A. Current Situation
A glance at a map of the recent disposition of opposing forces around Robotyne indicates that the line of contact has not changed significantly since its capture by Ukrainian forces on August 23. (See Map SEP 19) Over the course of the preceding month, the Ukrainians have made small incremental gains towards the next town south at Novopokropivka and east through the "dragon's teeth" of the Surovikin Line towards the town of Verbove. Preliminary attacks were also reported against the 2nd (main) Russian defense line along the high ground between Novopokropivka and Verbove, referred to in situation reports as Hill 166. The name stems from the alleged altitude of the elevation in meters. Although, older topographical maps of the Russian General Staff indicate that the actual elevation is 163 meters. Nevertheless, so far Russian artillery fire has forced the Ukrainians back from Hill 166. (See artillery barrage No. 3 on Map SEP 19). Meanwhile, Russian positions on the high ground near the town of Kopani to the west of Robotyne have been merely contained, instead of seriously attacked.
The method of advance during September has been identical to the one that enabled the Ukrainians to reach Robotyne in the first place - short range attacks by infantry squads infiltrating along tree lines, in conjunction with or preceded by precise artillery strikes and drone bombardment of Russian positions, occasionally followed-up by platoon-sized mechanized attacks of no more than 3-4 vehicles and tanks. The small unit infiltration leaves a smaller signature for drone surveillance and consequently, results in less accurate and belated Russian artillery fire. Moreover, particular attention has been given to the counter-battery battle. Russian artillery has been singled out for destruction by Ukrainian artillery and "kamikaze" drones. The neutralization of Russian artillery has been instrumental in Ukrainian territorial gains.
The Ukrainian advance from Orikhiv towards Robotyne has resulted in a salient jutting into Russian defenses approximately ten kilometers in depth and ten kilometers in width - not wide enough to secure the neck from potential Russian counterattack from the flanks. More importantly, Russian artillery can fire through the entire width of the penetration from both flanks, making it difficult for the Ukrainians to transport reinforcements and supplies to the forward edge of the battlefield. The Ukrainians need to widen their breach by at least another ten kilometers before braving a further advance south towards Tokmak.
One of the factors for the slow Ukrainian advance since the capture of Robotyne is the Russian decision to defend as far forward as possible, throwing reinforcements towards the 1st line of defense in repeated counterattacks against Ukrainian incursions, instead of trading space for time and dropping back to secondary positions in a classic elastic defense. The rationale for this unconventional approach is subject to speculation. Perhaps the Russians want to keep Ukrainian inroads as shallow as possible before the muddy season sets in, to shape the domestic propaganda message on Russian TV; delaying bad news for as long as possible while hoping that changes in the political fortunes of pro-Russian politicians in the United States and Western Europe weaken Western resolve. Or the Russians want to keep the "land bridge" between Rostov-on-Don in Russia and Crimea out of effective range of Ukrainian long-range rockets and artillery. In any case, the Russians have eaten up several battalions of the Russian 42nd Division in defending Robotyne in such a manner, as well as countless newly raised regiments of its territorial troops, consisting of newly mobilized recruits, as well as an assortment of BARS detachments (Russian Army ready reserve units), that are thrown forward to plug gaps in the line.
However, these reinforcements have not been able to stop the Ukrainian advance from creeping forward. Thus, the Russian General Staff made the operational decision to reinforce the Robotyne sector with two of its elite airborne divisions to choke off the Ukrainian salient at the neck. As early as September 15, at least two regiments of the 7th Mountain Air Assault Division of the vozdushno dessantni voiska (VDV) were shifted from operational reserve behind the Kherson front towards Verbove. Meanwhile, by September 19, elements of three regiments of the 76th Airborne Division were relocated from the Lyman-Svatove front in Luhansk oblast towards Kopani. Essentially, the Russian General Staff decided to relocate two of their four elite airborne divisions from strategic reserve to the Robotyne sector. (Elements of the other two divisions, the 98th and 106th, plus the independent 11th, 31st and 83d VDV Brigades, are all in the Bakhmut sector) [1] So far, Russian counterattacks have yielded disappointing results. An attack from north of Verbove towards Nova Tokmachka by the 108th VDV Regiment was stopped by concentrated Ukrainian artillery, after minor gains. Similarly, on September 19 a counterattack at the opposite flank north of Kopani towards Novodanylivka by the 104th VDV Regiment was stillborn in a cloud of Ukrainian artillery fire and active defense by elements of the Ukrainian 65th and 116th Mechanized Brigades. (See artillery barrages Nos. 1 and 2 on Map SEP 19)
Regardless, on September 21, drone video from the 56th VDV Regiment of the Russian 7th Mountain Air Assault Division showed that for the first time Ukrainian Stryker and Marder infantry fighting vehicles had penetrated behind the dragon's teeth tank obstacles and anti-tank ditches at the forward edge of the 2nd (main) belt of defenses west of Verbove. Moreover, the vehicles were shown disembarking infantry just shy of the field fortifications that comprise the back end of the Russian defenses in this sector. The attack appeared to consist of up to two mechanized companies of the 82nd Air Mobile Brigade. Moreover, Ukrainian BTR-4 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) were also spotted, meaning that a company of the National Guard (probably the 15th "Kara-Dag" Brigade) was also involved. (The National Guard and 92nd Mechanized Brigade are the only units that still field the native-born BTR-4 "Bucephalus" IFV) Thus, it appears that the Ukrainians made an attempt to resume their momentum. Once through the rear trenches of the Surovikin Line, their task only gets harder. The last kilometer west of Verbove consists of open ground without any cover or concealment. [2] Therefore, pending further confirmation, I do not want to prematurely announce a Ukrainian success at Verbove. Until such time, let us return to a discussion of the tactical hurdles encountered by the Ukrainians during their approach through the Security Zone towards Robotyne during June-August 2023.
Destroyed Marder IFV near Verbove
B. The Difficulty of Penetrating the Security Zone in Front of Robotyne
In my September 1 article about the Ukrainian capture of Robotyne, I focused on the actual storming of the village that resulted in its capture on August 23. The climactic attack was compared to the U.S. Marine attack on "Sugar Loaf" Hill during the Battle of Okinawa in May 1945, which offered many parallells. In closing, I suggested that storming the village, while bloody, was not the biggest problem. The greatest tactical challenge was in negotiating the five kilometers of open and heavily mined fields of the Security Zone along the approaches to the town. In essence, the topography and the minefields force a mechanized column to proceed very slowly through the depth of the Security Zone, increasing the time when it is exposed to observation and defensive fires.
To circumvent the depth of the open fields in front of Robotyne after the initial failed mechanized attacks on June7-8, the Ukrainians shifted to small unit infiltration tactics. [3] The fighting assumed characteristics of siege warfare, like at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu during the Franco-Vietnamese conflict in 1954 or even at Port Arthur during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905, where sap trenches were dug incrementally in a zig-zag pattern towards the objective to provide cover for assaulting infantry until they were close enough for the final assault. In such a manner, the attackers were exposed to defensive fires for only a brief period, right at the end. In comparison, at Robotyne the Ukrainians used existing Russian entrenchments as interim objectives, capturing them methodically by stealth by infiltrating through tree lines until they closed the distance sufficiently to assault the village itself.
Nevertheless, anytime Ukrainian infantry works its way up against stronger company-sized entrenchments, infiltration tactics are not enough. Larger units have to brave artillery fire and ATGMs to advance speedily in armored personnel carriers, before disembarking on the objective - always a harrowing experience. These maneuvers do not always succeed and result in heavy losses in armor, which started to pile up in "tank graveyards" throughout the Security Zone. (See Map 2) The silver lining in these attacks is that Western armor protects the Ukrainian infantry inside and keeps casualties down.
The specific factors complicating the approach to Robotyne are discussed below.
1. Unfavorable Terrain
Robotyne is a small village with a peacetime population of less than 500 residents in the Tokmak district of the Polohy subdivision of Zaporizhzia oblast in southern Ukraine. It sits 11 kilometers south of the town of Orikhiv astride the T-04-08 road that leads further south to the town of Tokmak, a strategic logistics hub. (Map 2) However, the tactical significance of Robotyne lies in its location on a subtle elevation that overlooks the entire countryside to the north, east and west. Although the topographical elevation of Robotyne is a mere 150 meters above sea level, it sits 25-30 meters higher than any of its northern approaches, which rise gently towards the village for up to five kilometers (the maximum effective range of the Russian Kornet anti-tank guided missile). The ground north of Robotyne is relatively open, with only a few small gullies, or balkas, and other folds in the ground, affording an attacker meager cover during an attack. The only concealment along the approaches to the village are the series of treevlines and underbrush that act as windbreaks in the open steppe of southern Ukraine. This ground makes up the Security Zone of the Surovikin Line, the so-called "crumple zone." This zone is chock full of anti-tank and anti-personnel minefields, which have taken such a heavy toll on Ukrainian armor and infantry since June 7-8, the date of the first larger attack in this sector. (See blue pyramids in Map 2 indicating the location, date, and the originating unit of "tank graveyards" along the approaches to Robotyne) The Security Zone is also sprinkled with firing positions and revetments for small mobile anti-tank teams, which correct Russian artillery and "shoot" at approaching Ukrainian armor with Kornet ATGMs, before "scooting" at speed in all-terrain reconnaissance vehicles to the next defensive position. The Russian ability to observe and cover the dense minefields in the relatively open terrain of the Security Zone by mortar and sniper fire from the elevation in Robotyne has been the primary deterrence against Ukrainian mine clearing efforts by dismounted sappers during the first three months of the counter-offensive.
Another unexpected difficulty presented by the terrain in the vicinity of Robotyne has been the added concealment provided to Russian defenders by the thick undergrowth that covers the open fields along its approaches. Whereas, during peacetime, Ukrainian farmers would have routinely cultivated the fields in accordance with seasonal planting and harvesting schedules, one and one-half years of war have interrupted the farming calendar. The resulting undergrowth favors the defender, who can better conceal his presence from overhead drone observation by sitting still, compared to the attacker, who is more likely to reveal his position when moving to contact. Nonetheless, this sundried undergrowth quickly burns off after a sector is subjected to artillery fire in the late summer heat.
Moreover, Robotyne is difficult to outflank because of the fortified villages of Kopani, on elevated ground six kilometers to the west, and Verbove, eight kilometers to the east. Intervening spurs and high ground between Robotyne and Verbove, like Hill 166, have revealed themselves to be key terrain in the battle. Their locations enable the Russian defenders to interlace fires from anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and heavy mortars with Robotyne. In turn, the elevation at Robotyne enables the Russians to cover the eastern flank of Kopani and the western flank of Verbove. Finally, the elevation at Robotyne continues to rise gently south towards the nearby village of Novoprokopivka, which forms a spur leading to an even taller east-west ridge (elevation 165-170 meters above sea level) that intersects the T-04-08 road at the villages of Ilchynkove and Solodka Balka. (Map 2) This ridge dominates the entire battlefield encompassing the Kopani - Robotyne - Novoprokopivka - Verbove sector. Consequently, the Russians have built their main line of defense (the 2nd line) behind the military crest of this ridge and constructed "dragon's teeth" and anti-tank ditches to its front. (Red-and-white dashed line on Map SEP 19).
Russian artillery lies beyond this 2nd line of defenses. This ridge also shields Russian tactical mobile reserves, which shelter near the T-04-08 road at Solodka Balka and Ilchynkove, before racing forward to counterattack Ukrainian incursions at Robotyne in infantry fighting vehicles. Moreover, Russian K-52 Alligator attack helicopters pop up from behind this east-west ridge to fire their Vikhr ATGMs at approaching Ukrainian armor from up to eight kilometers out. The elevation at Robotyne also shields these attack helicopters from the line-of-sight of Ukrainian short range anti-air missiles (SHORAD), giving the K-52 Alligators the time to hover above the intervening ridge long enough to guide their missiles towards their targets.
But make no mistake - Robotyne is the keystone of the entire Russian defensive system in the sector. As a combat outpost it is perfectly situated to cover the surrounding area by supportive fire and observation in all directions. It is the central apex of the first line of Russian defenses on this shortest axis of advance to the Ukrainian operational objective - Tokmak. After all, the space between the first defensive belt at Robotyne and the 2nd (main) line at Solodka Balka is five kilometers - the narrowest gap along the entire Surovikin Line. Seize Robotyne and Novorokopivka behind it will eventually fall, putting the rear of the 2nd line at Solodka Balka within direct fire of Ukrainian tanks and ATGMs, let alone artillery. Moreover, the capture of Robotyne puts the defense of both Kopani in the west and Verbove in the east in jeopardy. Of course, the high ground along the flanks of Robotyne, or at least the two spurs along its eastern approaches, must be seized or neutralized before Robotyne can be attacked. Arguably, if lessons from the 1945 Marine attack on "Sugar Loaf Hill" have any application, Kopani, Noprokopivka and Verbove need to be attacked simultaneously with an assault on Robotyne, in order to deflect the attention of supportive fires from these villages while the main assault on Robotyne is in progress.
2. Extensive Minefields Covered by Fire
As the adage goes, "obstacles are useless unless covered by observation and fire." Thus, the most troublesome characteristic of the elevation at Robotyne is the ability to keep the extensive minefields along its approaches under constant observation. Any daytime attempt to conduct demining efforts with mine plows or line charges results in an almost instantaneous response by artillery, mortar, and sniper fire. Moreover, Russian artillery, ATGMs, and "kamikaze" drones prioritize the destruction of mine-clearing equipment since the Ukrainians did not have many of these to begin with. Concurrently, Russian snipers prioritize the shooting of Ukrainian dismounted sappers. As the Ukrainian demining equipment approached Robotyne, direct fire weapons were also brought to bear as it came within range. Many anti-tank mines are laid in three layers to magnify the power of the explosion so as to destroy demining equipment beyond repair. [4]
When taking into consideration the depth and width of the minefields laid by the Russians over the course of eight months, one can begin to appreciate the challenge facing the Ukrainians in front of Robotyne. Given that the Ukrainians began the offensive with a relatively small number of demining tanks and plows, they were limited in the number of lanes that they could open towards Russian forward positions. Instead of attacking the Russian first line on a broad front of over ten kilometers with multiple lanes, they were forced to limit their efforts to 2-3 kilometers in two to three lanes. By way of illustration, in the initial mechanized attacks launched by the 47th Mechanized Brigade on June 7-8, the Ukrainians lost three of their Finnish supplied Berger Leopard-2R mine clearing tanks and two Soviet era mine trawling BMPs - approximately 50% of the mine clearing vehicles in the brigade. [5]
Furthermore, attempts at using heavy demining equipment at night is risky, since Russian K-52 helicopters are equipped with thermal night vision devices, which are able to detect such efforts through heat signature. Therefore, most of the demining had to be done by sappers the old-fashioned way, inching their way forward on their hands and knees while prodding the ground with sticks, or walking erect through tree lines while using handheld detectors. State-of-the-art man-portable mine clearing charges that could be carried on the back of a sapper would have been useful. Unfortunately, the Ukrainians were able to obtain such prized items only recently, and in small batches. It was only after the front lines moved up to and adjacent to the village of Robotyne, that large-scale mechanized demining efforts could be attempted further back, relatively safe from Russian observers. Even so, continued Russian control of the ridge southwest of Robotyne at Kopani, enables direct fire onto the main T-08-04 road from Orikhiv from mortars, ATGMs and tanks. Thus, the Ukrainians are still hampered in the timely resupply of their front-line battalions at Novopokropivka and Verbove. During daylight hours, almost everything has to be brought up on foot or delivered at high speed by Bradleys or all-terrain vehicles while exposed to artillery and other forms of suppressive fire. The same applies for the evacuation of the wounded, who face the threat of artillery or "kamikaze" drones during the perilous race back to friendly lines.
While mines rarely destroy heavier armor, like the German Leopard tanks or American Bradley M2A2 infantry fighting vehicles, they disable them and make them stationary. This makes them vulnerable to artillery, ATGMs, and "kamikaze" drones. Speed is an essential requirement on the battlefield for survivability. Take that away and the destruction of the vehicle is a matter of time.
Another consequence of the extensive Russian minefields is operational. Although, the Ukrainians were able to attrit Russian forces on the Orikhiv - Tokmak axis to such an extent that the Russian General Staff was forced to shift two of their elite VDV divisions to the Robotyne sector, the thickly sown minefields in other sectors of the front cannot be demined quickly enough to take advantage of gaps that open up after the lateral relocation of Russian reserves. Thus, for instance, even if the Russians weaken themselves along another sector of front, like at Vuhledar, the Ukrainians do not have enough time and resources to demine the approaches to the new objective fast enough before the Russians shift reinforcements back again. This forces the Ukrainians to pursue their counteroffensive along the previously selected axes of advance, and consequently, in a more predictable manner.
3. The Counter-Battery Artillery Battle
The Russo-Ukrainian War has been described, quite accurately, as an artillery war. So too, at Robotyne, artillery is the primary killer, both of personnel and armor. Any daytime maneuver above squad level invariably results in either an artillery precision strike by a single drone directed laser-guided shell, or a more traditional artillery barrage, where a tight area is selected for bombardment based on map coordinates and corrected for any deviation by observation drones. 120 mm mortars are also active in blanketing small teams of infantrymen, particularly sappers, who are not important enough to warrant tube artillery.
Earlier in the war the Russians enjoyed a vast artillery superiority. However, as they fired off much of their stocks of ammunition and wore out the barrels of their guns, the Ukrainians were able to redress the balance, somewhat, through the supply of Western artillery and ammunition. Nevertheless, the Russians usually had more shells to fire. Ukrainian artillery had to be more accurate and efficient, out of necessity, relying on drones or pre-programmed computer tablets or planchettes to correct their fire. The Russians, on the other hand, adhered to tried and tested formulas of saturating a particular area by the requisite number shells per square meter of the target. That changed during the Ukrainian offensive in Kherson in the Fall of 2022. Taking advantage of the physical barrier posed by the Dnieper River to complicate the free flow of logistics to Russian units on the opposite west bank, the Ukrainians were able to starve Russian guns of their usual diet of shells. Australian general Mick Ryan called this the Ukrainian strategy of corrosion. [6] Eventually, general Alexandr Surovikin convinced Vladimir Putin of the prudence of retreating across the Dnieper in order to avoid a general collapse.
During this Summer counteroffensive, the Ukrainians are attempting to duplicate their success at Kherson by pursuing a similar campaign of corroding Russian logistics, but on a grander scale. Only this time, they do not have the advantage of the Dnieper River at the Russian backs. Nevertheless, taking to heart Soviet Marshall Mykhail Tukhachevsky's operational approach of "deep battle", they have cast their eye further afield. [7] By taking advantage of Russian vulnerabilities to their lines of communication through the Kerch bridge into Crimea, and then running out of the peninsula to southern Ukraine over bridges at Henchinsk and Chongar, the Ukrainians are attempting to starve Russian artillery of ammunition.
On an operational level, long range rockets like American High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), British Storm Shadow, and the French SCALP have been utilized to target Russian ammunition supply dumps, as well as transportation infrastructure, such as railroad stations and bridges, to starve the Russians of artillery shells. Although these efforts have diminished the volume of Russian artillery support, the process has not been able to eliminate it altogether. To date, enough Russian artillery ammunition remains available for defensive fires and preparatory barrages prior to local counterattacks.
Moreover, at the tactical level the Ukrainians have paid particular attention to the counter-battery fight by prioritizing Russian artillery at every opportunity. They have been able to concentrate three entire artillery brigades, the 40th, 46th and 47th, as well as a portion of the 44th Artillery Brigade in the Kopani-Robotyne-Verbove sector. Moreover, the organic artillery battalions of at least twelve mechanized or motorized brigades also provide artillery support for their parent units. Finally, Ukrainian "kamikaze drones have been effective at disabling Russian guns. Consequently, the Ukrainians have been able to establish an artillery superiority in the area, albeit not an overwhelming one.
Nonetheless, despite putting numerous Russian artillery pieces out of action by counter-battery fire, the enemy is still able to hide and concentrate enough artillery to blanket a Ukrainian penetration of the front to disorder the Ukrainian attackers prior to a Russian counterattack. Moreover, the Russians maintain a superiority in multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), which they attempt to exploit at every opportunity. The Russians have located the 50th, 291st and 292nd Artillery Brigades in the area. Finally, the Russians are attempting to compensate for their depreciating artillery advantage by using K-52 attack helicopters, Lancet "kamikaze" drones, and air launched KAB glide bombs.
4. Ubiquitous Drones; especially "Kamikaze" Drones
No technology has dominated the Russo-Ukrainian war more than the drone. The utilization of tens of thousands of cheap commercially produced drones by both sides has amped up the scale and scope of their application. Now, virtually any tactical unit, however small, is under constant observation from the air. Nevertheless, aerial surveillance is but a small sample of what drones can do. Whereas initially the drone was used for observation and correction of artillery fire, it has now morphed into a dangerous lethal weapons platform, which can accurately drop or fire munitions of various lethality on armored vehicles and personnel. For instance, explosive-dropping drones have partially replaced light-mortars, since a skilled drone operator can drop ordinance with more precision on a trench line than a mortar team. After all, a mortar is an area fire weapon. Furthermore, the drone operator need not be a full-fledged infantryman in his/her prime. Older servicemembers, the disabled, and even amputees have assumed the role of drone operators and are as valuable as front-line personnel.
Overall, the drone has become so ubiquitous that at any given time scores are hovering over a battlefield with video cameras capturing the ongoing activity on the ground, not only for brigade commanders in the rear, but also tank company commanders, infantry platoon commanders, and even patrol squad leaders in direct contact with the enemy. The video stream from all levels is displayed at higher headquarters on multiple monitors, availing commanders at brigade level and above heretofore undreamed-of situational awareness (and the temptation to micromanage). Perhaps the most serious consequence of the wide-spread application of the drone is that it has severely diminished, if not eliminated, the opportunity for tactical, let alone operational surprise on the modern battlefield, especially after foliage falls away in Autumn. This, more than any factor, impeded early Ukrainian attempts to surprise the Russians with combined arms mechanized maneuver towards Robotyne. [8]
Moreover, the application of so-called commercial sporting, or "racing", drones has turned the drone into a munition in-and-of-itself - the so-called "kamikaze" drone - which crashes into its target at high speed. These are operated by, for want of a better phrase, virtual reality gamers, who pilot these high-speed aircraft remotely by donning video gaming goggles to see the terrain from the drone's perspective. Because of their high speed they are very difficult to intercept. Furthermore, the "kamikaze" drones are directed to their targets by other observation drones, which scour the countryside for vulnerable targets. Increasingly, they are augmenting artillery and ATGMs as the weapon of choice against enemy artillery, armor, and personnel. Ukrainian armor and artillery have increasingly been the target of these illusive flying munitions. But a disclaimer is necessary. Because of their small size, "kamikaze" drones do not carry a heavy payload. Thus, they merely damage; not destroy a tank or IFV. However, when disabled, armored vehicles and self-propelled artillery pieces are inevitably targeted by artillery or ATGMs. [9]
During the three months leading to the capture of Robotyne, observation and "kamikaze" drones severely complicated Ukrainian maneuver and logistics. Even after the capture of Robotyne, Ukrainian supply efforts from Orikhiv are impeded by Russian control of the high ground to the west at Kopani. Drawing on lessons discussed in my last article that compared the capture of Robotyne with the U.S. Marine battle for "Sugar Loaf" Hill in Okinawa, control of high ground on the flanks of a critical elevation is a prerequisite for further offensive operations. Until Ukrainian forces can control the high ground at Kopani, the T-04-08 road, which is the main supply artery to the forces in Robotyne, is within range of Russian mortars, ATGMs, and tanks that are situated along the ridge between Robotyne and Kopani. Consequently, reinforcements and supplies have to be brought up at night in small and highly mobile vehicles, like HUMVEEs, all-terrain buggies, and even motorcycles with sidecars. Therefore, during daylight hours, everything essential is carried on foot. Fast armor, like Bradleys are quickly spotted by the ubiquitous observation drones and subjected to artillery or "kamikaze" drone attacks.
5. Nowhere to Hide After Successful Attack
Degraded trenches east of Robotyne
Small-unit infiltration tactics that seek to seize limited objectives (that is, attacks at short distance of a few hundred meters) and then defend them against counterattack have been around since the First World War. The British called them "bite and hold" tactics. [10] The success of these depend on the ability of the attacker to maintain control of territorial gains. Only, during the advance to Robotyne, the trenchlines and fortifications captured by Ukrainian infantry have sometimes been so degraded by artillery fire during alternating assaults by Ukrainians and successive counterattacks by the Russians that there is virtually no effective cover remaining. Furthermore, Russian combat engineers customarily set explosives and booby-traps inside of trenchlines and bunkers, which are detonated remotely as soon as Ukrainian assaulting infantry enter the fortifications. One only has to look at overhead drone video of Robotyne itself, where most of the structures have been levelled to the ground. Too often, Ukrainian artillery chases the Russian defenders out of a trenchline before the Ukrainian attackers enter it, only for Russian artillery to chase the Ukrainian attackers out shortly thereafter and the Russians counterattack and recapture empty but degraded fortifications. The Ukrainians have started to plan for an immediate effort to improve fortifications as soon as these are captured, in order to withstand subsequent bombardment.
7. K-52 Attack Helicopters and Weak Ukrainian SHORAD
The elevation at Robotyne amplified the Ukrainian deficiency in mobile short range anti-air defense missile systems (SHORAD) near the line of contact. SHORAD are weapons systems that have a longer range than man portable air defense systems (MANPADS), like American supplied Stingers or Russian Ihlas (range of five-six kilometers), but a shorter range than medium range systems like the BUK (70 kilometers).
Ukraine has a number of older Soviet era systems, like the 9K33 Osa, 2K22 Tunguska, 9M337 Sosna-R, 9K35 Strela-10 and Pantsir that qualify as SHORAD, all with a range of between 5-20 kilometers. Moreover, the Ukrainian ground forces have been supplied by over 50 of the excellent German Gepard anti-air cannon that can also engage helicopters at up to 5.5 kilometers. However, most of these have had to be pulled back closer to the large cities to defend against the slow flying Iraqi Shahed-136 drones that have been launched at Ukrainian cities almost every night. In the choice between tactical success on the battlefield and protecting the civilian population and infrastructure, the Ukrainians have so far opted for the latter.
This deficiency was evident during the fighting in the Robotyne - Verbove sector on June 8, when Russian K-52 helicopters were able to fire Vikhr anti-tank guided missiles at the advancing Ukrainian armor from long range, up to eight kilometers away, without fear of Ukrainian retaliation. In large measure, the Russian helicopters were able to avoid the shorter-range Ukrainian shoulder fired anti-air weapons like the Stinger and Ihla systems by staying out of range and by hugging the terrain at low altitude, especially at night, where their thermal sights can target armored vehicles. Moreover, even after Ukrainian infiltration tactics helped close the distance between the Stingers and Ihla teams and the ridge south of Novopokropivka, behind which the Russian helicopters sheltered before popping up to fire their missiles, the elevation of Robotyne played a significant role in creating difficulties for the Ukrainians. The high ground blocked their line-of-sight for direct observation of the Russian helicopters and, consequently, negated the use of the man portable anti-air missiles.
Matters changed dramatically, however, once the Ukrainians captured Robotyne on August 23. Having closed the distance and captured an elevation which afforded Ukrainian man portable anti-air missile operators a clear view of the ridgeline further back behind Novopokropivka, Russian helicopter crews have less time to hover uninterrupted during which to fire their Vikhr ATGM missiles. Meanwhile, Ukrainian Stinger and Ihla and even Swedish RBS-70 crews are within range and direct observation of the K-52 Alligators. [11]
8. Russian Fixed Wing Air Attacks; KAB Glide Bombs
Ukrainian anti-air defense systems have been able to deny Russian tactical aviation access to their airspace since the first days of the war. When the Russians tried to bomb targets over Ukrainian territory during the first week of hostilities, their jets were shot out of the sky by long-range S-300 anti-air missiles, BUK mid-range missiles, and man portable anti-air missiles (MANPADS). Moreover, the Russian bombs were "dumb"; meaning that they had no outside guidance system and relied on gravity and the skill of the pilots to reach their target. After their initial losses, the only option remaining for Russian jets was to launch air-to-ground missiles from outside Ukrainian airspace, on their side of the frontlines, and out-of-range of Ukrainian anti-air defenses.
However, beginning this year, the Russians adapted. They realized that they could launch traditional heavy "dumb" bombs, those without guidance systems, from well inside of their airspace, if these bombs had wings attached to enable them to glide to their targets. Moreover, if equipped with primitive guidance systems that were connected to the Russian version of GPS, they had a modicum of accuracy. Under optimum conditions, these can fly 25 miles or farther if the launching plane releases it at 40,000 feet or higher. Known as UPAB-1500 and FAB-500 glide-bombs, these have the added benefit of carrying a heavy payload and thick armor, making them difficult to bring down with lighter anti-air weapons. Some pack quite a punch - up to 2,000 pounds of high explosive. Moreover, the Russians have an almost endless supply of these in stock. Thus, Russian jets are launching their munitions from outside the range of the densest Ukrainian air-defenses.
The use of the glide bombs began to proliferate during the fighting for Robotyne. Ukrainians refer to these as “KABs”. It is evident that Ukrainian troops fear these munitions more than any other because of their wallop. Thankfully, these are not as precise as "kamikaze" drones or laser guided artillery shells. Moreover, it is inefficient to use them against smaller units. The glide bombs, however, have caused havoc in Ukrainian staging areas, like Orikhiv and Novodanylivka. [12]
The introduction of F-16 fighter jets with their long-range radars and anti-air missiles would negate the effectiveness of the glide bombs by enabling Ukrainian fighter jets to fly at higher altitude, thereby pushing Russian aviation further back from the battlefield.
9. Russian Electronic Warfare
One of the anecdotal observations in this war is that Russian communications are primitive and relatively easy to intercept or to disrupt. Paradoxically, Russian electronic warfare units are superb. These are staffed by genuine specialists who constantly adapt to Ukrainian efforts to keep their signal communications secure and operating; especially the video feeds between cameras in observation drones and the recipients of the film product on the ground. Consequently, Ukrainian commanders at all levels struggle to maintain communications and must be prepared to implement fallback channels to sustain situational awareness. In fact, Russian electronic warfare stations are primary targets of Ukrainian "kamikaze" drone operators, more so than even artillery or command-and-control vehicles.
10. Competent Resistance of the Russian 42nd Division and Attached Spetsnaz/Recon Units
The Kopani - Robotyne - Verbove sector is manned by sub-units of the Russian 42nd Division. The sector immediately to the west along the Kamianka-Vasilivka axis is the responsibility of the 19th Division. It must be noted that that the 19th and 42nd Divisions performed very well during the first weeks of the Russo-Ukraine War - much better than the Russian units assaulting Kyiv, Kharkiv or the Donbas. They were instrumental in the Russian capture of the Black Sea and Azov coasts of Ukraine, as well as southern Zaporizhzhia oblast, including the Enerhodar nuclear facility along the east bank of the Dnieper River. Since March of 2022, this area has been a relatively quiet sector of front, without major offensive operations by either side. Consequently, the sub-units of the 19th and 42nd Divisions were relatively fresh when the Ukrainians commenced their counteroffensive on June 7-8.
Throughout the defense of the Robotyne sector beginning on June 7 through the present, the sub-units of the 42nd Division have been resilient and competent in executing the Russian tactics of resisting Ukrainian incursions as far forward as possible, counterattacking Ukrainian gains at every opportunity. Although, the 42nd Division has sustained heavy losses, its 291st and 70th Motor Rifle Regiments have had at least one or even two of their battalions in the fight at any given time. In September the 70th Motor Rifle Regiment also joined the division. Furthermore, recognition must be given to the 22nd Spetsnaz Brigade and the 110th and 417th Reconnaissance Brigades, which have been attached to the 42nd Division. These elite units operate in small teams along the width of the front, where they correct artillery and utilize Kornet ATGMs in attriting Ukrainian armor. In assessing the factors that made Robotyne such a tough nut to crack, the resistance of the 42nd Division and the spetsnaz and reconnaissance units cannot be discounted. They fought with skill and resolve.
Of course, Ukrainian strategy and tactics had a say in how the battle for Robotyne unfolded. But that is a topic for another time.
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