Strategic Objectives
One hundred days into the war, Vladimir Putin can brag of achieving only one of his stated war aims. He has established a land corridor to Crimea from Rostov-on-the-Don in Russia. This was completed by the capture of the port of Mariupil on May 21, after Russian forces initially gained control of the Azov Sea coast in March. As a secondary benefit of this land bridge, the Russians gained water access for Crimea from the reservoir at Kahhovka in Kherson oblast. In the process they seized the port city of Kherson, on the west bank of the Dnieper River, the only oblast center to fall into their hands. Otherwise, neither Luhansk nor Donetsk oblasts have been fully cleared of Ukrainian forces. In fact, significant portions of Donetsk oblast are firmly in Ukrainian control, particularly the twin cities of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. Furthermore, the operation to seize the port city of Odessa, considered a traditional Russian city by Putin, was defeated at Mykolaiv in April. The same can be said of an offensive to reach the pro-Russian statelet of Transnistria in Moldova. Prospects for the creation of a corridor to this territory died with the repulse of Russian forces from Mykolaiv. More importantly, the Ukrainian government is still in control of all of the major cities and continues to exact a heavy toll on Russian manpower and equipment in pursuit of its defensive war.
Furthermore, the Russians have not been able to establish air superiority. Despite superior Russian numbers, the Ukrainian air force is still flying sorties in support of ground operations and the Ukrainian integrated anti-air defense system continues to impose a severe cost on Russian fixed wing aircraft and cruise and ballistic missiles. In fact, with the exception of tactical air support for ground operations in the salient in the Donbas, Russian aircraft launch missiles at long range from outside Ukrainian controlled territory, in order not to expose their expensive aircraft to Ukrainian anti-air missiles. Consequently, the Ukrainian railroad system is still functional and delivering troops and supplies to the front from Ukraine’s base of supply in Poland. This allows for the resupply of ammunition and the replacement of lost manpower, armor and artillery, although at a rate that barely keeps up with Ukrainian losses.
Presently, Vladimir Putin has scaled down his war objectives to merely capturing Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. Consequently, the Russians have shortened their supply lines and are able to concentrate their resources on a narrow front. While the Ukrainians can match the Russians in manpower the Russians have overwhelming superiority in artillery and airpower. Operationally this means that the Russians have to capture the twin cities of Severdonetsk and Lysychansk in Luhansk oblast and the twin cities of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk in Donetsk oblast, in order to achieve Putin’s revised goals. These cities are prestige objectives that will be played up to the Russian public as the original war aims all along. After all, Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts are of greater symbolic value to Putin than of strategic importance to Ukraine. If these four cities are captured, Putin will launch a global peace offensive, leveraging access to cheap Russian oil and Ukrainian grain, to force the world to pressure Ukraine to the negotiating table. Putin will want nothing less than a victor’s peace that will relegate Ukraine to a rump state status. The trump card in Putin’s hand is that his army controls the mouth of the Dnieper River, which suffocates Ukrainian grain exports and hobbles the Ukrainian economy.
However, it is unlikely that the Russian army has the combat power to capture Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, at least before the end of the year. Moreover, Ukraine cannot accept Russian control over the Dnieper delta on Putin’s terms. Therefore, a Ukrainian counteroffensive to retake Kherson oblast on both sides of the Dnieper will likely begin by late July. If the Ukrainians can mobilize sufficient reserves and supplies for an offensive to seize and hold the city of Melitopol (found on the map northeast of Crimea), they will deny Putin the land bridge to Crimea. Moreover, Russian forces on the west bank of the Dnieper River would be caught in a trap. Consequently, the Ukrainian government could engage in peace talks from a position of strength. Possession of territory that Putin desires is essential as leverage during peace negotiations.
Against the backdrop of ongoing operations, both sides have revealed strategic weaknesses related to the replacement of battlefield losses. The Russians lack manpower to replace their casualties while the Ukrainians have been slow to adequately train and arm their available manpower. The Ukrainians are also suffering from a strategic shortage of Soviet era 152 mm artillery ammunition, while they wait for the arrival of more Western howitzers that can fire NATO 155 mm shells. They also need armored vehicles. Finally, I comment on the difficulties that both sides face in the strategic application of air power.
Russia’s Manpower Shortage
After the retreat from Northern Ukraine following defeat in the Battle of Kyiv, Russia’s army revealed an inability to fully replace manpower losses that is of strategic proportions. Reckless abuse of its elite spetsnaz, airborne and naval infantry in trying to break through to Kyiv over wooded and marshy terrain resulted in shocking casualty rates that left most Russian battalion tactical groups (BTGs) with a shortage of infantry, but with the elite formations particularly damaged. Similarly, repeated attacks by airborne BTGs towards Mykolaiv and that of naval infantry and spetsnaz at Mariupil also reduced the availability of these valuable troops. Nonetheless, after a short operational pause without adequate time to regroup, the Russians launched their next offensive to seize the Donbas on April 19 and have been pursuing this objective relentlessly through a slow, methodical advance. Although the rate of Russian killed has dropped, it still numbers between 100 to 200 daily. The latest estimates of Russian casualties in this war place them at 15,000-16,000 killed in action, 45,000-50,000 wounded and 5,000 prisoners of war, out of an attacking force that numbered less than 200,000 at the start of hostilities. When one parses the fact that the Russians lost 12 generals in the fighting, the magnitude of their losses is amplified. Official Ukrainian estimates place the Russian dead in excess of 31,000. However, these must be considered as wartime propaganda.
Instead of taking time to rest, reorganize and to replenish their BTGs with trained replacements and new armored vehicles, the Russian General Staff rushed its broken units back to pursue the offensive in the Donbas, with composite BTGs that were cobbled together from still useful components of otherwise damaged units. Consequently, Russian brigades have been able to fit out only one BTG apiece (whereas in normal conditions, a regiment or brigade is expected to fit out two BTGs), while divisions can rarely produce three BTGs (from a peacetime strength of six to eight). These new BTGs have more combat experience than earlier in the war but possess less combat power, are short on infantry, and have lower morale. Whereas a peacetime Russian mechanized BTG was composed of 900 men, presently these contain no more than 700. The remaining airborne BTGs barely amount 400 men. Perhaps, the Russian General Staff senses that the Ukrainians are suffering losses that they cannot sustain and must be pounded into submission before the Ukrainian army is able to train and arm its larger pool of mobilized reservists.
Additionally, the Russians lost over 2,500 of their front-line tanks and armored fighting vehicles and have been forced to replace these with older equipment that has been held in storage. Due to Western sanctions on high tech components, the Russian production of new equipment has slowed to a trickle. Concurrently, since the Ukrainians retained the battlefield following the defeat of the Kyiv, Kharkiv and Mykolaiv offensives, they reaped the benefit of adding abandoned or damaged Russian armor to their tank park, partially offsetting their own losses.
In their article “Not Built for Purpose; The Russian Military’s Ill-Fated Force Decision[1],” analysts Michael Kofman and Rob Lee attribute Russia’s manpower problems to the force structure that was implemented as part of the Russian military reforms after 2013. According to Koffman and Lee, the Russian decision to prioritize airpower, artillery and tanks over infantry, while contemporaneously expanding the number of BTGs without increasing the number of professional enlisted soldiers (kontraktnyky) to fill out these units, has left them scraping the bottom of the barrel for suitable replacements after the losses in the Kyiv, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv and Mariupil operations.
It must be said that Russia’s autocratic regime has exploited its coercive powers to implement a disguised mobilization of garrison troops and former contract soldiers to sustain a flow of replacements to their refurbished BTGs at a faster pace than anticipated. Recently, indications are that the third reserve battalions back in garrison are being filled out by older experienced soldiers who have enlisted for higher pay and are undergoing training under the guidance of the remaining officers and NCOs who were left at base. However, these are being used up in the Donbas at a rate that is unlikely to be sustained much longer. Once this Donbas offensive reaches its culminating point, the Russian army will be in no condition to launch a new offensive for months.
The immediate remedy to Russia’s manpower problem is a full mobilization of Russian society for war. However, such a move would be unpopular and politically destabilizing. After all, the more affluent ethnic Russians prefer not to put themselves at risk and are underrepresented in the armed forces, with the infantry overwhelmingly supplied by the non-Russian ethnic minorities from the central and eastern Asian republics of the Russian Federation. Even if Putin decides to fully mobilize Russian society, adequately trained specialists that are capable of operating the tanks, artillery and high-tech equipment necessary to fight a modern war, won’t be available until the end of the year. In fact, the latest trend to outfit the third reserve battalions of the Russian regiments and brigades will leave no one back in garrison to train the mobilized conscripts. This presents the Ukrainian side with a window of opportunity of approximately five months during which to launch a major counteroffensive. Time will tell whether the Russian army retains sufficient defensive resiliency to absorb the Ukrainian effort until competently prepared fresh reserves are available.
The Slow and Inadequate Training of Ukrainian Reserves
Meanwhile, the above-described Russian weakness does not mean that the Ukrainians have had it all their way. One hundred days into the war, the Ukrainian side also grapples with strategic problems. Firstly, the Russians are not the only side having to replace heavy losses. According to president Volodymyr Zelensky, since the fighting intensified in the Donbas in mid-April, Ukraine has been losing 60-100 killed and 450-500 wounded daily. During the past week the daily death toll has reportedly increased to 100 to 200 with a proportionate increase in wounded. That amounts to anywhere between 4,000-5,000 killed and up to 25,000 wounded from the middle of April to the present. This spike in losses reflects the positional nature of the fighting in the Donbas, where Russian superior numbers in artillery and airpower find Ukrainian targets in greater abundance and in a more constrained space. Simply put, Ukrainian defenders have less room for maneuver and fewer places to hide from concentrated fire. Moreover, the Donbas salient allows the Russians to concentrate fires from three directions, making it dangerous for Ukrainian long-range anti-air assets, like the S-300 or the Buk systems, to be positioned closer to the front lines. Therefore, Russian fixed wing and rotary aircraft enjoy a safer environment. For that reason, Russian planes get to bomb Ukrainian positions with greater frequency. Furthermore, Ukraine has almost run out of Soviet 152 mm ammunition, a problem that is discussed in the next section. Thus, the Russian advantage in artillery has increased five-fold.
Previously, official Ukrainian estimates for killed and wounded through April 15 were 3,000 killed and 10,000 wounded. If such a casualty rate was accelerated in the Donbas fighting in accordance with Zelensky’s recent estimation, then Ukrainian casualties have reached 8,000 killed and 35,000 wounded since the beginning of the war. Proportionally to the Ukrainian manpower strength at the beginning of the war of approximately 200,000 in the regular armed forces, the national guard and the territorial defense, that exceeds a casualty rate of 20%. Such losses will be hard to sustain for much longer.
Fortunately for the Ukrainians, they have called up 400,000 reservists, which gives them a larger mobilizational pool than the Russians. Many of these are veterans who have previously fought in the Donbas and are available for mobilization into reserve brigades. 300,000 more are available for active duty, but have no previous training or experience. With 700,000 potential replacements, Ukraine is winning the manpower battle, at least on paper. However, this leads us to a discussion of Ukraine’s failure to effectively organize and train this reserve pool of manpower during the first one hundred days. Due to populist sentiment, much of the available manpower has gone to the volunteer territorial defense brigades, instead of the ready reserve brigades of the regular army. Local politicians have channeled manpower to their region’s territorial defense battalions, resulting in an uneven standard of leadership and combat effectiveness. While some of these volunteer formations adhere to an acceptable standard of military discipline, others are no better than local militia. Many territorial defense battalions receive scant training for modern war and suffer from a lack of experienced commanders in their chain of command. To quote one British description, these are merely “blokes with rifles.” Thus, so far Ukraine has wasted the opportunity to timely organize adequate reserve brigades with which to rotate its front-line troops, in order to give them time to rest, regroup and refit.
It is true that territorial battalions with cadres that had previous combat experience were rushed to the front during the first weeks of the war, where they provided useful service in secondary roles west of Kyiv. However, this was possible because of the densely wooded and marshy terrain in the area, which heavily favored the defense and required nothing more than a light infantry presence. Moreover, territorial defense battalions situated on the eastern approaches to Kyiv carried out successful hit-and-run attacks on Russian supply lines. Furthermore, units like the Kharkiv based 127th territorial defense brigade proved effective even in offensive operations, when attached to the 92nd mechanized brigade during the recent counteroffensive northeast of Kharkiv. Nonetheless, after the Russians shifted their focus to the Donbas, territorial defense battalions that were rushed to the front proved inadequate. The key city of Popasna fell on May 19 when the Russian assault forces broke through positions held by territorial defense battalions in low ground on both flanks of the main defenses held by regular forces. The territorials were unable to withstand Russian preparatory fires. Similarly, a certain territorial defense battalion in the Toshkivka sector near Lysychansk abandoned its positions and drove to Kharkiv, where it checked in to a hotel. There they posted grievances on social media about how they had been misused by the higher command.
Sadly, there have been numerous scenes reminiscent of the fighting in 2014, where volunteer units, lacking the proper military discipline and training, publicly blamed their higher commanders for abandoning them without artillery and air support and claimed to have faced the entire Russian army all on their own. It will require political will by the Zelensky administration to curb the Ukrainian zeal for enlisting in local volunteer battalions with their buddies instead of the reserve battalions of the regular army, where they are subject to military discipline and competent training.
It must be said that a few brigades of the ready reserve have made it to the front. Battalions of the 3d and 4th reserve armored brigades fought in the Barvinkove and Lyman sectors and have revealed themselves combat effective. Additionally, the 5th reserve armored brigade has been stationed near Odessa, to guard against a potential Russian amphibious attack. Moreover, the 45th reserve artillery brigade made an immediate impact in the Hulyaipole area in May. Drone video of their accurate fire began appearing on social media. Regarding reserve infantry formations, the 60th reserve motorized and the 63d reserve mechanized brigades have also made it to the front. The 60th brigade occupies the northern flank of the front in the Mykolaiv-Kherson area, where it has been blocking Russian access to Kryvyi Rih. Meanwhile, the 63d brigade made an appearance in the Hulyaipole-Tymerivka area of Zaporizhzhia oblast, where a battalion was involved in an ill-fated attack near Polohy in mid-May. The 63d brigade lost 18 armored vehicles and suffered close to 100 killed in action. The reasoning for this attack is unclear. It may have been a reconnaissance in force to test Russian defenses in preparation for a future Ukrainian offensive. In any case, early indications are that the attack was poorly planned. Regardless, the 63d mechanized brigade has since been relocated south of Kryvyi Rih to take its place alongside the previously mentioned reserve 60th motorized brigade.
Therefore, the slow rate of reinforcement of the front lines with brigades of the active reserve and the premature relocation of inadequately trained volunteer battalions to the front have forced the Ukrainian General Staff to send carefully husbanded regular battalions from their operational reserve to plug holes in the Donbas. For example, the relentless Russian offensive to capture Severdonetsk and Lysychansk forced the Ukrainian command to send the 1st battalion of the elite 80th air-assault brigade to reinforce the previously committed battalions of the 24th and 30th mechanized brigades in the Popasna area. The Ukrainian war effort would have been better served by keeping this battalion in reserve for a strategic counteroffensive. Moreover, a battalion of the 72nd mechanized brigade was just thrown into the fighting in Severdonetsk. If the Ukrainians are unable to sort out the inefficient training and outfitting of their reserves, their carefully husbanded pool of first line regular brigades will be ground down by the meat grinder in the Donbas. This will weaken and/or delay any Ukrainian counterattack that will have to be launched during the window of opportunity after the Russian Donbas offensive culminates but before the Russians can regroup.
A solution to the current disarray in the training of Ukrainian reserves would be to screen the existing pool of reservists for combat veterans with specialized skills, like tankers and artillerymen, and then assign them for training to the reserve battalions in the regular brigades, instead of the territorial defense. That way, they could be used to fill out the fourth, fifth and even sixth battalions of a brigade and then made combat ready by the cadre of the brigade’s reserve officers and non-commissioned officers. This would be a process akin to the British “regimental system,” where recruits are trained after they arrive at their assigned regiment. Apparently, the Russians are raising third battalions in the garrisons of their regiments and brigades using such a method.
Of course, the new reserve brigades have to be armed with howitzers and armored vehicles. This leads us to another of Ukraine’s strategic vulnerabilities, the lack of ammunition, artillery and armor.
The Shortage of Ukrainian Artillery Ammunition, Long-Range Howitzers and Armor
Another causal factor in the Ukrainian inability to form adequate reserves has been the shortage of long-range artillery and armor necessary to fit out new mechanized and artillery brigades. It is one thing to organize a light infantry unit like a territorial defense battalion. It is an altogether different matter to organize a mechanized battalion, with its armored fighting vehicles, personnel carriers and heavy weapons. Similarly, one needs howitzers to put together an artillery battery.
Poor planning before the war left Ukraine with limited stocks of artillery ammunition. As reported previously in my newsletters, a central theme of the Russian offensive in the Donbas has been the race between the dwindling number of Russian infantry reserves against the dwindling supply of Ukrainian 152 mm artillery shells. The Russian army has literally had to scrape the bottom of the barrel of existing reserves in order to sustain the offensive in the Donbas. Meanwhile the hyper intensity of this war has the Ukrainians scraping the bottom of the barrel for remaining Soviet era 152 mm artillery shells. Lastly, a lack of funding prior to the war led to a shortage of Ukrainian Tochka-U, Smerch and Vilkha long-range tactical missiles, which were exhausted by the beginning of May. Thus, with the exception of a few ancient Soviet 2S7 Pion self-propelled long-range guns, the Ukrainians no longer possess weapons that can fire beyond 40 kilometers. Ukrainian artillery is not only outgunned numerically but also outranged.
American efforts on behalf of the Ukrainians to find supplies of the Soviet era ammunition amongst former Soviet NATO members have exhausted available stocks. Therefore, the transition of Ukrainian artillery from Soviet 152 mm howitzers to NATO 155 mm artillery pieces is crucial. Once the Ukrainians receive enough Western artillery pieces, they will be able to draw on NATO stocks to replenish the ammunition for its artillery. Thus, their dependence on Soviet ammunition will be gradually redressed. Moreover, the introduction of American M777 howitzers and modern artillery from other NATO members will enable Ukrainian artillery to outrange their Russian counterparts. The gradual introduction of M777 howitzers into the fighting in the Donbas has had an immediate impact. For instance, the appearance of the M777 howitzers in the fighting near Izyum and in the Donbas salient contributed to Ukrainian successes in May. M777s were instrumental in stopping the Russian attack west of Popasna and defeating the bridging attempts near Bilohorivka. But more guns are needed, if the Ukrainians are to form the necessary reserve brigades with the combat power necessary to launch and sustain an offensive on a strategic axis.
Of particular importance is the anticipated arrival of the M270 HIMARS multi launch rocket system (MLRS), which can outrange Russian MLRS systems. This would be crucial in staging a breakthrough of enemy positions in preparation of an offensive, since the Ukrainians could suppress Russian artillery without being subject to counter battery fire themselves. Paradoxically, the Ukrainian army in the Donbas finds itself in a transitional stage, where it is running out of Soviet ammunition and has to be selective about when it uses its old howitzers but has yet to receive sufficient NATO artillery to replace the Soviet equipment. Therefore, Ukrainian artillery fire has slackened while Russian artillery is in the ascendancy, with higher Ukrainian casualties and deeper Russian advances as a result. By some estimates, the Russians fire 50,000 artillery shells daily to the Ukrainian rate of 6,000 to 8,000. The Ukrainians hope to receive the full complement of promised NATO artillery pieces and train enough crews by July, to redress the imbalance in artillery fire and to launch a counteroffensive with strategic effect.
The same goes for armored fighting vehicles. Stripping former Soviet bloc NATO members of their Soviet era BMP-1 fighting vehicles and then sending them to Ukraine will not be enough. If the Ukrainians are to organize new mechanized brigades of sufficient size and quality, vehicles like the American M113 personnel carrier or the German Marder armored fighting vehicle will have to be transferred in greater numbers.
The supply of old T-72 tanks from former Soviet bloc NATO countries, on the other hand, appears to meet the organizational needs of the new reserve tank battalions. Ukrainian tank losses have not been as heavy as on the Russian side. After all, the attacker suffers much heavier losses, since it is necessary to expose tanks in the open during a breakthrough of enemy lines. Furthermore, the Ukrainians try to keep their tanks at the maximum stand-off distance, beyond three kilometers, in order to keep them outside of the effective range of anti-tank missiles. Moreover, they have made up some of their losses through captured Russian equipment when the Russians had to abandon the battlefield. Finally, close to 150 Polish, Check and Slovak T-72s have arrived in Ukraine for inclusion into the new reserve mechanized formations. Nonetheless, once the Ukrainians go on the offensive, tank losses will increase.
Unrealized Russian Air Superiority and Concurrent Ukrainian Air Vulnerability
The inability of the Russian air force to knock out Ukraine’s anti-air missile defense system and to keep the small Ukrainian air force from flying has perplexed both experts and amateurs alike. The Russians began the war with close to 350 fixed wing aircraft dedicated to the Ukrainian campaign, compared to no more than 80 jets available to the Ukrainians. By the end of May Russian fixed-wing losses approached 100. Consequently, some Russian pilots began launching air-to-ground missiles from outside Ukrainian controlled territory in order to avoid Ukrainian air defenses. On the other hand, the longer time and distance to target has diminished the accuracy of these missiles. This has enabled Ukraine’s beleaguered Ukrzaliznytsia railroad system to keep reinforcements and supplies flowing from the NATO base of supplies in Poland to the Donbas.
Nevertheless, during the preceding 30 days the Russians have improved their tactical air support over the Donbas. This is due to the shape of the battlefield in Eastern Ukraine, where Russian artillery can fire from three sides and reach well inside the salient that is formed by the cities of Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Severdonetsk, Lysychansk, Siversk and Bakhmut. This prevents the Ukrainians from fielding their valuable S-300 and Buk anti air missile systems within the salient for fear of destruction. Thus, Ukrainian mechanized and infantry formations are not only subjected to non-stop artillery bombardment but also frequent air-attack. This includes Russian rotary aviation, which appears to by flying in force over the battlefield, albeit in an indirect method, where rockets are fired by helicopters from long range in a high trajectory, in order to avoid Ukrainian man portable anti-air missiles. As stated previously in this newsletter, the Ukrainians will be unable to sustain such damage into the Summer.
In this environment, the Ukrainian air-force continues to fly a few close-air support sorties a day, using their dwindling number of SU-25 attack planes and Mig-29 fighters (in a ground attacks role) to attack key Russian ground targets, like bridges. Ukrainian air losses are difficult to assess and at one point must have reached 50% of available airplanes. Despite heavy losses, the Ukrainian number of the precious SU-25s has actually increased through the surreptitious shipment of disassembled attack planes from former Soviet bloc NATO countries, for assembly inside of Ukraine. Regardless, the number of available SU-25s does not exceed 20.
Ukrainian tactical air-support activity has had more success in secondary sectors of the fighting, like in the Mykolaiv-Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv areas, where Russian anti-air defenses are not as dense as they are over the Donbas. Nevertheless, the Ukrainians sustain steady losses in attack planes. It must be said that Ukrainian tactical air support is more important to the morale of Ukraine’s ground forces at the front rather than kinetic results on the ground, since the presence of Ukrainian jets roaring overhead gives hard-pressed Ukrainian infantry the feeling that the Russians are also suffering. The Ukrainian army’s rotary aviation is also limited by similar restrictions, although recent video of Ukrainian helicopters firing missiles from longer range in an indirect fashion using a high trajectory indicates that these are still trying to impact the battlefield.
The Ukrainian fleet of MIG-29 and SU-27 fighter jets, which began the war numbering no more than 70 planes, sustained heavy losses during the early days of the fighting from Russian long-range S-400 anti-air missiles and superior Russian SU-33 and SU-35 fighter jets. While fast, durable and maneuverable, the MIG-29s lack the advanced avionics, far ranging radar and state-of-the-art air-to-air missiles to defeat Russian fighters on a consistent basis, especially when fighting outnumbered. Regardless, recently Mig-29s were observed over the front with more frequency, leading to the conclusion that a number of these had been smuggled across the border from Poland disassembled and then assembled inside of Ukraine. Moreover, spare parts from the West may have enabled the repair of damaged planes.
Reportedly the Ukrainian anti-air defenses have downed close to 100 Russian fixed-wing aircraft. However, few of these shoot downs can be attributed to Ukrainian jets. It is true, that Ukrainian fighters work to use their radar in tandem with S-300 and Buk anti-air missile systems to lure Russian fighters into kill zones, where these are targeted from the ground. The primary difficulty faced by Ukrainian fighter pilots is that their older R-27 air-to-air missiles require enemy jets to be followed by radar until impact, thereby exposing themselves to risk, while the Russian fighters can fire their modern R-77 “fire-and-forget” missiles and turn away before being targeted themselves. Furthermore, the advanced Russian fighters possess radar that is more powerful and able to find Ukrainian aircraft at longer range before they themselves appear on Ukrainian radar screens. Nevertheless, there have been verified claims of Ukrainian victories in air-to-air dogfights, particularly when the Russians dive down to low altitude and lose situational awareness because their radar is unable to get a wide view of the battlespace. For instance, on June 1 a Ukrainian Mig-29 reportedly downed a Russian SU-35 in the Kherson region, after surprising it while it was flying close to the ground.
The Ukrainian armed forces have managed to defend much of their country for one hundred days, despite not winning control of the air. However, when they launch the inevitable strategic counteroffensive in the South, they will need to dedicate all of their SU-25 attack planes and at least one-third of their fighters in support of the attacking force. The Ukrainians have to plan for the eventual attrition of these air assets during the attack. Therefore, the Ukrainian counteroffensive must succeed in order to justify the sacrifice of its air force.
Regarding a rearmament of Ukraine by 4th generation fighter jets from NATO, this is unlikely. Such an overt step by the West would likely expand the conflict to NATO territory and pose an unacceptable risk of nuclear war with Russia.
In Part III, I describe the four operational phases of this war and recent tactical trends. I close with a forecast of what to expect in the short term.
[1] War on the Rocks, June 2, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-ill-fated-force-design/