UNRAVELING THE RIDDLE AT ROBOTYNO[1]
Historical Comparisons: Kursk, Normandy, or "Sugar Loaf Hill"
The Ukrainian counteroffensive is now entering its thirteenth week. Throughout, the Ukrainians have been assaulting the security zone in front of the first belt of multi-layered defenses in southern Ukraine, dubbed the Surovikin line. The campaign has coalesced into four axes of advance: (1) Kamyanske - Vasylivka, (2) Orikhiv - Tokmak, (3) Novovasylivka - Novomlynivka, and (4) the southern and northern flanks of the city of Bakhmut in Donetsk oblast. (See Map 1) Moreover, at the time of this writing the Ukrainians have been able to maintain two small diversionary bridgeheads on the east bank of the Dnieper River at the Antonivsky Bridge near the town of Oleshky and at Kozachi Lahery (5-6). Meanwhile, the Russians have resisted stubbornly, if not adroitly, behind the forward security zone of their carefully prepared defenses, while launching a significant diversionary offensive further north towards Lyman and Kupiansk in Luhansk oblast (7-8). They have also continued to attack the Avdiyivka (9) and Mariyinka (10) salients, hoping to pin Ukrainian forces in these sectors from reinforcing the axes of advance in southern Ukraine.
So far, the counteroffensive has resulted in modest Ukrainian territorial gains (300 sq kilometers). During the first weeks of the counteroffensive, extensive Russian minefields and elaborate defense works slowed the pace of the advance to a crawl. In the process, they exacted substantial equipment losses and heavy casualties on the Ukrainians. In fact, Ukrainian forces have only been able to penetrate the security zone and breach Russian defenses in the vicinity of the village of Robotyne along the Orikhiv - Tokmak axis, which they were able to partially capture on August 23. On August 29th they also breached the forward edge of the 2nd (Main) line of Russian defenses east of Robotyne at Verbove. (See diagram AUG 29) However, the direction of the attack towards Verbove veers way from the main effort along the southerly axis of advance to Tokmak. The second (Main) line of defenses on the Tokmak axis is still five kilometers to the south at Solodka Balka. We shall see whether the Ukrainian General Staff will be able to exploit these tactical successes to seize operational objectives, like Tokmak.
Needless to say, progress has fallen far short of Western and even Russian expectations. This presented Vladimir Putin with fodder for a propaganda victory, both at home and abroad. For the first time since the capture of Lysychansk in July 2022, the Russian TV viewing public has something to cheer about. (Even many ordinary Russians recognize that the capture of Bakhmut in May 2023 was but a Pyrrhic victory[2], due to the excessive casualties that it cost to capture the town) As I keep reiterating, popular Russian support for the war is Putin's center of gravity. This vulnerability grows with every new wave of Russian mobilization, which is forced upon him by Russian failure at the front. However, when Russia achieves battlefield successes, Putin gets a reprieve.
Of greater significance to the Ukrainian war effort in the near term is the pessimistic outlook in recent Western media as well as in professional military assessments by NATO members, which contain criticism of the Ukrainian military performance. A leaked intelligence assessment from the U.S. Department of Defense was published in the Washington Post on August 17, asserting that Ukraine's counterattack will be unable to seize the strategic objective of Melitopol and is unlikely to capture the interim operational objective of Tokmak.[3] At the crux of this opinion was the decision of the Ukrainian General Staff to abandon larger NATO-styled combined-arms mechanized attacks and to revert to infiltration tactics by small dismounted infantry squads, followed up by occasional platoon level mechanized assaults over short distance.
The dispersed effort by small Ukrainian infantry and mechanized detachments was singled out as violating the principle of mass, namely concentrating superior force at the decisive point. Moreover, a stinging criticism of Ukrainian operational methods by officers of the Bundeswehr was published in the German publication Bild. [4] The German opinion also criticized Ukrainian practices, especially their reluctance to mass forces at the decisive point, instead of diffusing their effort into disparate squad-sized infiltration attacks along the wood lines that crisscross the otherwise open southern Ukrainian landscape, where they act as windbreaks. Essentially, both the American and German critiques implied that Ukraine should throw the bulk of its combat power into a breaching operation all at once, irrespective of casualties and equipment losses, instead of gradually grinding down Russian defenses. The rationale behind such an approach is that the trickle of casualties incurred through an incremental approach will eventually far exceed the painful loss of life suffered in a single bloody attack.
Moreover, the Western militaries criticize President Volodymyr Zelensky's insistence that Ukraine maintain a counteroffensive at Bakhmut, arguing that this is an unnecessary drain on resources, obviously failing to appreciate the political difficulties this causes for Vladimir Putin. Indirectly, these criticisms affect Ukraine's center of gravity - continued Western financial and military support. Adverse reporting influences public opinion in donor countries like the United States, Great Britain and Germany, which in turn puts pressure on politicians to cut down on aid to Ukraine. We shall see whether the recent Ukrainian tactical successes at Robotyne and Verbove change the narrative in Western media.
No single engagement during the offensive has been more emblematic of the problems posed by the Russian defenses than at Robotyne, along the main T-04-08 road from Orikhiv in the north to Tokmak in the south. As of the writing of this article, Ukrainian forces seized control of a portion of Robotyne on August 23, after two-and-one-half months of a brutal slog through minefields and trench lines. In this article I endeavor to distill the factors that make it such a tough nut to crack. I find that at the root of Ukraine's slow counteroffensive in this sector are four tactical hurdles, namely:
(1) unfavorable terrain,
(2) extensive mining,
(3) pervasive drone presence, especially "kamikaze" drones, and
(4) the dearth of shelter from Russian artillery fire after a successful attack due to the degradation of buildings and Russian entrenchments at the objective by artillery from both sides.
Furthermore, one cannot ignore the competent resistance of the Russian 58th Army in this sector, with the 42nd Division mounting a classic elastic defense in which its troops initially fall back and then counterattack once the Ukrainian forces take losses from artillery and begin to tire. Also, Russian K-52 attack helicopters, with an eight-kilometer range of their Vikhr anti-tank missiles, have been particularly pesky.
In my analysis, I forego excuses regarding the reluctance of Western partners to supply Ukraine with advanced fighter jets or long-range rocket cluster munitions, as these are issues beyond the control of the Ukrainian military and outside the tactical conditions imposed by the realties on the ground.
A. Comparison of Robotyne to Kursk and/or Normandy
In analyzing the tactical impediments to a Ukrainian attack towards Robotyne, I looked for historical comparisons. In my previous articles, I likened the Ukrainian offensive along the Orikhiv - Tokmak axis to the German operation against the southern flank of the Kursk salient during Operation Citadel between July 6-13, 1943. In fact, the commander of Ukraine's armed forces, General Valery Zaluzhny, used Kursk as an example when responding to Western criticism regarding the slow pace of the attack in southern Ukraine. But after following the slow progress of the counteroffensive, I notice that the current minefields are deeper, more elaborate, and widespread than the ones thrown up by the Red Army in 1943. The Red Army had three months to prepare its defenses; today's Russian army had eight months. Moreover, the Red Army relied primarily on battalions of anti-tank guns and mobile armored reserves to counteract the German offensive in 1943. That is not the case on the Tokmak axis today. Rather, the Russians are defending further up, using small mobile local reserves to foreclose Ukrainian incursions. Furthermore, the German attack lasted just one week, before being stymied by waves of Russian tanks at Prokhorovka. In the case of Robotyne, the campaign has stretched beyond 12 weeks. Thus, another historical battle had to be used as a benchmark.
Recently, I read an interesting historical analogy by Benjamin S. Cohen and Gian Gentile, who compared the Ukrainian campaign with the Allied breakout out of the bocage in Normandy in July 1944. [5] Indeed, the compartments formed by the bocage in Normandy resemble the tracts of land that are framed by Ukrainian tree lines that act as windbreaks in the open steppe of southern Ukraine. But after following updates regarding the battle for Robotyne, I realized that I must narrow my focus on the purely tactical aspect of the fighting. After all, the Allies broke out of the bocage in Normandy at the operational level after carpet bombing German positions at St. Lo with hundreds of strategic bombers on July 25, 1944. [6] That is not the case today in southern Ukraine.
Bocage in Normandy, France, 1944
No doubt, the hedgerows of the bocage compartmentalized the fighting in Normandy into isolated company-sized engagements. However, the fighting in 1944 was conducted through substantially smaller tracts of land than the larger open fields that are framed by tree lines in southern Ukraine. Also, the French hedgerows provided cover and concealment to the German defenders as well as serious obstacles to advancing Allied tanks. In comparison, the Ukrainian tree lines and undergrowth offer no cover and only partial concealment. Furthermore, they do not impede the movement of tanks and armored vehicles. The Ukrainian terrain is substantially more open. Thus, observation and engagement ranges are exponentially greater. Rather, the disproportionate advantage afforded to the side that controls the high ground becomes paramount.
Perhaps I betray a bias towards my branch of service, but I find uncanny tactical parallels between the battle for Robotyne and the struggle by the US 6th Marine Division for "Sugar Loaf" Hill between May 9-18, 1945, during the Battle of Okinawa. The interrelationship between Japanese defenses on the trio of small elevations nicknamed Sugar Loaf, Half-Moon, and Horseshoe on the Japanese island of Okinawa draws similarities with Russian defenses on the high ground at the villages of Robotyne, Kopani, Novopokropivka, and southwest of Verbove in southern Ukraine.
From the start, I concede that the size of the battlefield at Robotyne is larger than that found at the Sugar Loaf. (I walked up to what is left of the hill when I was stationed in Okinawa in 1985; the battlefield was then a housing development) Engagement ranges on the Ukrainian battlefield are much greater, when considering the increased range of modern weaponry. After all, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) can reach five kilometers and the Russian Vikhr ATGMs on Russian attack helicopters approach eight kilometers. In comparison, on Okinawa, Japanese anti-tank guns could fire no further than one kilometer. At most the base of Sugar Loaf Hill stretched five hundred yards in total frontage, compared to the close to two kilometers of the forward positions at Robotyne. Therefore, the scale of the battlefield at Robotyne is at least four times wider and eight times deeper. Nevertheless, I hope to prove that the tactical hurdles faced by the attacker in both battles were similar. Moreover, the lessons from Sugar Loaf Hill provide a blueprint for the eventual solution to the tactical riddle at Robotyne. As events proved on August 23, some of these lessons were in evidence when the Ukrainians seized the northern half of the village.
Crest of Sugar Loaf Hill after the battle, 1945
B. Comparison of Robotyne with "Sugar Loaf" Hill.
The Battle for Sugar Loaf Hill ranks as one of the bloodiest in the sanguine history of the United States Marine Corps. It was fought between May 9-18, 1945, during the campaign to capture the Japanese island of Okinawa. Over the course of nine days the 22nd and 29th Marine Regiments of the 6th Marine Division launched no less than thirteen company-sized infantry attacks onto the crest and flanks of Sugar Loaf, as well as Half-Moon and Horseshoe Hills, two neighboring elevations to its rear, before capturing the hill in a clever double envelopment. The Marine infantry was supported by Sherman A4 tanks of the 6th Marine Tank Battalion and the Amtraks of the 6th Amphibian Tractor Battalion. [7]
The capture of Sugar Loaf Hill unsettled the left flank of Japanese defense works known as the Shuri Line, which stretched the entire width of Okinawa. The Marine victory eventually forced the Japanese to relinquish the Shuri Line and to retreat to the southern third of the island. The day after the fall of the Sugar Loaf, the 6th Marine Division had to throw in its reserve, the 4th Marine Regiment, to continue the attack onto the Horseshoe and Half-Moon. The 22nd and 29th Marines were unable to continue the attack.
The 6th Marine Division's after-action report describes the human toll of the battle, as follows:
"On the following day, 19 May, the 4th Marines moved up to relieve the exhausted 29th Marines. During the 10-day period up to and including the capture of Sugar Loaf the 6th MarDiv had lost 2,662 KIA or WIA; there were also a staggering 1,289 cases of combat fatigue. In the 22nd and 29th Marines three battalion commanders and eleven company commanders had been killed or wounded. On 20 May, the 4th Marines gained more ground on Horseshoe hill but were still unable to reach the crest of Half Moon." [8]
In other words, close to 4,000 of the original complement of 6,000 Marines of the 22nd and 29th Marine Regiments, were hors-de-combat after taking Sugar Loaf Hill. What the after-action report fails to mention is that the newly appointed commander of the 22nd Marines, Colonel Harold Roberts, was killed by a sniper's bullet on May 19, one day after replacing Colonel Merlin Shneider, who was no longer able the muster the willpower to urge his decimated regiment forward, due to a clear case of combat fatigue. [9]
The after-action report also included the following topographical description of the terrain:
"The crest of the hill, according to topographical maps, rose to an elevation of a mere 230 feet. However, when compared to the surrounding ridges and territory, the crest of the hill rose about 50 feet above the northern approaches to its slopes. The defensive complex was honeycombed with enemy positions. Any one of the three hills could be defended by any of the others. Interlocking fields of fire from each hill protected the slopes and approaches of the others."[10]
It will become evident that the victorious attack of the U.S. Marines on Sugar Loaf Hill had many parallels with the Battle for Robotyne.
Even though an earlier attack by the 29th Marines on May 17 was unsuccessful in dislodging the Japanese from Sugar Loaf Hill, the regiment was able to gain a toehold at the foot of Half-Moon Hill to the east. This enabled the regiment to launch their successful attack the following day, because Japanese 47 mm anti-tank guns could no longer menace Marine Sherman tanks from their left rear. Similarly, on August 12, 2023, the Ukrainian 46th Air Assault Brigade seized trench lines on the spur east of Robotyne, negating the Russian ability to fire ATGMs into the flank of Ukrainian armor assaulting Robotyne out of the low ground to the east of the village.
Moreover, the approaches and flanks of Sugar Loaf Hill were sown with thick anti-tank minefields, which took a toll on Marine tanks and amphibious tractors. In fact, Japanese mines disabled six Sherman tanks out of the 10 that enveloped the Sugar Loaf during the decisive attack on May 18. Only two Sherman tanks were left unscathed, one on each flank, when Marine armor, infantry and artillery destroyed the Japanese garrison on the reverse slope of the hill during the climactic moments of the attack. [11] Similarly, to say that the approaches to Robotyne were heavily mined is an understatement. Arguably, Robotyne may have been the most heavily mined objective in history, except for the Maginot Line in France 1940 and the current American enclave at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Japanese 47 mm anti-gun and Marine tank graveyard on east flank of the Sugar Loaf
Furthermore, during the entire battle, Marine attacks onto Sugar Loaf Hill never exceeded two companies in strength at any given time. The terrain and width of the objective did not allow for denser formations. In fact, the decisive attack on May 18 consisted of only two platoons - 80 men in all. One platoon headed for the crest from the left (east) side and the second platoon approached from the right (west) side. This is similar to the engagements at Robotyne, when overwhelming enemy artillery necessitated the use of no larger than platoon-sized detachments to leave a smaller signature for drone surveillance. Also, the Ukrainian attacks rarely involved more than a few tanks and armored vehicles, for similar reasons. Most of the time, armored support consisted of a pair of Bradley infantry fighting vehicles.
Finally, the Japanese managed to mount a classic elastic defense. During American preparatory bombardments, they would relinquish control of the hill and hide in caves and tunnels on the reverse slope, waiting for artillery and supporting fires from Horseshoe and Half-Moon Hills to take a toll on assaulting Marine infantry. Only then would they emerge from their hiding places to counterattack the weakened and disordered Americans. Additionally, reserves would rush forward from Horseshoe and Half-Moon Hills to replace losses amongst the garrison of Sugar Loaf Hill. Similarly, Russian defenders would hide in reinforced bunkers and cellars of the buildings in Robotyne during Ukrainian preparatory bombardments, while mobile reserves would race forward in armored vehicles from Novoprokopivka or further back from Ilchynkove to counterattack Ukrainian infantry that somehow managed to withstand Russian artillery and rocket fire. Reportedly, the Russians even dug a few tunnels between strongpoints in Robotyne, mimicking the Japanese at Okinawa.
The after-action report of the 6th Marine Division following the battle for Sugar Loaf Hill had this to say about the formula for a successful attack of the Japanese defenses:
"So well integrated were the enemy defenses on Half-Moon and Sugar Loaf, capture of only one portion was meaningless; 6th Division Marines had to take them all simultaneously. If only one hill was seized without the others being neutralized or likewise captured, effective Japanese fire from the uncaptured position would force the Marines to withdraw from all." [12]
C. The Capture of Robotyne
The Ukrainian army captured the north and central neighborhoods of Robotyne on August 23 in an attack that was reminiscent in concept to the Marine attack on Sugar Loaf Hill. (Diagram AUG 23) While the 47th Mechanized Brigade, supported by the 73d Maritime Special Operations Center (equivalent of US Navy Seals) and the Skala Reconnaissance Battalion, assaulted Robotyne from the north and northeast, the 65th Mechanized Brigade supported the main attack by attacking the trenches in front of the village of Kopani to the west, while the 46th Air Mobile and the 82nd Air Assault Brigades attacked the high ground to the east. After lodgments were made in the trench lines along the northern and northeastern outskirts of the village at night by the naval special forces and the recon unit, a dismounted company of the 47th Mechanized Brigade advanced house-to-house along the main north-south avenues of the settlement, supported by Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, operating in tandem on both sides of each street. Resistance was suppressed by the fire from the Bradleys and precision artillery strikes, which were called in by the special forces and recon.
The soldiers from the recently mobilized Russian 1430th and 1441st Motorized Regiments could not withstand the pressure and eventually broke, fleeing south along the fields and the T-04-08 road towards Novopokropivka. However, before the entire village could be secured, the Russian command rushed elements of the elite 56th Air Mobile Regiment from Ilchynkove and the 201st Motorized Regiment from Novopokropivka to counterattack the Ukrainian advance, after the usual artillery barrage. The fighting went back and forth before the Russians were pushed back, although a few squads managed to maintain a toehold in the southwestern neighborhoods of Robotyne. Precision work by Ukrainian artillery and a nighttime clearing operation by elements of the 47th Mechanized Brigade secured the high-school in the southern neighborhood of the village. By the morning of August 24, the troopers of the 47th Mech were able to display a Ukrainian flag on the roof of the ruins of the school - just in time to present their countrymen a gift on Ukraine's Independence Day.
While the narrative regarding the capture of Robotyne on August 23 is dramatic, we must recall that it took over twelve weeks for Ukrainian troops to fight their way through the five kilometers of the security zone in front of the village to get there. In contrast, the 6th Marine Division took the Sugar Loaf in nine days, following 13 bloody frontal attacks, at the cost of 4,000 casualties of all types. Is this the approach urged by NATO experts for the Ukrainians to adopt in attacking Robotyne? After acknowledging that taking objectives “come-what-may” is what the Marine Corps does best, I point out that there is one major difference between the two battles. The Marines had the benefit of favorable terrain along the approaches to Sugar Loaf Hill, like Charlie Hill and Hill 3. (See map of Battle of Sugar Loaf Hill) This made it easier for them to reach the jumping-off points for their assaults, without incurring excessive losses. The difficulty came on the objective itself, because of the enfilading fires from the supporting hills. The Ukrainians, on the other hand, had miles of open steppe to cross before approaching within range of a final assault. Therefore, it wasn’t the taking of Robotyne itself that was the problem. The challenge was in getting there.
In my next article, I will examine the tactical factors that made Robotyne such a difficult objective to capture.
[1] The official spelling for the name of the town is Robotyne. But Robotyno is frequently bandied about in Ukrainian news reporting. I use Robotyno in the title because it rhymes better with the other words, creating a more memorable alliteration.
[2] Pyrrhic victory, a term named after the Greek King Pyrrhus. After battling the Romans at Asculum in 297 BC, he observed, “If we are victorious in one more battle with the Romans, we shall be utterly ruined.”
[3] Susannah George. Ukraine running out of options to retake significant territory. WSJ, August 20, 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/08/20/ukraine-counteroffensive-analysis-war-russia/
[4] James Jackson. The Telegraph. Ukraine counter-offensive too slow because they’re not doing it properly, Germans claim. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/07/25/german-military-ukraine-counter-offensive-too-slow/
[5] Benjamin S. Cohen, Gian Gentile. Stop Comparing Ukraine to World War I. Foreign Policy, July 18, 2023. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/18/ukraine-counteroffensive-world-war-i-ii-western-front-normandy-trench-warfare-strategy-history/
[6] Michael D. Doubler. Busting the Bocage. Combat Studies Institute. (U.S. Army and Staff College: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1955), pp. 57-58.
[7] James H. Hallas. Killing Ground on Okinawa. (Praeger Publishers, Westport, Ct., 1996), p. 167; 6th Marine Division After-action Report, Okinawa Operation, Phase III, 1945, pp. 11-16.
[8] 6th Marine Division After-action Report, Okinawa Operation, Phase III, 1945, p. 16.
[9] James H. Hallas, supra, pp. 161, 211.
[10] James H. Hallas, supra, p. 171.
[11] 6th Marine Division After-action Report, Okinawa Operation, Phase III, 1945, p. 15.
[12] James H. Hallas, supra, p. 161.
[13] David Axe. In 13 weeks, Ukraine Has Lost Just Five of Its 71 Leopard 2 Tanks, Forbes August 28, 2023. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/08/28/in-13-weeks-ukraine-has-lost-just-five-of-its-71-leopard-2-tanks/?sh=1ce3b5bb185b
[14] Alexandre Robert. HistoryLegends. August 11, 2023, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=Jrd9LEfn1aM
[15] Alexandre Robert. HistoryLegends, August 11, 2023, supra.