Operational Phases
The Russo-Ukrainian War is currently in its third operational phase. The phases align with consecutive Russian offensives with successively diminishing objectives. It must be emphasized that none of the first two operations succeeded, with the exception of the capture of Kherson oblast.
The initial phase began on February 24 with an all-out Russian offensive on multiple axes of attack with the operational objective of capturing Kyiv in a coup de main (French word of art for overwhelming surprise assault from all directions). The strategic objective was the destruction of Ukraine’s government and military leadership. It had the secondary operational objective of preventing the Ukrainians from concentrating at any one point. Over the course of the next two weeks, Russia attacked Ukraine from the northwest, northeast, east, southeast and south, but was tamed on all fronts, with the exception of the southern sector, where the concentration of troops from the 49th and 58th Russian armies poured out of Crimea and seized Kherson oblast, before diluting their effort with divergent attacks towards Mariupil, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv and Kryvyi Rih.
By March 11 Russian attacks on Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy and Mykolayiv ground to a halt. It is at that point that the Russians decided to double down on their initial objectives, with an added twist. Whereas initially the Russians made some attempt to limit collateral damage, by the second week of March they began to apply the Aleppo formula (based on the Russian experience in Syria) to the major metropolitan centers of Ukraine, subjecting their civilian populations to indiscriminate bombardment and destruction of vital infrastructure. Apparently, the strategic objective was to accelerate a refugee crisis and to intimidate the Zelensky administration into capitulation, while concurrently resuming attacks that had failed during the first weeks of the war. Despite immense pressure, the Ukrainians held everywhere, except in the southern Donetsk oblast at Volnovakha, where they had to perform a fighting withdrawal to Vuhledar to shorten their front. It became apparent that after sustaining heavy casualties, the regular Russian mechanized infantry was of little value on the offensive. Russian ground assaults made inroads only if led by elite spetsnaz (special forces), airborne or naval infantry, who had the collective esprit de corps to advance. However, with their lightly armored BMD fighting vehicles, these were horribly exposed to artillery fire. By March 21 the Russian spetsnaz and airborne regiments west of Kyiv were no longer combat effective. On the average, most had sustained casualties of 30%. They had been recklessly misused to lead mechanized assaults in the forests and marshes northwest of Kyiv. Similarly, the majority of the naval infantry was also in a bad state. Like their counterparts in the Russian army, the marines were tasked with leading mechanized assaults, a mission they tackled with valor but for which they were not intended. Some of these were particularly bloodied in the fighting for Mariupil. To add insult to injury, Ukrainian artillery and snipers killed close to ten senior Russian generals, with the help of signals intelligence. There are unconfirmed reports that American intelligence was involved in some of these targeted kills. These losses reflect the risks of a top-down style of command where senior commanders go to the front to personally kick-start a stalled attack.
Due to the above setbacks, the Russian General Staff convinced Vladimir Putin that it was necessary to narrow the operational focus and to prioritize resources on a single objective, namely, the recapture of the Donbas. In other words, Russian efforts would focus on the recapture of those parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts that remained in Ukrainian control. This objective would shorten Russian supply lines and play to the Russian strength of concentrated preparatory fires. Consequently, by the fourth week of March, Russian forces northwest and northeast of Kyiv started to withdraw for relocation to the Donbas. By April 4 Kyiv, Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts were free of Russian troops.
After a short operational pause, the Russians resumed their offensive on April 19. This initiated the second phase of the war. Russian forces attacked along the entire front from Hulyaipole in the west (near Zaporizhzhia) to Izyum in the east, a distance of nearly 500 kilometers, in order to pin Ukrainian reserves in place all along the front. However, the main effort was focused south of Izyum towards the town of Barvinkove, which sat along communications to the twin-cities of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk in Donetsk oblast, and further east, to the cities of Severdonetsk and Lysychansk in Luhansk oblast. In fact, Russian forces had been fighting for the strategic crossing of the Northern Donets River at Izyum since mid-March, with heavy losses. The troops utilized for the offensive were refurbished BTGs, which were quickly glued together from other BTGs broken by the Kyiv offensive during the first phase of the war. As you may recall from my earlier newsletters, the offensive from Izyum towards Barvinkove had the ambitious operational objective of enveloping 30,000 Ukrainian forces in the Donbas. The Russian General Staff began giving the Izyum axis particular attention in early April, when refurbished BTGs from the famous 2nd Guards Tamanskaya motorized division and 4th Guards Kantemirovskaya tank division began reinforcing the Russian forces advancing towards Barvinkove and Slovyansk. The battle turned into a meat grinder with Ukrainian infantry and minefields channeling Russian attacks into narrow kill zones, where they were subjected to precision artillery strikes. The operation continued until the end of April, when the Russian General Staff realized that in one month their advance toward Barvinkovhad barely made progress. The symbolic end of this second phase of the war occurred on April 27, when the chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov, flew in to Izyum and after taking the temperature of the offensive proceeded to shut it down.
By the beginning of May the Russians downsized their expectations a third time and shifted their primary attention to the capture of the twin cities of Severdonetsk-Lysychansk, the last Ukrainian controlled territory in Luhansk oblast. This was a tacit admission on the part of the Russian General Staff that its previous offensive towards Barvinkove had failed. In its own right, the capture of Severdonetsk-Lysychansk is a battle for Putin’s prestige, intended to show the Russian television viewing public an ostensible success. Even if a complete victory, the operation would likely surround no more than 5,000 Ukrainian soldiers in a much smaller salient of territory than in the Barvinkove operation.
On June 3 the Ukrainian army relinquished all but the northwestern industrial area of Severdonetsk, after nominal resistance, sucking Russian forces into the center of the city. Then reinforcements, including the Ukrainian Foreign Legion battalion, a composite of foreign volunteers with special forces experience, counterattacked west to east. The Ukrainians were applying an urban variant on the old North Vietnamese “grab them by the belt buckle” tactics, where infantry keeps in close contact with their enemy counterpart, thereby making it difficult for the adversary to use artillery. Regardless, the Russians ordered its artillery to fire on both its forces as well as on the Ukrainians. As of the writing of Part III of this newsletter, the Ukrainians were in control of less than 20% of Severdonetsk, although the issue was still in doubt in the industrial area in the northwest of the city and in the suburb of Metolkine to the southeast.
Meanwhile, the bulk of Ukrainian forces in Severdontesk have retreated west to Lysychansk, which is on higher ground and located on the opposite bank of the Northern Donets River. That way, the prospects for trapping a large concentration of Ukrainian troops in Severdonetsk have diminished significantly. Attacking Lysychansk from Severdonetsk will be a much more difficult proposition for the Russians, because the approaches are in full view from the high ground on the opposite bank of the river. Moreover, the attackers will have to conduct another opposed bridging operation – a task that has been beyond the capacity of Russian units so far. BTGs from the Russian 35th and 74th motorized brigades were annihilated during efforts to bridge the Northern Donets at Bilohorivka during May 7-13.
In any case, with the Ukrainians ensconced along the Northern Donets River at Lysychansk and counterattacking in Severdonetsk, the Russians are shifting their elite BTGs of the 76th airborne division and naval infantry back to the southern flank of the Ukrainian salient at Popasna. They still have an overwhelming superiority in the number of artillery and an inexhaustible supply of ammunition, so the attack will continue as long as there is infantry willing to occupy ground that has been subjected to preparatory fires. A successful breakthrough from Popasna will outflank the defenders at Lysychansk from the south, obviating the risk of a river crossing.
The Russians were able to capture Popasna on May 19, when poorly trained Ukrainian infantry from newly raised battalions of the territorial defense were unable to withstand Russian preparatory shelling and fled their positions. The Ukrainian General Staff rushed the elite 1st battalion of the 80th air-assault brigade along with its organic artillery to reinforce the Popasna axis and the situation has stabilized. Reportedly, a battalion of the 10th mountain brigade also reinforced Ukrainian defenses further south, along the approaches to Bakhmut, a key road intersection. Still, it appears that the terrain west of Popasna will be subjected to fresh Russian assault, due to the strength of Ukrainian defenses in Lysychansk. It may be that Russia still possesses the combat power to seize Lysychansk. If that is the case, Ukrainian forces will likely be able to withdraw west without being trapped in a cauldron.
After the capture of Severdonetsk and Lysychansk, the Russians will pause briefly before beginning the fourth phase of the war. Their next operational objective will be the twin cities of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. These two urban centers are the largest cities in Donetsk oblast still in Ukrainian hands. Slovyansk and Kramatorsk are familiar to Russian TV viewers from the fighting in 2014. Putin’s ability to paint this war as a success, rides on the capture of these cities. The Russian 90th division is already within six kilometers east of Slovyansk at Sviatohirsk but is stymied by the Northern Donets River. Nonetheless, the Northern Donetsk is a formidable obstacle and Russian bridging efforts so far have proven futile. Thus, any progress on this avenue of advance will cost the Russians dearly.
In order to avoid a river crossing north of Slavyansk, the Russians may attempt to attack down the west bank of the river towards Dolyna and Bohorodychne to threaten Slovyansk from the northwest, but this too will become a grind because of the narrow corridor of terrain available for ingress. So it is unlikely that the Russian army will be able to mobilize sufficient combat power to take Slovyansk and Kramatorsk anytime soon, at least until the end of the year. The Ukrainians have had time to turn the cities into virtual fortresses. For example, the hill called Korachun between both cities proved to be quite the strongpoint during the fighting for Slovyansk in 2014. Both sides will concentrate artillery fire on each other in great numbers. Such an encounter has the potential to turn into the Verdun of the Russo-Ukrainian War.
The Battle of Verdun in 1915-1916 was one of the bloodiest campaigns of WWI. German field marshal Erich von Falkenhayn believed he could break the will of the French army by forcing it to recapture an objective important to French prestige, the symbolic fort of Verdun. His intent was to destroy the French attacking columns with overwhelming artillery before British reinforcements could be trained and brought over to France for an offensive elsewhere. The French turned the tables on him through a feat of logistics by concentrating an equal number of guns and howitzers near Verdun. The result was a stalemate where each side lost over 300,000 killed.
It may be that the Ukrainian General Staff may welcome such a development, since it would allow for Ukrainian artillery to bleed the remaining elite Russian BTGs dry. Furthermore, a Russian attack on Slovyansk and Kramatorsk would increase the chances of a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive on an axis away from the Donbas, since the Russians will likely weaken other sectors to reinforce the assault. Of course, the concentration of Russian artillery, situated north and east of the cities, will be immense - greater than what the Ukrainians hope to muster. The question remains, whether the Ukrainian General Staff will sacrifice too many of its soldiers in pursuit of its sanguine strategy of exhausting the Russians. Heavy losses may trigger a political crisis as Ukraine’s populist forces are sure to pressure president Zelensky to stop the bleeding.
Recent Tactical Trends
Three months in, one can dispel a few initial impressions about the Russian defeat during the first month of the war. First, the Russians are not as incompetent as they first appeared. At the start, the Russian army was the victim of a flawed operational plan prepared by the Russian intelligence services that violated many tenets of Russian military doctrine, a plan the army had neither prepared nor approved. However, during the offensive in the Donbas, the Russians have found their footing and started to play to their strength, which is massed artillery fire as a prelude to mechanized maneuver. Shorter supply lines from Russia enabled them to amass an almost limitless supply of artillery ammunition. This allows the Russian army to dwarf Ukrainian artillery fire in the Donbas, sometimes by a rate of 10 to 1. The positional nature of the fighting has allowed the Russians to establish better command-and-control, which is no longer complicated by a war of movement, as in the initial phase. Although the average Russian mechanized infantry suffers from poor morale, one has not observed wholesale surrenders or panic on a large scale. On the contrary, Russian spetsnaz, airborne and naval infantry have attacked stubbornly, despite suffering initial setbacks. Finally, the proximity of the battlefield to the Russian border is more conducive to Russian tactical air support, where the paucity of Ukrainian anti-air missile defenses allows for a more hospitable environment for attack aircraft and helicopters.
This is no different from the performance of Russian armies in the past, even the victorious Red Army in WWII. Historically, Russian success has occurred at the operational level after the enemy has been worn down by attrition on several fronts, siphoning reserves from other sectors, before the decisive blow is delivered on a weakened front. After all, tactical excellence has never been a Russian virtue. The problem that the Russians face today is that they do not have the mass conscript armies of yesteryear. Modern war with its technology and destructiveness makes these obsolete. Thus, the Russians are hoping that their disguised mobilization pulls in enough replacements with which to exhaust the regular Ukrainian army before it trains its mobilized reserves.
The fighting in the Donbas shows that the Russian army has changed its tactics and attempts to bite off small chunks of territory in its offensives, which it consolidates before moving on to the next objective. The Russians no longer try to execute deep penetrations of the front by mechanized forces, thereby exposing their supply lines, as they did in the initial offensive in March. Expendable troops recruited in the Luhansk National Republic (LNR) or the Donetsk National Republic (DNR) are sent forward to perform a reconnaissance in force, before the airborne and naval infantry press home the attack and suffer losses for their trouble. Close assault in urban environments, however, is usually performed by spetsnaz (or Chechen spetsnaz), who have the training to perform such a specialized task. This practice further diminishes the numbers of these elite formations, which are organized to execute small strategically impactful strikes, but the Russian high command does not seem to care.
Contrary to the early narrative that the Russians were defeated in March by American and British anti-tank missiles, Ukrainian success was due primarily to the excellence of Ukrainian artillery, which was able to engage advancing Russian columns well out of range of anti-tank missiles. That way, the Ukrainians inflicted casualties upon the Russians while preserving their own manpower and equipment. Another factor in the earlier Ukrainian tactical success was the fact that mobile Russian artillery was unable to keep up with the armored spearheads, allowing the Ukrainians to retain local artillery superiority. Moreover, artillery fire caused Russian tank columns to disperse, making them more vulnerable to infantry armed with anti-tank missiles. Video shows that the majority of the long-range tank kills early in the war were caused by Ukrainian made Stuhnas and Korsar missiles. In fact, video from the famous ambush of Russian armor on March 9 at Brovary, northeast of Kyiv, not only involved Stuhnas and Korsars but also the older Soviet era Fagot missiles. The proliferation of the longer-range Javelins did not become widespread until a few weeks into the war. These certainly started taking a toll on Russian armor as the war progressed. Admittedly, the British NLAWs were available in large numbers from the start and were very effective in killing tanks at short range, although such encounters were rare. Most occurred at longer range. Ukrainian tactics intended to elongate and expose Russian supply lines to make them vulnerable to attacks from the flanks also contributed to Ukrainian victory in the opening campaign of the war.
Video of Ukrainian artillery fire taken from observation drones during the early days of the war reveals a disproportionally high number of direct hits upon Russian armor. Recent reports came to light that this was due to Ukrainian gunners using laser guided artillery munitions that are steered to the target by drones, which “sparkle” or “paint” tanks and BMPs with laser beams of specific wavelengths to guide the shells directly onto the target. Reportedly, the Ukrainians manufactured their own laser-guided munitions, the Kvitnyk for 152 mm shells, and the Karasuk for 122 mm shells. However, after 30 days of campaigning the supply of Ukrainian stocks of this high-tech munition was exhausted. The Ukrainians had to turn to simpler kinetic ammunition, which they had to husband due to their diminishing supply. The accuracy of Ukrainian artillery still remains high, since they must be more careful with their dwindling stocks of ammunition. However, the Ukrainians are frequently outgunned in the sectors of the Donbas that are prioritized for Russians assault.
When compared to earlier in the war, the volume of Ukrainian artillery fire in the fighting in the Donbas decreased because of the dwindling supply of Soviet 152 mm ammunition, making it easier for the Russians to mass their own artillery closer to Ukrainian positions. Consequently, Russian losses have decreased while Ukrainian casualties have increased. Thus, both sides have achieved a rough parity in the daily death toll. This imbalance in artillery fire is expected to be redressed partially as the Ukrainians receive more Western 155 mm howitzers. There have been moments during the recent fighting where the Ukrainians established a temporary parity in artillery, when batteries of the new NATO howitzers appeared at the front. But it will take time to make this a regular occurrence.
Another recent trend that has affected the volume and accuracy of Ukrainian artillery is the increasingly effective use of Russian electronic countermeasures that aim to disrupt the signals between Ukrainian drones and the artillery batteries that rely on them to adjust fire. This is evident in drone surveillance video, which does not have the definition that it had previously. With the fighting settling into positional warfare and the front becoming static, Russian electronic warfare units have been able to establish a persistent presence.
Ukrainians continue to rely on an elastic defense, where terrain allows for it. Surveillance drones watch for advancing enemy columns. Once spotted, infantry maneuvers forward to establish temporary blocking positions, supported by minefields, which funnel attacking Russian mechanized columns into channels where these are attacked by artillery. Then small teams of infantry move in with anti-tank missiles to finish off Russian stragglers that have had to disperse. Every opportunity is taken to keep forward defense positions lightly manned to escape preparatory fires. The reserves move up after battle is joined and then try to retreat before Russian artillery can be massed.
The prevalence of mission command[1] in the Ukrainian regular army has eroded a bit because of battlefield attrition amongst the senior lieutenants, captains, majors and lieutenant colonels. Junior commanders with recent combat experience have taken the place of the fallen, but theirs may be a more pragmatic, less flexible, style of command. The standards amongst reserve officers and the territorial defense commanders are not as high. Nonetheless, decentralized mission command still remains the stated goal of the Ukrainian army.
What Comes Next?
Putin will push his generals to seize Severdonetsk and Lysychansk. Meanwhile the Russian disguised mobilization will try to squeeze as many replacements as possible from the far reaches of the Russian Federation to fill out the BTGs that will be sent to attack Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. Throughout, the Ukrainian General Staff will defend these cities and absorb casualties in order to bleed the Russian BTGs dry. In a reprise of the infamous Battle of Verdun in WWI, the Ukrainians will lure Russian forces into an assault on Slovyansk and Kramatorsk to subject them to artillery fire, while waiting for an opportune time to launch a counteroffensive in the South to recapture Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.
While Russia’s ability to continue offensive operations appears to be diminishing, there is every indication that even second-rate Russian mechanized infantry is capable of holding prepared positions on defense, when supported by artillery, tanks and airpower. Therefore, the Ukrainians should be sober in their assessment of a breakthrough of Russian positions in preparation for any large strategic offensive. Since the beginning of the Russian offensive in the Donbas, the Ukrainians have launched two limited counteroffensives. The first one north of Kharkiv was aimed at interdicting supply lines to Izyum that passed through the town of Vovchansk. The second at Davydiv Brid on the Mykolaiv-Kherson front was intended to establish a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Inhulets River. These have had modest success. The Ukrainians had to stop when they faced infantry in prepared positions. Moreover, Ukrainian airborne and spetsnaz have engaged in a quasi-counteroffensive in the forests immediately west of Izyum near the village of Protopopivka. This last effort has killed plenty of Russians through directed artillery strikes but has not seized much territory. The timing and location of the Ukrainian counteroffensives was clever. However, their operational objective was not to recapture territory but to distract the Russians from their main effort in the Donbas. Moreover, all three counteroffensives attacked in sectors that were lightly defended by the Russian army.
However, a major Ukrainian counteroffensive must plan for a breakthrough of prepared and layered defenses, which will result in significant attrition in both manpower and armored vehicles, especially tanks. Such a breakthrough operation must be supported by substantial reserves, if it is to have any chance of success. Furthermore, the Ukrainian air force will have to allocate a substantial portion of its remaining assets to such an operation. Losses amongst the fixed wing and rotary squadrons will be steep. If there is any lesson to be learned from the Russian offensives so far, is that the attacker is at a serious disadvantage and suffers disproportionally heavier losses because of minefields, drone corrected artillery and anti-tank missile fire, perhaps at a proportion of 4 to 1. Ukraine’s Secretary of the Interior Oleksiy Danilov is of the opinion that Ukraine needs at least six full mechanized brigades, or 18 BTGs, in order to attempt such an offensive. According to my previous newsletters, no more than 12 Ukrainian battalions are available for a counterstrike. However, since my last tweet, perhaps three of these have been fed into the fighting in the Severdonetsk-Lysychansk area. Thus, a better Ukrainian effort at training and outfitting its reserve brigades is crucial to the success of a strategic counteroffensive. The Ukrainian General Staff will have to choose wisely as to where and when to use these reserves.
For instance, a breakthrough from the Hulyaipole sector in late July with an exploitation towards Melitopil, would threaten to cut off Russian forces in the south of Ukraine from their supply lines in Crimea. Such a counteroffensive would have to be coordinated with the ongoing counteroffensive on the Mykolaiv-Kherson front, to divert Russian reserves away from Melitopil and onto the west bank of the Dnieper River. The capture and successful defense of Melitopil by the Ukrainian army would be a strategic defeat for Russia, since it would allow Ukraine to control the delta of the Dnieper River and deny Putin the land bridge to Crimea. Ukraine could then mount a diplomatic offensive to negotiate a favorable peace, while going on the defensive. The Russian army would counterattack from Donetsk oblast and Crimea to redress such a development, in order to improve its negotiating position. Whether it will have mobilized sufficient forces to roll back Ukrainian gains is an open question.
Stand by, this war is far from over.
[1] Mission command is a decentralized process where a superior gives subordinates general directives, allowing the lower officers to exercise initiative in accomplishing their mission. This empowers the junior officers with the flexibility to react to changing conditions at the front, instead of waiting for permission from the top.