After a determined and bitter defense of Severdonetsk, which the Ukrainian army abandoned on June 25, Ukrainian forces unexpectedly withdrew from neighboring Lysychansk after only a few days. It was assumed that the Russian army would face another brutal campaign in taking the city. After all, the eastern approaches to Lysychansk are shielded by the Northern Donets River and would have required complex bridging efforts to cross. However, the Russians avoided a crossing of the river by sustaining the momentum of their recent breakthrough at Toshkivka to envelop the city from the southwest.[1] Once the Russians seized the oil refinery at Verkhnyokamyanka and threatened to cut off the avenues of retreat from the city, the Ukrainian command decided that it was better to save its forces from encirclement rather than forcing the Russians to suffer through another street-by-street slog.
By July 2, the bulk of Ukrainian forces retreated west to the more easily defensible line of Siversk-Soledar-Bakhmut. The Ukrainians spent the previous weeks building defensive positions along the Bakhmutivka River, which are buttressed by high ground to the west, behind which they can shield their artillery. Moreover, they now can straighten their lines and deny the Russians a salient into which artillery could be fired from three directions. Most importantly, by abandoning Lysychansk the Ukrainians dashed Russian hopes of encircling some of their best brigades in the salient formed by the conglomeration of Rubizhne, Severdonetsk, Lysychansk and Popasna. Elements of the previously engaged 24th mechanized and 17th armored brigades and the 4th brigade of the National Guard have been rotated out of the front line for rest and refitting while other units assumed the defense of the new and shorter line that runs from Siversk in the north to Bakhmut in the south.
The Russian capture of Lysychansk presents Vladimir Putin with a dilemma. The fall of both Severdonetsk and Lysychansk completes the Russian conquest of Luhansk oblast, one of Putin’s original war aims. Nonetheless, it is too early for him to declare victory in this war. The capture of neighboring Donetsk oblast is even higher on his wish list of territorial objectives. Only the capture of the twin cities of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk will prove to Russian TV viewers that Vladimir Putin has truly led them to victory against the truculent and disloyal Ukrainians, who have turned their back on the project of Russian imperial retrenchment and decided to throw in their lot with the decadent West. However, Slovyansk and Kramatorsk are heavily fortified and present the Russian General Staff with an altogether greater challenge than the capture of Severdonetsk and Lysychansk. Does Putin order his generals to continue the tempo of their recent success in Luhansk oblast and attack towards Kramatorsk from the east, while simultaneously renewing the stalled Russian operation near Izyum to attack Slovyansk from the north? Or does he call for an operational pause to reinforce, rejuvenate and reequip Russian forces before resuming their efforts in the Donbas?
An operational pause would enable the Russians to regroup after fighting non-stop since early April. However, it would also give the best Ukrainian brigades, which have been fighting in the Donbas since the beginning of the war, the opportunity to replenish their ranks with recently mobilized reserves and Western equipment. The Russians would prefer to continue the offensive in order to destroy the best regular brigades of the Ukrainian army before newly trained reserve brigades are rotated into the line to give the veterans time to regroup. On the other hand, an operational pause would improve Russian chances to capture Slovyansk and Kramatorsk.
In focusing manpower and resources in the Donbas, the Russians gave the Ukrainians the opportunity to counterattack in other sectors where Russian defenses were weak. Thus, limited Ukrainian counteroffensives intended to distract the Russians from their main effort in the Donbas had some success on several axes. A Ukrainian counteroffensive on the west bank of the Dnieper River towards Kherson has made slow but steady progress throughout June. Similarly, Ukrainian attacks south of Hulyaipole have made some progress towards the Russian strong point in Polohy. Moreover, a recent Ukrainian counterattack south of Vuhledar towards Ivanivka threatens Russian control of the important railroad hub at Volnovakha. Finally, previous Ukrainian advances north of Kharkiv towards the Russian border may have stalled, but still place Ukrainian artillery within range of lines of supply that pass through the town of Vovchansk. Does Putin allow his commanders to shift some of their meager reserves away from Lysychansk to these disparate sectors of the front to push the Ukrainians back from their earlier gains, or does he insist that they seize Slovyansk and Kramatorsk?
Frankly, it is unlikely that the Russians have enough combat power to capture Slovyansk and Kramatorsk anytime soon. They may sustain an offensive to collapse the northern flank of the new Ukrainian defensive line at Siversk or break through the center at Soledar, but anything further will require reinforcements. Much has been made of Putin’s reluctance to order a general mobilization of the Russian people, because such a step would be unpopular. Reportedly the Putin regime is using its coercive powers to complete a disguised mobilization of the last remaining pool of contract servicemen that are scattered throughout the military bases in the far reaches of the Russian Federation. Rumor has it that up to 15,000 Russian replacements are being prepared on the basis of the 3d reserve battalions back at the home base of Russian mechanized and airborne brigades and regiments. (A Russian mechanized brigade or regiment generally fills out two battalion tactical groups (BTGs)) Reportedly up to 30 new BTGs are being filled out by existing contract soldiers who have reenlisted, younger conscripts who have been coerced into signing service contracts or by older Russian veterans, who are being enticed back into service with much higher pay than the current servicemen. Of course, these BTGs are under-strength and fall far short of the prescribed number of personnel, especially in infantry. Most of these newly formed BTGs will be sent to attack Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, but some may also be ordered to reinforce the front at Kherson, Polohy, Volnovakha and Vovchansk to reverse recent Ukrainian territorial gains. Practically all of these reserve 3d battalions are being outfitted with outdated mothballed equipment, like T-62 tanks and early versions of the BMP-1 armored fighting vehicles. A downside of this disguised mobilization is that the officers and non-commissioned officers who are training these new reserve battalions will have to accompany them to the front, leaving no cadres behind with which to train follow-on recruits in any subsequent mobilization.
One may inquire regarding the price that the Ukrainians paid in blood and treasure to defend Luhansk oblast, specifically Severdonetsk, Popasna and Rubizhne. After all, since mid-April the fight for the Donbas has cost the Ukrainians in excess of 10,000 killed and close to 30,000 in wounded and prisoners-of-war. Of these, some belonged to the better Ukrainian brigades, like the 24th mechanized, 30th mechanized, 17th armored, 79th air-assault and the 4th brigade of the National Guard, which were there from the start of the war. Later these were joined by the 128th mountain, 10th mountain, 58th motorized and 80th air assault brigades. All were subjected to intense artillery bombardment, when Ukrainian artillery began running out of Soviet era 152 mm shells and was unable to engage in counter battery fire. Why put up a fight for so long, incur such heavy losses, only to retreat from Lysychansk with minor opposition?
For one, Russian artillery superiority and momentum generated by the breakthrough at Toshkivka made a determined defense of Lysychansk very risky. A full envelopment of up to 15,000 Ukrainian forces near Lysychansk would have resulted in the destruction or capture of some of the best Ukrainian units. With a retreat behind their new defensive line, the Ukrainians have shortened their front, enabling the exhausted regular units to rotate out of the line to rest and refit. Second, the speed of the Russian disguised mobilization surprised the Ukrainians by reinforcing broken BTGs in the Donbas sooner than expected. Regardless of the number of Russian casualties, replacements always seemed to be close at hand. Third, by forcing the Russians to fight so hard for Luhansk oblast, the Ukrainian army prevented them from allocating troops to secondary fronts, where the Ukrainians had the combat power to launch counterattacks. Finally, the determined Ukrainian defense of Luhansk oblast was designed to win the Ukrainian army time to build up and train its reserves. After four months of training, some of the new reserve Ukrainian mechanized brigades are becoming combat ready. Once they are outfitted with Western armored vehicles and artillery, they will be available for a major counteroffensive on one of the four existing axes of advance that the Ukrainians may choose to exploit. Apparently, some of this rearmament has already taken place. Otherwise, the Ukrainians would have risked a more determined defense of Lysychansk to buy more time.
I anticipate that Putin will push his generals to continue the advance on Slovyansk and Kramatorsk without a major pause, hoping that the disguised Russian mobilization will sustain the offensive long enough to result in the capture of the twin cities. Nonetheless, the offensive will stall because of rising Russian casualties. Recent reports indicate that the Russian superiority in artillery fire is starting to be redressed somewhat, as more NATO artillery enters the fight on the side of the Ukrainians. Slovyansk and Kramatorsk are heavily fortified and will pin Russian forces in place for devastating artillery strikes.
We can expect a Ukrainian counteroffensive in the south by late Summer, perhaps as early as the end of July. It will take time to root out the Russian army out of its defenses near Kherson, Polohy or Melitopil. In fact, cutting Kherson off from its supply lines to Crimea through the capture of Melitopil may be a more practical option, forcing Russian forces to retreat from Kherson over the Dnieper, lest 10,000 Russians get trapped on the west bank as a useful bargaining chip in future cease fire negotiations. Another option may be to capture the river crossing in Nova Kakhovka north of Kherson and then threaten to cut off the city from the east bank. Therefore, the Ukrainian General Staff will have to give itself three months to achieve its operational objectives before the muddy season returns by the end of October. Ukrainian gains will have to be consolidated by then, because the Russians may be ready to counterattack as soon as the ground freezes.
[1] Truth be told, at the end of June DNR forces successfully bridged the Northern Donets River near Pryvillya on the northern flank of Lysychansk. However, the effort was on a small scale and did not affect the Ukrainian decision to abandon the city.