"Subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence."[1]
- Sun Tsu, The Art of War, Chapter 3.
The Ukrainian recapture of the city of Kherson on November 11, 2022 was a remarkable achievement. The Ukrainian army's patient and deliberate campaign of interdicting supply lines to Russian troops on the west bank of the Dnieper River convinced the Russian high command to abandon Kherson without firing a shot and to withdraw its force of some 25,000 men to the opposite side of the river with barely a whimper. The objective of the campaign was accomplished through the disabling of the bridges across the Dnieper River with high mobility artillery rocket systems (HIMARS) and the bridge over the Kerch Strait to Crimea with a remotely detonated truck bomb, coupled with the steady pressure of intermittent local offensives by Ukrainian forces along the periphery of the Kherson front. The victory at Kherson invokes the assessment of the ancient Chinese commentator Sun Tsu that "...subjugating an enemy's army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence." Clearly the Kherson campaign does not reach the gold standard of Napoleon's famous envelopment at Ulm in 1805, when a French movement onto the enemy rear resulted in the surrender of an entire Austrian army. After all, the Russians were able to withdraw most of their troops and equipment before relinquishing control of the west bank of the Dnieper. Nevertheless, the Kherson operation saved thousands of Ukrainian lives and much war materiel, which would have been sacrificed in the event of an all-out assault on the city. Most of the Ukrainian forces assigned to the capture of the west bank can can now be shifted to other fronts to help the Ukrainians maintain the strategic initiative, particularly in Luhansk oblast in the offensive in the Svatove-Kreminna sector and potentially in an offensive in Zaporizhzhia oblast towards Melitopil. Overall, the Ukrainians scored a major strategic victory by recapturing territory that is crucial to the economic viability of Ukraine. They also foreclosed Russian designs to capture the port city of Odessa or to advance into the heart of Central Ukraine from the south. Moreover, the fall of Kherson will resonate positively in Western capitals, where decisions on continued aid to Ukraine will be made in the coming months. Perhaps what is most significant is that the retreat from Kherson publicly humiliated Vladimir Putin in the eyes of his Russian electorate, despite efforts by the media to spin it as a prudent temporary readjustment.
Perhaps the siege of Petersburgh in 1864-1865 during the closing stages of the American Civil War holds parallels to the Kherson campaign, when Ulysses S. Grant forced Robert E. Lee to abandon Richmond. Although it must be mentioned that Lee sheltered behind the James and Appomattox Rivers, not with his back to the water obstacles, as the Russians did in relation to the Dnieper. In any case, the Battle of Kherson will take its place on the short list of great campaigns of the post-WWII era - on its own merits. The decisions of the Ukrainian commanding general, Valeriy Zaluzhny, his chief-of-staff lieutenant-general Serhiy Shaptala, major-general Andriy Kovalchuk, commander of the operational command "South," and brigadier general Oleksandr Tarnavsky, the commander of the operational-strategic grouping of troops Kherson, which implemented the operational plan, will be analyzed by military professionals the world over.[2]
While the Russian retreat from the west bank of the Dnieper was relatively bloodless, the actual campaign that preceded it was quite bloody. It involved a slow grinding offensive that began in early September over some of the flattest terrain in Europe, along a frontage of over 200 kilometers, at a cost of thousands of killed and wounded on both sides. Moreover, both adversaries lost over a thousand armored vehicles and artillery pieces. The flat terrain makes tactical surprise impossible and any mechanized attack by even a platoon is subject to observation and a quick artillery barrage. It was only in the closing stages beginning on November 9 that the Russians stopped mounting serious resistance. Until that point, the Russian forces, particularly the elite airborne vozdushny desantni voiska (VDV), had contained Ukrainian converging attacks towards Kherson along three axes of advance - from Mykolaiv to the southwest, Davydiv Brid to the west and Kryvyi Rih to the north. Drone-corrected Russian artillery fire from both banks of the Dnieper made mechanized advance very costly, which became even more difficult when the muddy season started in mid-October. The tactical difficulties were exacerbated when the Russians improved their electronic countermeasures to the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) by the Ukrainian air force, which made it more difficult for Ukrainians to fly close air support for their ground forces as well as to communicate with surveillance drones to correct artillery fire.
The actual Russian decision to concede the west bank of the Dnieper was made in mid-October when it became apparent that the Kerch bridge could not be repaired sufficiently to resupply Crimea from Russia until next year. Drone and sattelite surveillance began confirming the steady flow of barges transporting men and equipment from the west bank of the Dnieper to the east by the third week of October. Many of these were the VDV airborne units. By November 9 almost 20,000 Russian troops had crossed back over the Dnieper, leaving a covering force of 5,000 on the west bank. These retreated by November 11. Consequently, the Russians were left with no choice but of using the long land corridor from Rostov-on-Don in Russia to resupply their troops on the west bank of the Dnieper and in Crimea. This is far from optimal since the only railroad line from the east, that runs from Volnovakha to Tokmak, is subject to interdiction by HIMARS rocket fire. In fact, a glance at the enclosed map indicates that the key railroad hub at Volnovakha falls within the 28-kilometer range of 155mm howitzers situated at Vuhledar. This may explain why the Russians have been attacking Pavlivka with such determination recently, in an apparent attempt to push Ukrainian artillery out-of-range.
Nevertheless, the Russians could have made it very difficult for the Ukrainians, had they decided to stand and fight for Kherson. A retreat to the perimeter of the city and the bridgehead across from the river crossing at Nova Kakhovka would have brought the Russian defenders within the cover of their artillery on the opposite bank of the Dnieper, where the resupply of ammunition is not an issue. The defenders could have fought with the river to their back with ample artillery support and turned Kherson into another Stalingrad. Which begs the question, why did Putin allow his generals to relinquish Kherson, the only oblast center to fall into Russian hands during the war? After all, the subsequent domestic political embarrassment and outrage from the nationalist fringe of the Russian electorate over such a major territorial concession was predictable.
First, it must be emphasized that the continued defense of the west bank of the Dnieper would have likely resulted in a comprehensive Russian defeat once Winter fully set in, at a cost of thousands of additional Russian soldiers in killed, wounded and prisoners, as well as armored vehicles and artillery captured or destroyed. The Ukrainian ability to continue their interdiction campaign with HIMARS would have further starved the large Russian force on the west bank of ammunition and supplies. The political fallout from such a disaster would have been much greater than the one following the recent withdrawal, where the Russians were able to save an entire army and its equipment. Presently, the pro-Putin Russian media has been able to mute the outrage of the Russian public to the obvious defeat on the west bank, by spinning it as a necessary military readjustment. Putin has distanced himself from the retreat personally by avoiding any public appearances connected with the recent change in strategy and by hiding behind the carefully staged public announcement of the retreat on November 9 by defense minister Sergei Shoigu and lieutenant-general Sergei Surovikin, the commander of Russian forces in Ukraine. Thus, he can blame the military for the setback to avoid public rebuke personally.
Second, the Russians relocated their forces from the west bank for fear of encirclement by a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive from Zaporizhzhia towards the crucial communications hub at Melitopil. In retrospect, the recent local Russian offensive towards the village of Pavlivka southwest of Vuhledar may have been a spoiling attack to siphon off Ukrainian forces away from a concentration further west at Hulyaupole or Orikhiv. In fact, the elite Ukrainian 72nd mechanized brigade, which was instrumental in saving Kyiv in March, has been fending off Russian attacks on Pavlivka for over a month, instead of preparing for a counter-offensive. By relinquishing the west bank, the Russian high command has narrowed its front by some 200 kilometers and made 15,000 of its best troops available for relocation elsewhere. Now the Russians can strengthen their defenses on the Zaporizhzhia front, where it is anticipated that the Ukrainians will strike next.
A perusal of the above terrain map indicates that a Ukrainian offensive on the Zaporizhzhia front will either follow an axis of advance along the low ground from Orikhiv south to Melitopil and Tokmak, or from Orikhiv and Hulyaypole towards the high ground at Chernihivka and Kamianka to the southeast. The sector south of Vasylivka has been strengthened with reinforced concrete emplacements and progress here will be slow and bloody - like it was on the Kherson front. In contrast, a Ukrainian offensive from Orikhiv and Hulyaypole that bypasses Polohy and attains the high ground to the southeast has greater prospects for success. Once in control of the high ground around Chernihivka and Kamianka, the Ukrainians can direct accurate HIMARS fire, with its maximum range of 84 kilometers, to interdict Russian supply lines to Crimea running along the coastal highway between Mariupil and Berdiansk. With the Kerch bridge out of commission, Russian logistics to the garrison in Crimea will be further exacerbated, in effect putting the peninsula in a logistical chokehold. Thus, the relocation of Russian forces from Kherson to Melitopil would strengthen Russian defenses and make a successful Ukrainian advance along this axis less likely.
Third, a portion of the force that was withdrawn from the west bank of the Dnieper can be redirected east to Luhansk oblast to strengthen the defenses along the Kreminna-Svatove front, where the Ukrainians have been maintaining a slow but steady offensive to interdict Russian supply lines from the Russian base at Valyuky. The relocated troops can reinforce the units of the 1st Tank and 20th armies that were severely attrited in the Balaklia-Kupiansk-Izyum operation in early September. Recently, these had to depend on reinforcement by untrained conscripts that have been inducted into the Russian army pursuant to Putin's recent partial-mobilization decree.
Finally, the 15,000 elite paratroopers of the VDV that have retreated from Kherson can be thrown into an offensive on another front to recapture the strategic initiative for Russia. Although decimated during the fighting near Kyiv in March-April and further attrited during the defense of Kherson oblast on the west bank of the Dnieper, the VDV still possess the fighting spirit and esprit-de-corps for offensive operations as part of the typical Russian artillery supported tactical scheme. The Ukrainians have been able to choose the time and place of offensive activity since their victory at Balaklia-Kupiansk-Izyum in early September. With the narrower front that resulted from the retreat from Kherson, the VDV can now be relocated to reinforce the stalled Russian offensives in the Donbas towards Bakhmut and Avdiivka, as well as the attack to seize Vuhledar. If the Ukrainians can be forced to react to new Russian attacks along these avenues of advance instead of pursuing their own offensives, Russia will have recaptured the initiative or at least achieved a temporary stalemate during the Winter months.
Please recall that the offensive towards Bakhmut has been the domain of the Wagner group - a private mercenary army funded by the former restauranteur Evgeniy Prigozhin, a close associate of Vladimir Putin, nicknamed "Putin's chef." The mercenaries have been making slow but steady progress in the attack towards Bakhmut, despite horrendous losses. The attack keeps Putin's hopes alive for the capture of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk - one of his original political objectives of the war. Whether Prigozhin is willing to share the spoils of any success along this front with the regular army is questionable? The only condition under which he may agree for the VDV to join his offensive is if they are directly subordinated under his command. Due to Prigozhin's hostility to the Russian high command and the ministry of defense, it is unlikely that the VDV will be gifted to him to use as he pleases. Therefore, expect the VDV brigades to reinforce the offensives towards Avdiivka and Vuhledar, which are under the direction of the Russian army. (The attack on Avdiivka is being pursued by the troops of the Donetsk National Republic (DNR), but under the command of Russian army officers). To offset the added pressure that the VDV can exhert along these two axes of advance, the Ukrainian General Staff may be forced to send some of the troops that captured Kherson to reinforce defenses in the Avdiivka and Vuhledar sectors. Consequently, these brigades will be subtracted from the Ukrainian order of battle intended for offensives towards Melitopil, Tokmak, Chernihivka and Kamianka.
In closing, the Kherson campaign returned the strategically vital west bank of the Dnieper River to Ukrainian control. It also freed up to 20,000 Ukrainian troops for relocation elsewhere. The result was also a political victory in that it maintained the momentum for continued military and financial support to Ukraine in Western capitals and embarrassed Putin in front of his domestic audience. Nonetheless, the east bank of the Dnieper is still under Russian control, which enables Russia to interdict commerce through the delta of this vital transportation artery. Therefore, while the victory at Kherson improved Ukraine's strategic situation, it did not entirely loosen Russia's chokehold on Ukraine's economic lifeline. It is unknown whether the Ukrainian General Staff will risk another offensive before the Russians repair the Kerch bridge - probably by early next year. The current muddy conditions make offensive operations a slog. Nevertheless, a successful Ukrainian offensive in a south-easterly direction from Orikhiv and Hulyaypole to the high ground at Chernihivka and Kamianka would place Russian controlled Crimea and the east bank of the Dnieper in a precarious position, since supply lines from Russia would come within range of HIMARS rocket fire. Such a development would create favorable leverage for Ukraine, which can be exploited to extract significant territorial and political concessions from Putin during peace negotiations. A major Ukrainian offensive along the Zaporizhzhia front will likely start in January 2023, when the ground freezes, although an attack in December should not be discounted. The Ukrainian General Staff would prefer to strike while the Russians are still reorganizing after their withdrawal from the Kherson front, but the weather may not cooperate.
I wish to attribute the attached topographic map of Zaporizhzhia oblast with the designated radiuses for the maximum range of HIMARS and 155 mm artillery to the Twitter handle J. comme_ JéJé #UkraineMap @HeliosRunner. I made a few additions.
[1] Sun Tsu, The Art of War. ed. and trans. Ralph D. Sawyer and Mei-chün Lee Sawyer. (Fall River: Fall River Press, 1994), 177.
[2] The Ukrainian ground forces are organized into four operational commands, labeled "North,"South,"East" and West." However, these are more administrative than operational. The actual operations are organized into ad hoc operational-strategic groupings of troops (operatyvno-stratehichne uhrupovannia viisk), in effect armies, which are in turn sub-divided into operational groupings of troops (operatyvne uhrupovannia viisk), the equivalent of a corps. Kherson oblast was recaptured by the operational-strategic grouping Kherson, which consisted of two division sized sub-units, the operational grouping of troops Prymoria, commanded by marine brigadier general Andriy Hnatov, and the operational grouping of troops Kakhovka, commanded by brigadier general Mykhailo Drapatyi.