The Obstacles to a Ukrainian Counteroffensive in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts?
Part I. All Power to the Defense, For Now.
On August 5, analysts at the respected Institute for the Study of War in Washington D.C. announced that Ukraine had seized the strategic initiative for the first time in this war. The conclusion was based on the Russian decision to withdraw some of their forces from the offensive in the Donbas to reinforce their defenses in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts (the South), where the Ukrainians are expected to launch a counteroffensive. The experts anticipate that going forward, the Ukrainians may be able to dictate when and where to launch future operations, whereas the Russians will be forced to respond instead of dictating the proceedings.
Perhaps the experts are correct. But this may be the first smart decision taken by the Russians since the beginning of the war. By maintaining control over the strategic southern regions of Ukraine, Russia may be in position to dictate the terms of cease fire negotiations, instead of wasting blood and treasure in pursuit of Putin’s “prestige” objectives of capturing the cities of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. After all, the latter are nothing but ostensible trophies to be offered to the Russian TV viewing public to boost Putin’s approval ratings.
Conversely, the Ukrainians must win back Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, if they are to recapture the delta of the Dnieper River and sever the land bridge between Russia and Crimea. If successful, the Ukrainians can negotiate from a position of strength in cease fire negotiations, which they can initiate before Russia is ready to launch a counteroffensive to win the territory back. But if they fail, Ukraine will be forced to either accept a cease fire on Russian terms and reconcile itself to becoming a rump state[1], without access to the sea, or gird itself for a long war of attrition with diminishing Western support. Neither option bodes well for Ukraine’s future. Moreover, the Ukrainians must complete the operation by late Fall. Otherwise, the onset of the muddy season in November will put an end to mechanized maneuver until the ground freezes in January of next year. In the meantime, Putin will take advantage of rising oil and gas prices together with freezing temperatures to persuade the populations of Western Europe to put pressure on their governments to force Ukraine to accept Russian territorial gains in return for cheaper energy.
Needless to say, a Ukrainian counteroffensive before the end of this year is much easier said than done. If anything, Russian offensives so far have demonstrated the challenges of mounting deep operations in the face of the latest technological capabilities that have swung the pendulum in favor of the defensive form of war, not only at the tactical but on the operational level.[2] The mix of new technological capabilities that are shifting the advantage back to the defense include the wide-spread use of drone surveillance, encrypted command and control communication networks, telecommunications between drones and artillery fire control centers, and precision long-range artillery and rocket systems with GPS or laser-guided munitions. When combined with older technologies, like anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and man portable anti-air defense systems (MANPADS), the side playing defense makes it difficult for the adversary to launch an attack above small-unit level. Even a company level attack is subject to detection and targeting by artillery. This technological trend negates previously held blueprints for how to conduct offensive operations against deeply echeloned defenses. These relied on a breakthrough of the front through a concentration of armored forces at a decisive point, followed by an exploitation and pursuit by mechanized reserves deep into the enemy’s rear.
Because of the recent shift of Russian reinforcements from the Donbas to the South, the task of launching a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive became that much harder. The Russian General Staff reinforced its forces near Kherson by at least four airborne battalion tactical groups (BTGs) from the 98th and 104th airborne divisions (2,000 men).[3] These have been withdrawn from the fighting near Bakhmut and Bohorodychne. Moreover, a further 3,000 men organized into four to five motorized rifle BTGs from the 35th army have been relocated from the fighting at Izyum to Ivanivka and Verkhnyi Rohachyk, which are located midway between Melitopil and Kherson on the east bank of the Dnieper. Apparently, these forces have been placed in reserve to be used to counterattack any Ukrainian offensive towards Melitopil into the right flank. Observers also noticed reformed BTGs from Belgorod, Russia concentrating west of Melitopil. Their current location suggests that the Russians are very concerned about a potential Ukrainian offensive to seize Melitopil. Furthermore, an undetermined number of conscripts from the Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples Republics (DNR/LNR) are also being redirected to reinforce the South. Thus, it seems that the Russian General Staff is abandoning its previous strategic objective of capturing the entirety of the Donbas and shifting priorities to maintaining territorial gains along the Black Sea and Azov coast. Russian attacks continue in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka sectors, but these appear more designed to pin Ukrainian forces in the Donbas, so they cannot be shifted to the South.
Notwithstanding the numerical and qualitative balance of opposing forces in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, solutions to unlocking the stranglehold on Ukrainian offensive operations in the South remain constant. These are found in the (a) dispersion of the attacking forces over a broad front, (b) attrition and misdirection of the enemy on multiple fronts, (3) synchronization and sequencing of attacks through good staff work from above, (4) concentration of artillery at the decisive points in both the close and deep battle, (4) concentration of anti-air missile defenses over the battle zone, (5) use of elite forces for the exploitation and pursuit following a breakthrough, and (6) the judicious interdiction of traffic over the strategic bridges. Also, much depends on the reinforcement of Ukrainian forces by the 10,000 soldiers who are currently undergoing training in Great Britain. These are expected to replace losses in the ranks of the better mechanized and air assault brigades.
A discussion of the obstacles faced by a large Ukrainian counteroffensive in the South and its solutions follows.
1. The Problem
For the casual student of warfare, memories of armored phalanxes of M1A1 Abrams tanks spread out across the desert striking deep into the rear of Iraqi defenses in 1991 or columns of M1A2 Abrams tanks snaking along the Euphrates River towards Baghdad in 2003 are the visual reference point for how to conduct a modern offensive. For a more serious military historian, archival footage of Heinz Guderian’s marauding Panzer III tanks pouring out of the Ardennes in 1940, Georgy Zhukov’s fleets of T-34 tanks gliding over the steppes of the Eastern Front in 1943 or George Patton’s Sherman M4s slashing through France in 1944 add to a mental blueprint of what an armored offensive should look like. Even recollections of Arik Sharon’s M60 tanks crossing the Suez Canal in 1973 conjure up images of the preconditions for a major mechanized exploitation.
However, that template no longer applies. The above vignettes depended on tactical or operational surprise to create the preconditions for a breakthrough of the first line of defense, before an exploitation of the enemy rear was possible in sufficient depth. In other words, concentrations of armor could be massed on the reverse slope of a hill that was out sight of an adversary before the initial attack was launched. Moreover, the attacking side could rely on total air superiority, if not supremacy, to blind the defender to the concentration of forces on the other side of that hill. But in an environment where neither of the adversaries has total control of the air, where both have access to satellite surveillance, can avail themselves of plentiful drone technology and enjoy relatively secure telecommunications, surprise at scale is difficult to achieve. Moreover, precision targeting by artillery, rockets and missiles makes the concentration of larger forces at the decisive point costly. Thus, in this transparent warfare between relative peer competitors, new preconditions need to be met before an attack of operational impact can be launched through enemy lines.
Until recently the Russian army concentrated the bulk of its forces and resources in the Donbas in pursuit of Putin’s political objectives of capturing Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. Nevertheless, the Russian General Staff has not been myopic. Cognizant of the strategic value of the occupied territories along the Azov coast and along both banks of the Dnieper River at its delta with the Black Sea, it has been preparing defensive belts comprised of three concentric lines of echeloned fortifications on both sides of the Dnieper to withstand Ukrainian efforts to recapture the area. The first front, on the west bank of the Dnieper, extends approximately 250 kilometers in a northeasterly direction from Oleksandrivka, west of Kherson, to Vysokopillia, just short of Kryvyi Rih. It is reportedly defended by approximately 17 BTGs comprised of 12,000 Russian motorized infantry, airborne, spetsnaz and conscripts from the DNR/LNR, supported by plentiful artillery, much of which can fire from the opposite east bank of the Dnieper River. Moreover, the terrain near Kherson is some of the most open and flat in all of Ukraine. Except for tree lines along riverbeds, roads and/or agricultural tracts to act as windbreaks, there is very little concealment, let alone cover, for the attacker. Because the open terrain favors the defense, the Ukrainians have lost up to 50% of their tanks and armored vehicles after four months of fighting in this sector. These will have to be replaced before a serious counter-offensive can begin.
The second front, also approximately 250 kilometers in length, begins on the east bank of the Dnieper from Vasylivka in the west to Vuhledar in the east. It is manned by approximately ten BTGs in the first line with three in reserve, altogether amounting to 9,000 infantry. To complicate matters for the Ukrainian side, an undetermined number of previously destroyed BTGs from Russia and from the DNR/LPR have been observed moving north from Mariupil and Melitopil to reinforce the Zaporizhzhia front. These will either be used in a spoiling attack towards Zaporizhzhia to attrit Ukrainian reserves intended for a counteroffensive or attack a Ukrainian counteroffensive in the flank. The terrain south of Zaporizhzia is more rolling and covered with foliage than on the Kherson front, providing advancing infantry with more concealment.
The Russian defense belts along the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia fronts are sprinkled with minefields that channel attacks into kill zones and contain bunkers and gun emplacements that are hardened with reinforced concrete. Mind you, these are not contiguous lines, but a series of separated fortifications that are tied together by supporting fires and drone surveillance. The whole arrangement is covered by ample artillery of various calibers. Tactical reserves comprised of platoons of airborne or spetsnaz infantry and tanks supported by artillery stay out of range to move up and lead local counterattacks, if one of the defense lines is breached.
So far, the Ukrainians have been conducting slow creeping offensives on both fronts, primarily with infantry, with steady but modest results. By creeping offensive, I mean the sequencing of attacks limited in scope and depth on sectors of front that are distant from each other, to spread out Russian reserves, artillery support and resources. During an interview in a podcast on Silverado hosted by Dmitri Alperovitch and Michael Kofman, retired Ukrainian colonel Serhii Hrabsky described such a process as “slicing the sausage.”[4] Such a method results in small gains of no more than a kilometer or two before the enemy can rush resources to the threatened sector. It also requires nothing more than foot infantry. Armored vehicles stay to the rear to provide covering fire. If the attacking force can withstand the inevitable artillery strike and counterattack, the territorial gain remains in place. Otherwise, the attacker retreats to the line of departure. The process is then repeated at a different point in a couple of days or even weeks. The creeping offensives have sought not only gradual territorial gain but to distract the Russians from their main effort in the Donbas. A secondary purpose is to conduct a reconnaissance in force for future reference in a larger attack. The attacks are carried out at no larger than company level with a sharp artillery preparation of short duration; at times the attacking force is no larger than a reinforced platoon and a pair of BMPs.
Another reason for the limited scope of Ukrainian attacks is to preserve manpower and equipment. Even a concentration of a reinforced mechanized company of ten personnel carriers and four tanks attracts the attention of drones and a sharp response from artillery and mortars. To concentrate an entire battalion immediately behind the front line near a major communications artery, like a crossroads, is to invite an extended artillery barrage from many batteries of artillery of different calibers, together with an attack by fixed wing and rotary airpower. Invariably, the battalion level attack is stillborn before it gets past the line of departure. Moreover, follow-on forces and logistical support can also be spotted by drones and hit by long-range fires as far back as 80 kilometers behind the front line.
Truth be told, the Ukrainians have not made a serious effort to attack along the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia fronts but have relied on the recent arrival of Western artillery and the High Mobility Rocket Artillery System (HIMARS) to degrade the Russian forces before going forward in force. They have taken advantage of the superior range of the HIMARS system (up to 80 kilometers) to hit Russian command centers and supply nodes to stifle Russian command-and-control and to slacken artillery fire in the area. On July 27 HIMARS rockets rendered the Antonivsky bridge across the Dnieper near Kherson unusable by heavy vehicles, forcing the Russians to take a circuitous route of an additional 120 kilometers to bring up artillery ammunition to Kherson via the bridge and dam further east at Nova Kakhovka. However, the bridge at Nova Kakhovka was also hit by HIMARS fire, putting it temporarily out of commission. Similarly, the bridge at Dariivka over the Inhulets has been shelled, partially impeding access to Kherson from the east. Nonetheless, Russian long-range artillery and rockets from the east bank of the Dnieper can hit Ukrainian forces along likely avenues of advance to Kherson, without the impediment of the river or interdicted supply lines. Moreover, Russian engineers are trying to repair the damage and to build pontoon ferries and barges to offset the disabling of the Antonivsky bridge, although the force of the river current in this location is causing the Russians difficulty. Not to be outdone in the proficiency of targeting command centers, on July 23 Russian long-range artillery destroyed the headquarters of the 28th mechanized brigade, killing the commander, colonel Vitalii Huliaiev and three other lieutenant colonels. This will diminish the effective command and control of the Ukrainian troops attacking north of Kherson, until suitable replacements assume control.
The composition and number of Ukrainian forces along both the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia fronts is outlined in the following sections:
a. The Kherson Front.
Since June Ukrainian attacks along Route M-14 northwest of Kherson resulted in an advance to within 20 kilometers of the city, but efforts to edge closer have stalled. This sector is part of the Ukrainian operational group Prymoria (operatyvne uhrupuvannia viisk OUV “Prymoria”) commanded by the marine brigadier general Andrii Hnatov, which is part of the operational-strategic group Oleksandria (operatyvno-stratehichne uhrupuvannia viisk “Oleksandria”) commanded by major-general Andrii Kovalchuk. The Ukrainian attacks in this sector have been led by the 137th and 18th marine battalions and at least two mechanized battalions of the 28th mechanized brigade (altogether approximately 3,000 infantry). These regular units have been supplemented by companies of the 241st territorial defense brigade (2,000).
Northeast of Kherson the battle lines follow the curving coils of the Inhulets River to Snihurivka, where the Russians have fashioned a strong point. Attempts to take this fortification have failed so far. In fact, on August 7 the Russians launched a local counterattack in this area, presumably by some of the recent reinforcements from the Donbas. However, southwest of Snihurivka, the Ukrainians are close to interdicting Route P-81, which supplies the town. The Ukrainians have relied on at least two battalions of the regular 14th mechanized brigade and two infantry battalions of the 59th motorized brigade to invest Snihurivka (2,500 men). These units belong to the operational group Kakhovka (operatyvne uhrupuvannia viisk OUV “Kakhovka”), under the command of brigadier general Mykhailo Drapatyi. This operational group also belongs to the previously mentioned operational-strategic group Oleksandria commanded by major-general Kovalchuk.
Much of the heavier fighting recently occurred for control of the bridgehead on the east bank of the Inhulets River that the Ukrainians established near Davydiv Brid, northeast of Snihurivka. As it stands, control of the area east of the river is contested - the Ukrainians control the villages of Andriivka, Bilohirka and Lozove. However, the Russians were able to drive the Ukrainians back over to the west bank of the Inhulets in some locations. Russian artillery was able to destroy the bridge at Davydiv Brid, forcing the Ukrainian forces on the east bank to rely on pontoon bridges and or small boats for resupply. Ukrainian attacks near Davydiv Brid were carried out by elements of the 5th tank brigade with support from the 1st battalion of the 36th marine brigade, the 109th territorial defense brigade and the 63d mechanized brigade. These units also belong to the previously mentioned operational group Kakhovka. The 5th tank and 63d mechanized are reserve formations and not of the same caliber as the regular brigades. Reportedly, the area just west of the bridgehead has been reinforced by a tank battalion from the regular 17th tank brigade and a battalion or two of the fresh 61st jaeger brigade, which until recently has been patrolling the border with Belarus. In all, Ukrainian infantry near Davydiv Brid numbers 5,000 men.
At the northern most flank of the front stands the town of Vysokopillia, which remains under Russian control. Vysokopillia has been under attack by the Ukrainian 60th infantry brigade (2,000 men). This is a newly organized reserve formation that entered the fight in late March. It consists of at least two infantry battalions with their organic artillery. The 60th infantry brigade is reinforced by the 108th territorial defense brigade and companies of the 73d naval special forces center (2,500). These troops also belong to the operational group Kakhovka.
In summary, the presence of 15,000 Ukrainian infantry along the Kherson-Vysokopillia front is not enough to launch a deep offensive against the 12,000 or so Russian motorized, airborne, spetsnaz and sappers arrayed against them, particularly when entrenched behind prepared defenses. So far, the Russians have made good use of the BTGs of airborne and spetsnaz as a mobile reserve to respond to Ukrainian inroads near Kherson, Snihurivka, Davydiv Brid and Vysokopillia. Additionally, the 10,000 Russian non-combat personnel and support troops located at the airfield at Chornobaivka and surrounding areas will be available for static defense of fortifications around Kherson itself. The recent reports of the Russians reinforcements in the form of 2,000 additional paratroopers arriving on the Kherson front will likely take away any numerical advantage that the Ukrainians possess. Thus, total Russian strength on the west bank of the Dnieper amounts to roughly 25,000 personnel, of which 14,000 consists of combat ready infantry. Therefore, this front will have to be reinforced by at least six regular Ukrainian mechanized battalions (3,600 men) and two air assault battalions (1,000 men) to enable a breakthrough of the Russian defensive belt and subsequent exploitation towards Kherson and Nova Kahkovka.
b. The Zaporizhzhia Front
Ukrainian offensive operations east of the Dnieper have been of lesser intensity than near Kherson. Nonetheless, a creeping, if not sporadic, offensive in Zaporizhzhia oblast has been ongoing since June, particularly towards the Russian strong points at Vasylivka and Polohy. Recently, a local Ukrainian attack further east towards the strategic railroad center in Volnovakha caught the attention of the Russian General Staff. This spurred the Russians to reinforce the Volnovakha sector with up to three BTGs. Hence, the Ukrainian attack has been stymied short of Yehorivka, although a Russian counterattack to take back the villages of Shevchenko and Pavlivka was unsuccessful. The fact that the Russian General Staff had to divert up to three BTGs to the Zaporizhzhia front, instead of the Donbas, is probably the biggest benefit to the Ukrainian war effort.
Most of the Ukrainian infantry facing Vasylivka and Polohy belong to the 9th special operations regiment of the national guard, the 27th brigade of the national guard and the 2nd and 98th volunteer battalions - loosely associated with the nationalist Azov regiment (the first battalion of which surrendered in Mariupil in early June). Altogether, these amount to 3,000 men. The 9th battalion of the 59th motorized brigade has occupied defensive position to the northeast of Polohy since March (500 men). Until June, a battalion of the 128th mountain brigade had been located northwest of Polohy in tactical reserve (500 men). However, there has been nothing heard of the mountain infantrymen in weeks. Thus, it is possible that they were relocated to reinforce their sister battalion in the Donbas, where it was involved in heavy fighting at Rubizhne, Bilohorivka and Siversk in June and July. Some sources indicate that the artillery group of the 128th brigade remains in the Polohy sector. In any case, the 128th brigade has been replaced by a battalion of the 81st air assault brigade (500). The above units belong to the operational group Dnipro commanded by lieutenant-general Volodymyr Kravchenko. The operational group Dnipro is subordinated to the operational-strategic group Khortytsia under the command of lieutenant-general Oleksandr Syrskyi.
Further east, at Velyka Novosilka and Vuhledar, the front lines have been occupied by the 37th battalion of the 56th mechanized brigade, at least two battalions of the 53d mechanized brigade and one volunteer OUN battalion (2,500). However, the 53d brigade may be in the process of rotating out of the sector in favor of the newly organized 68th jaeger brigade (2,000). Similarly, the newly formed 71st jaeger brigade (2,000) has reportedly taken up positions in the second line of the front behind Velyka Novosilka.
The one recent Ukrainian redeployment to the Zaporizhzhia front that points to potential heightened activity is the appearance of the elite 1st battalion of the 1st armored brigade (30 tanks and 500 men) in operational reserve at Zelene Pole - Novosilka. Reputedly the best tank battalion in the Ukrainian army, it was involved in intense tank battles around Chernihiv during the initial campaign of the war. Its sudden appearance in the South may indicate that the Ukrainian General Staff is beginning to slowly concentrate attacking forces in preparation of a counter-offensive towards Melitopil. On the other hand, the Ukrainian command may be thinking of only stiffening the Zaporizhzia front defensively, given that the 68th and 71st jaeger brigades are untested formations that consist overwhelmingly of light infantry and lack heavier armored vehicles.
In all, Ukrainian strength along the Vasylivka-Vuhledar front amounts to approximately 11,000 infantry. Opposing them the Russians have positioned approximately 9,000 motorized, airborne, spetsnaz and naval infantry organized into 13 BTGs. These may be in the process of being reinforced by second-rate BTGs from the DNR/LNR or from Russia. It is obvious that the numerical relationship of forces along the Zaporizhzhia front is no more favorable to the Ukrainians than on the Kherson front. Their 2,000 advantage in infantry is hardly enough to assure a successful offensive. Only the battalions from the 1st armored and 81st air assault brigades pack a serious offensive punch. The remaining units are better suited for defensive responsibilities in positional warfare. Moreover, the Russian grouping of four to five BTGs from the 35th army west of Vasylivka is poised to hit any Ukrainian attack south in the right flank. The Ukrainians will need at least six additional mechanized battalions (3,600 men) and an armored battalion (30 tanks) before they hope to breach the Russian defense belt and then advance to the east-west railroad line between Volnovakha and Novobohdanivka – the obvious initial objective of any offensive towards the south (see map of proposed dual offensives towards Kherson and Melitopil). Moreover, a further three elite air assault battalions (1,500 men) will have to be available for a deep exploitation towards Melitopil, let alone a pursuit towards the Azov coast and the bridges to Crimea.
In Part II, the discussion shall consider possible solutions to the deadlock imposed by the defense on a counteroffensive in southern Ukraine.
[1] A rump state is the remnant of a once much larger state, left with a reduced territory in the wake of secession, annexation, occupation, decolonization, or a successful coup d’etat or revolution on part of its former territory. Wikipedia, retrieved 9 August 2022.
[2] The tactical level involves the realm of combat, i.e. the coordination of fires, maneuver and logistics of formations up to regiment and/or brigade in direct contact with the enemy, which in contemporary warfare can extend in depth as far as the combined range of both opposing artilleries – up to 80 kilometers. The operational level, on the other hand, concerns the organization, logistics, sequencing, and synchronization of the movement and supporting fires of larger formations, usually at corps level or above, in furtherance of an operational objective in the theater of operations that leads to a strategic benefit. The theater of operations can be hundreds of kilometers in breadth and in depth. Thus, the new technologies also influence the operational level, when reserves and supplies can be spotted, targeted and destroyed at operational depth.
[3] https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1555513462180270087
[4] Dmitri Alperovitch and Michael Kofman, “Slicing the Sausage: Ukraine’s Upcoming Counteroffensive.” 3 August 2022, http://podcast.silverado.org