As we enter the last week of May 2022, the Russian army has redirected its main effort to surrounding Ukrainian forces in the Severdonetsk-Lysychansk salient, with particular focus on the southern pincer emanating from Popasna towards Bakhmut. (See attached map with red arrow pointing north from Popasna) The capture of Bakhmut would sever the last main supply route to Lysychansk and would complicate the retreat of Ukrainian forces out of the salient. As reported previously, Russian efforts to bridge the Northern Donets River at Bilhorivka, Serebrianka, Dronivka and Yampil to create a northern pincer to this operation have failed, at least for now. A contributing factor to the Russian failure on the Northern Donets has been the reinforcement of Ukrainian forces with fresh battalions from the 80th air-assault, 81st air-assault and 58th motorized brigades, together with attached artillery. (I attach a map of Ukraine with the last reported location of most of the battalions of the Ukrainian regular army and some of the better battalions of the National Guard and territorial defense. Most battalions of the National Guard, territorial defense and volunteer formations are not depicted due to space limitations)
The Severdonetsk-Lysychansk salient is a less ambitious objective in comparison to the previous Russian effort south of Izyum along the Barvinkove or Slovyansk-Kramatorsk axis of advance. (See red arrows pointing from Popasna and Lyman on the attached map, compared to territory that contains Slovyansk and Kramatorsk) The current downsized offensive seeks a political objective aimed to offer the Russian people an ostensible victory. There is no strategic value for Ukraine to hold onto what little they still control of Luhansk oblast, except for denying Vladimir Putin a public relations prize. Therefore, a retreat of Ukrainian forces out of the salient would amount to no more than a symbolic victory for the Russians. The fact is that the Severdonetsk-Lysychansk salient is occupied by no more than seven Ukrainian battalions; one each from the 24th mechanized brigade, the 58th motorized brigade, the 17th tank brigade, the 128th mountain brigade, two battalions of the 4th brigade of the National Guard and the 115th territorial defense brigade - at most 6,000 troops of all arms. This is a small number in comparison to close to 30,000 Ukrainian soldiers that could have been bagged, if the previous objective of Barvinkove had been captured and exploited. Moreover, Severdonetsk and Lysychansk do not have the symbolic value of the twin-cities of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, which have a greater resonance with Russian TV viewers, going back to the war in 2014. The fact is that it will be months before Russia mobilizes the forces necessary to reach and then take Slovyansk-Kramatorsk. In the meantime, we can anticipate a withdrawal of the Ukrainian forces from the Severdonetsk-Lysychansk salient west to a new defensive line along the Bakhmutivka River between Siversk and Bakhmut. This could be followed by a Ukrainian counteroffensive on a strategic axis, the viability of which we shall explore in this newsletter.
Still, after a two-week operational pause, Russian forces are poised to renew their push south from Izyum towards Slovyansk, however, as a supporting attack to the operation in the Severdonetsk-Lysychansk area, not as a main effort. We can tell by the less illustrious battalion tactical groups (BTGs) that are aligning themselves for renewed attacks. For instance, elements of the Russian elite 76th airborne division, that had been fighting south of Izyum less than ten days ago, have now appeared in the Severdonetsk-Lysychansk sector. We can also anticipate that some of the regiments of the illustrious 4th Kantemirovskaya tank division, which were recalled from the fighting near Izyum to Russia two weeks ago, will soon appear in the Severdonetsk-Lysychansk area. By some accounts, one BTG of the 4th Kantemirovskaya tank division and one BTG of the equally famous 2nd Tamanskaya are still south of Izyum. However, a full offensive from Izyum is unlikely. Too many Russian BTGs have had to be directed west and northwest to block Ukrainian threats to the supply line running from Russia to Izyum through Kupiansk.
The recent Ukrainian counteroffensive north of Kharkiv has petered out within ten kilometers of Vovchansk, a key transportation hub. (See blue arrows north of Kharkiv, particularly the one pointed at Vovchansk) Nonetheless, Ukrainian artillery is well within range to disrupt supplies that are transported through Vovchansk. The Ukrainians attacked north of Kharkiv with only six battalions abreast and have encountered Russian reinforcements once they neared the towns of Vovchansk, Ternove and Kozacha Lopan near the Russian border. While these battalions have been able to push the Russians out of artillery range of Kharkiv and even established a small bridgehead on the east bank of the Northern Donets River east of Staryi Saltiv, they do not possess enough combat power to continue the offensive east of the river. The Ukrainian army would require a further six battalions in order to launch a serious offensive east to cut Russian supply lines at Kupiansk. However, it appears that the Ukrainian General Staff is saving its reserves for a counteroffensive elsewhere. Still, the Ukrainian offensive north of Kharkiv caused the Russians to shift reinforcements away from Izyum. Its indirect effect on the stalled Russian offensive south of Izyum cannot be overstated. Moreover, Ukrainian lodgments east of the Northern Donets at Chuhuiv and further south in the forest east of the crossing point at Protopopivka, have also forced the Russians to direct up to eight BTGs to defend the west flank of their efforts south of Izyum.
The Russians in turn have been making headway on the east bank of the Northern Donets towards Lyman, east of Slovyansk, where they have recently reinforced that sector with BTGs from the 90th motorized division. (See red arrow pointing southeast from Lyman) Overwhelming artillery and rocket fire, including liberal use of thermobaric munitions, are making the Ukrainian defenses in Lyman untenable. We can expect a retreat of Ukrainian forces to the west bank of the Northern Donets soon. Nonetheless, the Russians will find the crossing of the Donets River towards Slovyansk and Kramatorsk no less challenging than their recent failures further south at Bilohorivka.
Which brings us to the question posed by this newsletter. Where are the Ukrainian reserves? The Ukrainian army has spent the first 90 days of this war on defense, while arming and training its reserves away from the fighting. Supposedly, over 100,000 Ukrainian fighters have been grouped into reserve brigades of the army or the territorial defense. The Ukrainian General Staff has been reluctant to introduce them into the fighting before they are ready to play a meaningful role. In the meantime, the regular and more experienced reserve formations have been steadily degraded by repeated fighting, waiting for the reserves to complete their training and organization. In fact, recent Russian gains near Popasna and further south at Svitlodarsk, are partially due to heavy losses amongst the battalions of the Ukrainian 24th and 30th mechanized brigades, which have been subjected to constant artillery bombardment since the beginning of the war.
The Russian army, on the other hand, has been attacking throughout the war, first along all fronts, particularly towards Kyiv, and recently in the Donbas, where the stated objective was the recapture of the entirety of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. It appears that the Russians are now willing to settle for the recapture of Luhansk oblast instead. As Russia wastes away its remaining striking power, shouldn't Ukraine be ready to seize the initiative and counterattack in a strategically advantageous point, during the narrow window of opportunity when Russia attempts to mobilize, train and reorganize its manpower?
In answering this question, we need to acknowledge that the Ukrainians have kept the location and identity of their units a closely held secret. Thus, the information from which to draw conclusions has to be harvested from disparate open sources and social media reports, which at first glance do not always give away their operational significance. For starters, most pundits speculate that the Ukrainians fight under a brigade command structure with all battalions of their mother unit grouped together. I disagree, based on the Ukrainian army's practice during the fighting in the Donbas during the previous eight years. In reality, Ukrainian brigades allocate individual battalions to ad hoc local operational commands, which utilize them as the situation requires. These local operational commands are hodge-podge compilations of battalions from different brigades.
Ukrainian mechanized brigades are more administrative organizations than field commands that task organize at least two battalion tactical groups (BTGs), with attached armor, infantry, artillery, air-defense, recon and logistics. These regular battalions are then farmed out to local operational commands, as needed, and rarely fight together. A third battalion is organized from the ready reserve and, generally, is not as powerful as the two regular BTGs. Nonetheless, these third battalions have been fighting on many fronts since the beginning of the war. For instance, the 72nd mechanized brigade had four battalions fighting in defense of Kyiv in March and April.
In contrast, the elite airborne and air-assault brigades, put three BTGs into the field. These are usually placed in reserve, to plug Russian penetrations of the first line of defense. The two regular armored brigades (the 1st and 17th) allocate their three tank battalions to disparate operational commands, as necessary. Thus, it is possible to find each battalion fighting many kilometers away from each other, under different field commanders. According to the official table of organization, each armored brigade has one mechanized infantry battalion from which to allocate a company to each individual tank battalion. However, these mechanized battalions occasionally fight separately from the tanks.
The Ukrainians also have five motorized infantry brigades, two mountain warfare brigades and close to three marine brigades, whose battalions are sprinkled throughout the front. At least three brigades of the National Guard (part of the Ministry of the Interior) are also fighting as motorized formations. Furthermore, the army is aided by the recently organized battalions of the territorial defense, some of which have enough experience to fight on the front lines or even participate in offensives. For instance, the 127th territorial defense brigade was on the forward edge of the recent counteroffensive north of Kharkiv. Nevertheless, the motorized and territorial defense battalions are primarily "trench" units, that play a subsidiary positional role in support of the regular mechanized, tank and airborne/assault battalions, which have the experience and armored vehicles to maneuver. Therefore, in our analysis only the more powerful Ukrainian formations will be included in the tally of battalions available for a major counteroffensive, particularly on the east bank of the Dnieper, where the Ukrainians have more space and options. My list does not include the independent Ukrainian artillery brigades. Although their input will be essential to any successful operation, I shall focus on the maneuver elements that will have to seize operational objectives. The maneuver brigades contain their own organic artillery.
In support of my analysis, I include brief histories of the mechanized, armored and airborne/air-assault brigades in this war, with a description of the known contribution of their battalions in the fighting so far. At the end, I render an opinion regarding the minimum number of front-line battalions available for a major Ukrainian counteroffensive on the east bank of the Dnieper River.
a. Mechanized Brigades
14th Mechanized Brigade – Based out of Rivne oblast. Table of organization consists of three mechanized and one tank battalion. One battalion participated together with the 95th air-assault brigade in the successful counterattack along the Zhitomir-Kyiv highway into the southern flank of Russian forces attacking Kyiv during the initial phase of the war. Supposedly another battalion made an appearance on the west bank of the Dnieper in the Kherson-Mykolaiv sector in April. Moreover, the artillery of yet another battalion has been recently identified west of Izyum. Presumably, at least one battalion is stationed along Belorussian border to guard against a surprise attack from the Brest area of western Belarus. Unclear if any battalions are available for a counterattack along the east bank of the Dnieper.
24th Mechanized Brigade – Based out of Yavoriv, Lviv oblast. Table of organization consists of three mechanized and one tank battalion. At least one battalion has been defending the Popasna axis in the Donbas since the beginning of the war. It has been partially degraded by intense artillery fire. Unclear if second battalion is stationed in Popasna. At least one, if not two mechanized battalions, as well as part of the tank battalion, is available for a counteroffensive on the east bank of Dnieper River.
28th Mechanized Brigade - Based out of Odessa oblast. Table of organization consists of three mechanized and one tank battalion. Three battalions have been stationed along the Odessa-Mykolaiv axis since the beginning of the war. Up to two battalions available for Kherson counteroffensive on west bank of Dnieper River. Unclear if any battalions are available for a counterattack on east bank of the Dnieper.
30th Mechanized Brigade - Based out of Novohrad-Volynskyi, Zhytomyr oblast. Table of organization consists of three mechanized and one tank battalion. At least one battalion has been defending the Sviatohirsk-Bakhmut axis in the Donbas since the beginning of the war. Unclear if a second battalion is stationed in Sviatohirsk. At least one, if not two mechanized battalions, as well as part of the tank battalion, is available for a counteroffensive on the east bank of Dnieper.
53d Mechanized Brigade – Based out of Luhansk oblast. A new brigade organized after 2015. It is unclear if it has a full complement of three mechanized and one tank battalions. At least one mechanized battalion has been defending the Temyrivka-Novosilka axis in the Donbas from the beginning of the war. Unclear if any battalions are available for a counterattack on the east bank of the Dnieper.
54th Mechanized Brigade – Based out of Luhansk oblast. A new brigade organized after 2015. It is unclear if it has a full complement of three mechanized and one tank battalions. At least one mechanized battalion has been defending the Krasnohorivka axis in the Donbas from the beginning of the war. Unclear if any battalions are available for counterattack on the east bank of the Dnieper.
63d Mechanize Brigade - Based out of Starokonstantyniv, Khmelnitsky oblast. A reserve brigade organized in 2017. It is unclear if it has a full complement of three mechanized and one tank battalions. In fact, on the attached map it is listed as a motorized brigade. At least one mechanized battalion has been defending the Hulyaipole-Tymarivka sector in Zaporizhzhia oblast since April. Unclear if any battalions are available for a counterattack on the east bank of the Dnieper.
72nd Mechanized Brigade – Based out of Bila Tserkva, Kyiv oblast. Four battalions made up the spine of the defense of Kyiv in the initial phase of the war. At least one mechanized and the tank battalion have been shifted from the Kyiv sector to northwest of Kharkiv, taking the place of a battalion of the 93d mechanized brigade. These have attacked northwest of Kharkiv towards Kozacha Lopan. At least one mechanized battalion is available for a counteroffensive on the east bank of Dnieper.
92nd Mechanized Brigade – Based out of Kharkiv oblast. Table of organization consists of three mechanized and one tank battalion. At least two mechanized and one tank battalion participated in defense of the northeastern approaches of Kharkiv during the initial phase of the war. At least one mechanized and the tank battalion participated in the counteroffensive northeast of Kharkiv towards the Russian border. One battalion may be in reserve, but brigade is fully committed along the Kharkiv axis. No battalions are available for a future counteroffensive.
93d Mechanized Brigade – Based out of Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Table of organization consists of three mechanized and one tank battalion. At least one mechanized and the tank battalion defended the Sumy-Kharkiv sector during the initial phase of the war. A second mechanized battalion fought in reserve of the front lines in Volnavakha in the Donbas, from where it covered the Ukrainian retreat towards Vuhledar. At least one mechanized and the tank battalion relocated west to the Balaklia-Izyum axis. At least one mechanized battalion is available for a counteroffensive on the east bank of the Dnieper.
128th Mountain Assault Brigade – Based out of Mukachev and Uzhhorod, near the Hungarian border. This is an older brigade that predates the 2014 campaign. It fought with distinction at the Battle of Debaltseve in 2015. Table of organization consists of one mountain assault battalion, two mechanized battalions and a tank battalion. The mechanized battalions are mounted in BMP-1 and BLTR armored vehicles. Therefore, it is listed as a mechanized formation on this list. One mechanized battalion was stationed near Melitopil at the beginning of the war, before retreating towards the Hulyaipole sector, where it has been in reserve of the front line ever since. The mountain assault battalion fought in the forests and marshes west of Kyiv near Malin during the first phase of the war. The second mechanized battalion was relocated to the Donbas, where it participated in the capture of Kreminna, before retreating south of the Northern Donets, when the Russians launched their Donbas offensive. Its artillery opposed the Russian bridging efforts at Bilohorivka. The mountain assault battalion is currently unaccounted for. Unclear if any battalions are available for a counterattack on the east bank of the Dnieper.
b. Armored Brigades
1st Armored Brigade – A regular brigade that pre-dates the 2014 campaign. Based out of Chernihiv oblast. Table of organization consists of three tank and one mechanized battalion. Bore the brunt of the fighting along the Chernihiv-Kyiv axis from the start. Three tank and one mechanized battalions remain in the Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts, keeping watch for a return of Russian forces from Bryansk and Kursk oblasts of Russia. None are available for a counteroffensive.
3d Armored Brigade – A reserve formation. One tank battalion has been supporting the infantry fighting south of Izyum along the Slovyansk and Barvinkove axis of advance. It is unclear if it has a full complement of three tank and one mechanized battalions. Unclear if any battalions are available for a counterattack on the east bank of the Dnieper.
4th Armored Brigade – A reserve formation. Only brigade armed with the older T-64BM Bulat tanks. It is unclear if it has a full complement of three mechanized and one tank battalions. One tank battalion has been supporting the infantry fighting near Lyman on the east bank of the Northern Donets River. Unclear if any battalions available for a counterattack on the east bank of the Dnieper.
5th Armored Brigade – A reserve formation. It has been stationed near Odessa since the beginning of the war. It is unclear if it has a full complement of three tank and one mechanized battalions. At least one battalion is available for counteroffensive towards Kherson on the west bank of Dnieper River. It is unclear if any battalions are available for a counterattack on the east bank of the Dnieper.
17th Armored Brigade - A regular brigade that pre-dates the 2014 campaign. Based out of Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Table of organization consists of three tank and one mechanized battalion. One mechanized and one tank battalion have been in the Donbas supporting the infantry at Severdonetsk, Lysychansk and Siversk. Two tank battalions are unaccounted for. At least one, if not two tank battalions are available for a counteroffensive on the east bank of the Dnieper River.
c. Airborne and Air-Assault Brigades
25th Airborne Brigade – A regular brigade that pre-dates the 2014 campaign. Based out of Hvardiyske, Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Consists of the 1st, 2nd and 3d airborne battalions. One battalion is in reserve of the front-line infantry and mechanized battalions fighting along the Hulyaipole-Novosilka sector. A second battalion is reportedly in reserve in the Lozova-Barvinkove area. At least one, if not two airborne battalions are available for a counterattack on the east bank of the Dnieper.
46th Air-Assault Brigade – Based out of Poltava. A new brigade organized after the fighting in 2014-2015. Presumably consists of at least two battalions. The whereabouts or involvement of the battalions are unknown. Presumably, at least one is stationed in reserve in Poltava. It is unclear if any battalions are available for a counterattack on the east bank of the Dnieper.
79th Air-Assault Brigade – A regular brigade that pre-dates the 2014 campaign. Based out of Mykolaiv. Consists of the 1st and 2nd air-assault battalions of the 79th brigade and the 88th independent air-assault battalion. Elements of one battalion, specifically the sniper platoon, were involved in the fighting for Hostomel airport to the west of Kyiv during the first days of the war. A second battalion has been fighting in reserve of the front-line units at Rubizhne, Severdonetsk and Lysychansk in the Donbas since the beginning of the war. A third battalion fought briefly in the Kherson-Mykolaiv sector. At least one air-assault battalion is available for a counterattack on the east bank of the Dnieper.
80th Air-Assault Brigade – Based out of Lviv. Consists of the 1st and 2nd air-assault battalions of the 80th brigade and the 87th independent air-assault battalion. One battalion has been fighting in reserve of the forces opposing the Russians on the Kherson-Mykolaiv axis. A second battalion just made an appearance in the Donbas in reserve of the infantry and mechanized battalions defending Severdonetsk, Lysychanksk and Siversk. The third battalion is unaccounted for. At least one air-assault battalion is available for a counterattack on the east bank of the Dnieper.
81st Air-Assault Brigade – Based out of Luhansk oblast. A new brigade organized out of units that fought for Donetsk airport in 2015. Consists of the 90th and 122nd independent air-assault battalions, and the 5th battalion tactical group. The 122nd air-assault battalion has been fighting in the Izyum and Barvinkove sector. Another battalion just made an appearance in reserve of the forces opposing the Russians in the Hulyaipole-Temyrivka sector. One battalion is unaccounted for. At least one, if not two air-assault battalions are available for a counterattack on the east bank of the Dnieper.
95th Air-Assault Brigade – The most celebrated brigade in the Ukrainian army. Based out of Zhitomir. Consists of the 1st and 2nd air-assault battalions of the 95th brigade and the 13th independent air assault battalion. One battalion fought in reserve of the front-line infantry and mechanized battalions defending the Avdiyivka-Horlivka sector in the Donbas during the early phase of the war. By late March it was shifted towards Izyum to reinforce the 81st air assault brigade on the Slovyansk axis. A second battalion was involved in the counterattack along the Zhitomir-Kyiv highway into the southern flank of Russian forces attacking towards Kyiv in the first phase of the war. The third battalion is unaccounted for. At least one, if not two air-assault battalions are available for a counterattack on the east bank of the Dnieper.
d. Summary
At a minimum, the Ukrainian army has four mechanized, two tank, one airborne and five air-assault battalions available for a major counterattack, for a total of 12 battalions. This amounts to approximately 7,500 infantry, 160 tanks and 440 armored personnel carriers. (For demonstrative purposes, these battalions are located on the attached map in the space between Poltava and Dnipropetrovsk) This calculation does not include independent artillery batteries, which would be crucial to the success of any operation. Nor does it factor in fixed wing and rotary aviation, which would also augment the combat power of such a force.
The above concentration of reserves could be exploited in an attack on the east bank of the Dnieper River. For instance, a breakthrough from the Hulyaipole sector with an exploitation towards Melitopil, would threaten to cut off Russian forces in the south of Ukraine from their supply lines in Crimea. The capture and defense of Melitopil would be a strategic defeat for Russia, since it would allow Ukraine to control the mouth of the Dnieper River and deny Putin the land bridge to Crimea. Six battalions could participate in the initial breakthrough and exploitation, while the second wave would consist of the other six. However, even if successful, these battalions would likely suffer very heavy losses and soon be a spent force. If there is any lesson to be learned from the Russian offensives so far, is that the attacker is at a serious disadvantage and suffers disproportionally heavier losses because of drone corrected precision artillery and anti-tank missile fire, perhaps at a proportion of 4 to 1. The Ukrainian attacking battalions would have to be reinforced by other units to consolidate and defend gains in territory from enemy counterattack. Moreover, most of the Ukrainian airpower would be destroyed in such an offensive. Whether 12 battalions would be sufficient to gain a strategic objective, remains to be seen. Anyhow, the Ukrainian General Staff will have to choose wisely as to where and when to use its reserves.
They can't attack yet. Russia's biggest headache has been that they do not control the air space, leaving the TB/2 drones to either slaughter directly or target other assets in the slaughter of Russian assets.
But, Ukraine does not control the air space either! Russia, if they go defensive gains all the advantages Ukraine currently holds.
Ukraine MUST control the sky are they are as dead as the Russians.
But if Ukraine can do that. They will have the power to seek payback. Not mere reparations sir, out and out payback. I believe they will. I can not conceive of any Ukrainian who could be so saintly as to resist. This is when the naive West will see that there are no such things as "good guys" and "bad guys", only the aggrieved and the aggressors.
Cracking that Naivete may cost Ukraine a lot of support. I hope not. I hold no such naivete. Russia is in the wrong here as plain as day, but Ukraine must be able to do better than mere payback. I just have no idea how they can possibly do it. I know that I could not, I would become a monster, so I can not judge.
Great article though. This is information I have been searching for, for quite some time.