My intention today was to dive straight into the reinforcement and resupply of opposing forces in the Izyum sector. However, I must deviate briefly to comment on the sinking of the Russian missile cruiser Moskva and how this event illustrates changes in modern conventional war. Like other events in this intensive, highly destructive conventional war between two closely matched adversaries armed with state-of-the-art weaponry, many closely held myths are being dispelled and many old truths are being reestablished:
The tank may no longer be king of the battlefield. After all, artillery never stopped being the king.
One can never have enough good, flexible and dispersed infantry. She is still the queen of the battlefield; think of articulating Roman centuria, ubiquitous Confederate skirmishers, or insidious German stosstruppen.
The jet airplane is too expensive to send up against cheaper anti-air munitions; the drone may suffice instead.
Capital surface ships are dinosaurs waiting to be sunk, regardless of how many missiles you strap on them. Mosquito fleets of missile-armed cutters and patrol boats will supplement the new capital ship: the submarine.
Which brings me to the destruction of the Moskva, the largest surface ship sunk since the Argentinian light-cruiser General Belgrano, which the Royal Navy dispatched to Davy Jones Locker in the Falklands War, albeit by torpedoes, not missiles. (It was actually the Argentinian air force that sank a few smaller Royal Navy ships with air-to-ship French Exocet missiles during that same conflict, but none of the same tonnage as the Belgrano.) So, what is it about the sinking of the Moskva that is so unique? Simply put, she was hit by two ground-to-ship cruise missiles that flew over 100 kilometers and outmaneuvered Russian electronic and anti-air defenses. Ukrainians destroyed a ship supposedly designed to survive such an attack. How was that possible?
“If you can see it, you can kill it,” so the proverb goes. The last quarter century has seen a revolution in missile technology. Particularly, its target acquisition, communications during targeting and control of the missile during its flight path to the target. As of April 13, Ukraine is one of the ten or so countries who possess the engineering and nous to create a working ground-to-ship missile. Ukrainians fired a successful prototype of their Neptun cruise missile in 2019. However, a lack of funds caused an interruption of the effort after construction of only one mobile four missile launcher battery, accompanying radar and command vehicles and a few extra missiles. The whole project was resurrected abruptly on February 24, 2022 when Russia attacked Ukraine and brought it back online just in time to sink the Moskva.
Now, full disclosure here. Despite spending a decade in the peacetime U.S. Marine Corps, my experience on board ship was very brief. A few days each on the U.S.S. Pensacola and the U.S.S. Belleau Wood imparted me with just enough nautical knowledge to find the head and the mess - not much else. Thus, for me to understand, let alone explain, how it is that the Ukrainian missiles were able to avoid Russian anti-air defenses, is nigh impossible. Nonetheless, I read that the two Ukrainian Neptuns that hit the Moskva were able to skim the waves on a stormy night and to outthink Russian electronic countermeasures while honing in on the frequencies reflected off of the Russian ship, before setting it ablaze. My takeaway is if the Ukrainians could do that, then why not someone else? Technology is the great qualitative equalizer on the battlefield. It is quickly becoming available to a wider spectrum of actors. A few clever electrical engineers and some stolen technology by a non-governmental entity may threaten even the vaunted U.S. Navy or Chinese fleet. Granted, I am oversimplifying matters, but the logical leap is quite easy to make.