykolaiv, inflicting horrific losses on the Russian army. However, after the Russians suffered a debacle at Balaklia in Kharkiv oblast in September 2022, Putin reluctantly ordered a partial mobilization of 300,000 reservists to make up the losses, which turned out to be very unpopular. Thus, Putin is afraid to order another mobilization for political reasons, particularly before Russian presidential elections in March 2024. Nonetheless, Russian recruitment cash incentives and death bonuses have been able to entice over 200,000 additional volunteers into the ranks. Many of these have prior military experience. It is a reality of life that the fiscal inducements exceed the average Russian annual salary. Thus, the discomforts of military service and likely demise in Ukraine have not dissuaded Russian working-class men from volunteering. This “silent mobilization” enabled the Russians to raise new regiments in 2023 that have been sent to reinforce hard-pressed brigades in all sectors, particularly near Robotyne and Bakhmut. Additionally, close to 15,000 men in the newly raised Z-detachments – consisting of prison convicts – have arrived at the front to mimic the former Wagner penal battalions that were so effective during the battle for Bakhmut at the beginning of 2023. (The Washington Post reports that since 2022 the Russian male prison population has decreased by 54,000) [14] Many of the new volunteers and prisoner conscripts have been thrown into a Russian offensive to encircle the fortified town of Avdiivka, west of the city of Donetsk, and to reinforce units along the east bank of the Dnieper River in Kherson oblast.
Burning Russian Armor at Avdiivka
Russian attacks throughout October along both flanks of the Avdiivka salient have been especially sanguine. Equipment losses exceed 400 vehicles and the constant frontal attacks have left over 5,000 Russian dead. [15] Moreover, desperate Russian counterattacks at Bakhmut and south of Robotyne have added to the butcher’s bill. Russian casualties notwithstanding, what is a troubling development for the Ukrainians is that the Russian reinforcements during the last three months have been better than expected. Although Ukrainian intelligence prognosticated in September that the Russians had 100,000 fresh troops ready to throw into the war, expectations were that these would be of low quality and likely committed to the Kupiansk and Lyman sectors in Luhansk oblast. But contrary to intelligence assessments, not only was there an uptick in attacks in the Kupiansk and Lyman sectors, but on October 5 the Russians launched a concerted double envelopment of Avdiivka in division strength (three brigades). It is true that the Russians were able to make only modest gains - at an inordinate price in lost men and materiel. Yet the tempo of attacks on Avdiivka continues with two further brigades being thrown into the struggle, regardless of Russian casualties.
Furthermore, between September and October, the Russian General Staff sent the newly raised 1152nd, 1429th, 1430th, and 1441st Motorized Regiments, together with the reconstituted 136th Mechanized Brigade, to the Tokmak axis, in time to reinforce the hard-pressed airborne regiments of the Russian 7th and 76th divisions of the vozdushno dessantniye voiska (VDV), which were being degraded by Ukrainian artillery during fruitless counterattacks onto the flanks of the Ukrainian penetration between the villages of Robotyne and Verbove. This dashed Ukrainian expectations of rendering the elite Russian airborne forces combat ineffective. Please recall, that the Ukrainians had previously substantially degraded the 42nd Motorized Division, which was originally positioned to defend the Tokmak axis. The airborne divisions were sent to relieve it. Although, not of particularly high quality, the new Russian motorized infantry regiments received sufficient training and proved resilient enough to stymie further Ukrainian attacks, when combined with the degraded regular airborne formations. This prevented the Ukrainians from continuing the momentum towards Tokmak, especially after they had to relocate certain units, such as the 47th Mechanized Brigade, to the hard-pressed sector at Avdiivka.
Thus, the entire 1,200-kilometer line-of-contact in the Russo-Ukrainian war is now engaged in an attritional contest where neither side commands a decisive numerical or qualitative advantage. In any case, the Russians benefit from a stalemate, since their strategic objective is to prolong the conflict well into 2024, when they hope Western fatigue ends support for Ukraine, especially if Donald Trump recaptures the White House. Trump’s open worship of Putin and disdain for Ukraine played out on TV during his administration for all to see.
Although Zaluzhny believes that the Ukrainian summer offensive has culminated, he claims that it is not over. He states that “Ukraine has no choice but to keep the initiative by remaining on the offensive even if it only moves a few meters a day.” In pursuit of maintaining the initiative, the Ukrainians continue to (1) make platoon-sized attacks along both flanks of the Robotyne penetration in an attempt to seize high ground that will better enable them to maintain their gains during the Winter, (2) push south of Bakhmut to pin Russian forces along this politically sensitive objective, and (3) sustain several amphibious lodgments along the east bank of the Dnieper River, which ostensibly threaten the approaches to the isthmuses to Crimea. (Map1) Although it is unlikely that the Ukrainian marine brigades will be able to push further than the protective umbrella of Ukrainian artillery firing from the west bank of the river, perhaps 20 kilometers, the lodgment forces Russians to pull reserves from elsewhere to keep this local Ukrainian offensive in check. The amphibious landings on the east bank of the Dnieper River are promising, not as a platform for a Ukrainian push towards the isthmuses of Crimea, but as a distraction to pull the two Russian VDV divisions away from Robotyne. This would weaken Russian defenses south of Robotyne and give Ukrainian forces an opportunity to increase the pressure toward Tokmak.
Map 1
Presently, the most pressing inquiry is whether the Russians have more troops in reserve that are being husbanded for another offensive this coming Winter or next Spring. For now, Russian manpower appears to be fully stretched along all sectors of the front, without anything extra waiting in the wings. However, one never knows whether Russia’s “silent mobilization” has managed to raise and train another sizeable force. The Ukrainian strategy of attrition intends to degrade current Russian manpower to the point where Russian lines can be breached at a vulnerable point, assuming the flow of weapons and supplies from the West resumes in sufficient quantity and F-16 fighter jets arrive in Ukraine. The Ukrainians are currently training more brigades to send to the front. These can replace tried-and-tested older brigades, which can rotate to the rear for rest and refurbishment, presumably in time for a future offensive.
d. Did the Ukrainian General Staff Believe in its Counteroffensive?
Which raises the question, did Zaluzhny and his staff truly expect their Summer counteroffensive to succeed? After all, expectations for a successful Ukrainian breakthrough by Western backers as well as the Zelensky administration gave the Ukrainian high command little choice but to launch an attack. Nonetheless, did Zaluzhny and Co. adopt the long view, focusing on maintaining an ostensible attack to induce the Russians into counterattacks that would lead to favorable casualty exchange rates in an attritional war? Such an approach would degrade Russian manpower levels to such a degree as to make large-scale offensives no longer possible, without another mobilization by Putin.
In early 2023 the Ukrainian high command was wary of exhausting scant resources and precious manpower in an all-out attack on the Surovikin Line, thereby exposing its armed forces to a devastating riposte by the Russians later in the year. In his first interview with the Economist on December 15, 2022, Zaluzhny stated that Ukraine required advanced fighter jets, 300 new Western tanks, 600-700 infantry fighting vehicles, 500 artillery pieces, as well as 30,000 fresh troops arrayed into ten new brigades to make a proper attack. [16] The West, in fact, supplied weapons for the offensive, but in far smaller numbers than on Zaluzhny’s shopping list. For instance, no fighter jets were provided to Ukraine. Even after the Western equipment began reaching the new brigades at their European training bases, Zaluzhny issued veiled warnings that the quantity of equipment fell far short of necessary requirements. For instance, the available demining equipment was deemed inadequate, outdated, and in too small a quantity. [17] Therefore, it is unlikely that the Ukrainian military high command believed that its brigades could push through Russian minefields all the way to Melitopil, a distance of 84 kilometers, as many commentators were suggesting.
I believe that the decision to use newly raised, inexperienced brigades on the main axis of advance in southern Ukraine, while keeping older, experienced brigades focused on the strategic defensive elsewhere, suggests that the Ukrainian general staff hedged its bets and focused on attritional war as a function of operational art, intending to attrit the Russians in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, while hoping that the new brigades and their Western equipment break through in Zaporizhzhia oblast, at least as far as Tokmak. This way, the new brigades, and particularly their staffs, would be able to gain valuable battlefield experience, while the old brigades contained Russian pressure at Kupiansk and Lyman, with some combat power left over for a local offensive at Bakhmut. So long as the new brigades remained combat-effective after the Ukrainian counteroffensive culminated, the entire exercise was a win-win for the Ukrainians in the context of a long-term strategy of attrition. Therefore, the emphasis was on keeping Ukrainian casualties manageable while forcing the Russians to expend their manpower in ill-advised counterattacks.
Furthermore, the Ukrainian decision to abandon costly company-sized mechanized attacks on the Tokmak and Novomlynivka axes, after initial setbacks near Orikhiv, Nova Tokmatchka, and Novodanylivka in June, only to revert to small unit infantry infiltration tactics, is another indicator that the Ukrainian high command was taking the long view by keeping casualties down and maintaining favorable casualty exchange rates vis-à-vis the Russians. The infiltration attacks accomplished the following:
1. Reduced the destruction of armored vehicles, which were no longer necessary, unless an assault had to be made over open terrain, in which case the attack was made in small batches of no more than three personnel carriers and one to two tanks;
2. Diminished casualties to personnel, not only the crews of the armored vehicles that no longer had to attack, but also the dismounted infantry, which now assaulted in smaller numbers (squads of no more than 15 men) while concealed in tree lines. Please note that at the beginning of the counteroffensive Ukrainians “were dying by the dozens every day.” [18];
3. Attacked objectives over shorter distances, a few hundred meters at a time, which limited the time when troops were exposed to enemy fire and made command-and-control and synchronization of reserves, artillery, and drones easier;
4. Enticed Russians into their doctrinally mandated counterattacks anytime the Ukrainians seized a trench line, which allowed Ukrainian artillery, mortars, and attack drones to degrade enemy personnel and materiel, maintaining a favorable casualty exchange rate. The New York Times estimated that at the beginning of September 2023 around 3,900 Ukrainians and 6,700 Russians were dying per month, on average. [19]
On the reverse side of the ledger, the infiltration tactics made a breakthrough of the Surovikin line unlikely, as Ukrainian tactics no longer aligned with stated operational objectives. [20] Although the infantry was able to seize trench lines, the attacks were too shallow and too slow to rupture the echeloned defenses before Russian reserves moved up to seal the breach and to prevent a penetration into operational depth. Regardless, the incremental advances pushed back Russian lines, which led to counterattacks. This facilitated the objectives of attritional war by affording Ukrainian artillery enemy targets out in the open. The intent was to have sufficient reserves available at the end of the counteroffensive to fend off a future Russian Winter offensive. This appears to have been accomplished, as the newly organized 33d, 47th, 116th, 117th, and 118th Mechanized Brigades, and the 82nd Air Assault Brigade have seen combat on the Tokmak axis. Of these, only the 47th and 118th were substantially degraded. Even so, both are back in action. For instance, the 47th Mechanized Brigade, despite heavy losses in assault infantry when taking Robotyne, has been reintroduced into the hard fighting at Avdiivka, where it has defeated numerous Russian attacks. Furthermore, the new 37th and 38th Marine Brigades earned their spurs in the fighting on the Novomlynivka axis. They are now situated on the west bank of the Dnieper, threatening to cross the river in an amphibious assault. Finally, the 21st and 32nd Mechanized Brigades, although ostensibly part of the 10th Corps that was to attack on the Tokmak axis, were introduced into the defensive battles near Kupiansk and Avdiivka. Thus, the goal of the Ukrainian general staff to husband enough combat power to contain future Russian offensives has been achieved, even if the Summer counteroffensive did not attain optimal goals.
e. Fallout from the Stalled Ukrainian Counteroffensive.
Granted, the Russian ability to contain the Ukrainian Summer counteroffensive short of Tokmak is a political victory for Putin, particularly domestically, where the images of the destroyed Western equipment have been painted as a defeat of NATO itself. After all, Russian TV avoids the notion that Russia has been losing to the Ukrainian “little brother” - a realization that even the Russian elite finds difficult to embrace viscerally. How can the Russians keep deluding themselves that they are superior to the Western Europeans and particularly, the Anglo-Americans, after they have suffered battlefield defeat to a former vassal, the inferior khakhly? [21]
Furthermore, the perception in the West that the Ukrainian counteroffensive has failed has weakened the willingness of Western European and U.S. voters to send further military aid to Ukraine. Although the political and military elites in the West still appear to be determined to keep Ukraine in the war, even if it means leaning on Germany, Eastern European NATO members, and South Korea to make up the difference in material aid until a political consensus can be reached in the United States. The fact is, most of the U.S. Senate and the majority of the U.S. Congress still support sending military aid to Ukraine, even if the voters in some of the key electoral swing states oppose doing so on isolationist grounds and loyalty to Donald Trump.
In retrospect, the Ukrainian high command had no choice but to launch the counteroffensive in June 2023 because of political pressure from Western allies and domestic expectations. Nonetheless, the military leadership was skeptical that the operation could achieve its strategic goals because of the depth of Russian defenses and insufficient weaponry. When the early mechanized attacks failed, the Ukrainians cut their losses and transitioned from a war of maneuver to one of attrition, relying on the Russian penchant to counterattack at every opportunity to engage them with artillery. This helped them to degrade the Russian 42nd Motorized Division and then the 7th and 76th airborne (VDV) Divisions, after these were sent to reinforce the Tokmak axis. Other Russian formations were also attritted near Novomlynivka, Bakhmut, and Kupiansk. This tactical approach resulted in a two-to-one casualty exchange rate in favor of the Ukrainians, even though they were on the attack. (Historically, the opposite occurs, as the attacker suffers the heavier casualties at a ratio of at least two-to-one). Now, that the counteroffensive has culminated, the Ukrainian army has gained ten additional combat-experienced brigades, on top of those that were in the line prior to the beginning of the operation. Ukraine is resigned to (1) fighting a defensive war of attrition into 2024, while (2) trying to maintain the initiative in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts, and (3) exploiting Russian logistical vulnerabilities in Crimea and the northwest quadrant of the Black Sea with long-range rockets and drones. The hope is that Western aid resumes by next Spring to enable another offensive that degrades Russian manpower to such a degree that Putin is confronted with the choice of ordering another mobilization, with its political perils and uncertainty.
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[1] Coup D’oeil is a French term loosely translated as “at a glance” or “in a bat of an eye.” Carl von Clausewitz argues coup d'œil is an element of military genius - an “inward eye” that enables a commander to reach a “rapid and accurate decision” and quickly recognize “a truth that the mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study.” Carl von Clausewitz. On War. Book 1, Chapter 3.
[2] “Ukraine’s commander-in-chief on the breakthrough he needs to beat Russia.” November 1, 2023, The Economist.
[3] Pavel S. Smirnoff. Proryv Ukreplennoy Polosy. (Voenzdat NKO USSR: Moscow, 1941).
[4] Napoleon famously identified seven “great captains” whose campaigns he thought worthy of careful study: Alexander, Hannibal, Ceasar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene and Frederick; Basil H. Liddel Hart listed the Mongol Ghenghis Khan and his lieutenant Subatai, French Marshall De Saxe, the Swede Gustavus Adolphus, the Bohemian Albrecht Wallenstein, and British general James Wolfe of Montreal fame. Basil H. Liddell Hart. “Great Captains Unveiled.” (W. Blackwood & Sons: Edinburgh, 1927).
[5] James Jackson. “Ukraine counter-offensive too slow because they’re not doing it properly, Germans claim.” July 25, 2023, The Telegraph.
[6] Michael Kofman, Rob Lee, Franz-Stefan Gady, Konrad Muzyka. "Initial Impressions From a Visit to Ukraine’s Front Lines.” November 16, 2023, War on the Rocks. Russia Contingency.
https://waron therocks.com/episode/russiancontingency/29922/initial-impressions-from-a-visit-to-ukraines-front-lines/
[7] Michael Kofman and Ryan Evans. “Adaptation on the Front and the Big Picture in Ukraine.” War on the Rocks, November 21, 2023,
[8] Ukraine War Casualties Near Half a Million, U.S. Officials Say. August 18, 2023, NYT.
[9] Kateryna Tyshchenko. “Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence reveals number of Russian troops in Ukraine.” September 9, 2023. Ukrainska Pravda
[10] The Military Balance, 2023, p. 201-204.
[11] 150th Mechanized Brigade. MilitaryLand. https://militaryland.net/Ukraine//armed forces//150th-mechanized-brigade/
[12] Saradzyan, Simon. “Average Age of Ukrainian Soldiers is Past 40 and That Could Be a Problem.” November 3, 2023, Russia Matters.
[13] "An interview with General Valery Zaluzhny, head of Ukraine's armed forces." December 15, 2023, The Economist.
[14] Mary Ilyushina. “Russia prison population plummets as convicts are sent to war.” October 26, 2023. WP.
[16] "An interview with General Valery Zaluzhny, head of Ukraine's armed forces." December 15, 2023, The Economist.
[17] Tom Porter. “Mine-clearing equipment given to Ukraine by the West is ineffective, noisy, and easy to strike, commander says.” July 19, 2023, Business Insider.
[18] Quentin. “Dying by the dozens every day – Ukrainian losses climb.” August 29, 2023, BBC.
[19] David Axe. “So Many Lost Russian Vehicles Near Avdiivka That the Russians Are Now Attacking on Foot.” November 24, 2023. Forbes.
[20] Konrad Muzyka. "Initial Impressions From a Visit to Ukraine’s Front Lines.” November 16, 2023, War on the Rocks. Russia Contingency.
https://warontherocks.com/episode/russiancontingency/29922/initial-impressions-from-a-visit-to-ukraines-front-lines/
[21] Pejorative Russian term for Ukrainians.