Operational Situation in Ukraine
Situational Map March 23, 2022 as of 18:00 p.m.; map symbols explained
For the most part, the Russian offensive in Ukraine has stalled and has been in an operational pause for at least five days. This gives me the opportunity to update my situational map, without the accumulation of arrows for attacks and retreats, that have cluttered the limited space on the map. Before giving my assessment of the operational situation, I include this explanation of the symbols on the map.
The war is fought by battalion tactical groups (BTGs). A mechanized or motorized BTG is roughly 1,000 men in 40 armored personnel carriers and/or fighting vehicles, with 10 attached tanks, artillery, anti-air assets and reconnaissance. An armored BTG is roughly 600 men with 31 tanks, 10 armored personnel carriers, attached infantry, artillery, e.t.c. Modern war is too destructive to enable greater concentrations of troops, lest they make too vulnerable a target for attack airplanes, artillery and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). In theory, BTG commanders have great discretion to make adjustments to operational plans and are encouraged to exercise intiative. The attached artillery and rockets give them powerful fire support.
Ukrainian BTGs, that have been identified through open sources, are depicted as yellow rectangles outlined in dark blue. They have the battalion symbol “II” on top. The traditional NATO nomenclature for the different type of arm applies, i.e. armor, mechanized, motorized, air-assault, parachute or marine. For the sake of simplicity, artillery, rocket, air and naval units are not depicted. Each rectangle contains the number of the brigade the BTG belongs to. More than half of the Ukrainian BTGs are not listed. Those that have not been identified through open sources are hiding somewhere on the map. Each Ukrainian armored, mechanized, motorized, air-assault, parachute and/or marine brigade generally fields two regular BTGs. These were moved to the front before the war. 2-3 reserve battalions in each brigade have been organizing during the preceding four weeks at the home base of each command. Ukraine called up the ready reserve to fill out these battalions just before Russia’s invasion. We can assume that some of these have finished their fitting out and have already relocated north along the Belarussian border or into the front lines southwest of Kyiv. For instance, the IVth battalion of the 72nd mechanized brigade has been fighting near Vasylkiv southwest of Kyiv since the first days of the war. Similarly, the Vth battalion of the 28th mechanized brigade has video recorded kills with “Stuhna” anti-tank missiles near Mykolaiv. Some of the reserve battalions will form their own BTGs, although with older equipment, less armored fighting vehicles and less artillery. Some reserve battalions will fight as mere motorized infantry with a company of attached tanks and no attached artillery. However, all of the reserve battalions will be led by experienced commanders and officers, who have combat experience in the war in the Donbas. Thus, they will project more than just nominal combat power.
Per the NATO style, Russian units are depicted as diamonds outlined in red, with their numerical designations and general locations depicted, per open sources. These are at battalion “II”, regiment “III”, brigade “x” and division “xx” level, with the symbol located on top. The higher commands that these units belong to, usually armies “xxxx”, are arrayed on the periphery of the borders of Ukraine. Twelve of thirteen Russian armies have supplied units to the campaign in Ukraine. The map also contains units that have been rendered combat ineffective. These contain a small black diamond on the right edge.
The origin and direction of Russian attacks are depicted by solid arrows. Ukrainian counterattacks are in solid sky blue. Cities under Ukrainian control along the line of contact are circled in blue. Russian controlled cities are circled in red.
That being said, my assessment of the operational situation as of March 23, 2022 is the following:
With the exception of the BTGs east of Zaporizhzhia in the location of Vuhledar and Volnovakha, Russian units have been stationary for at least three days. The Russians are short of food, ammunition, fuel and above all infantry and tank crews who are willing to close with the enemy. The Russians continue with their systematic reduction of the defenses of the port city of Mariupil, in search of their first symbolic victory of the war. Nonetheless, the remnants of the stout Ukrainian 36th Marine brigade and the fanatical Azov Regiment are making them pay for every inch. Mariupil should fall by the weekend, although it remains to be seen whether there will be any infantry willing to make the final push. The Russian 810th naval infantry brigade has been making slow but steady progress. However, they have suffered bloody casualties - including their commander Colonel Oleksey Shavrov, who was killed on March 19. There appears no attempt by the Ukrainian armed forces to relieve Mariupil or to launch diversionary attacks elsewhere, in order to draw away the troops arrayed around it. Afterall, mid-March is not a good time for a counteroffensive, what with the mud limiting advances of armored columns to the paved roads. The question remains whether the Ukrainian garrison will attempt to break out of the city or whether they will fight to the last man and woman.
In the south, the Russians have been able to squeeze the Ukrainians out of the defenses around Volnovakha after a BTG of the 71st motorized rifle regiment seized Vuhledar in their rear from the west on March 21, attacking from the direction of Polohy. This caused the Ukrainian battle group south of Donetsk, which was facing east against attacks originating from the Rostov-on-the-Don region, to retreat north and to establish a new front facing south along the line of Hulyaipole - Kurakhove. Nonetheless, the Russians appear spent after their efforts around Volnovakha and will need a few days to regroup, before pushing northwards.
The Russians continue to break through Ukrainian defenses southwest of Kharkiv at Izyum, a key crossing point over the Northern Donetsk River. Fighting took place today southwest and southeast of Izyum today. Apparently the Russians launched a concentric attack from both sides of the bend in the Northern Donetsk River, which surrounds Izyum like a necklace, but have yet to cross the river in order to cut off the town from the south. It appears that a BTG of the 254th motorized rifle regiment has skirted around the bend in the Northern Donetsk River further west and made it as far south as Hrushuvakha. However, this effort has stalled short of its objective at Barvinkove and awaits reinforcement. The intent here is to develop a buildup of forces that can envelop the fortified twin cities of Slaviansk and Kramatorsk from the north, while simultaneously pursuing a breakthrough all the way towards the strategic city of Dnipro on the Dnieper River via Lozova and Pavlohrad. The Russians have suffered heavy losses in armor and men at Izyum and their efforts on this front appear stalled. Nevertheless, they are improving their railroad connections at Kupiansk as a staging area for reinforcements north of Izyum. Moreover, they have launched air and cruise missile attacks on the railroad yards at Lozova and Pavlohrad. It appears that they are not ready to give up on developing the situation in their favor on this avenue of advance and this may be the focus of their main effort during the following days. Ukrainian intelligence reports that the 144th motor rifle division, which has been roughly handled at Izyum, is to be reinforced by fresh troops shortly.
The Ukrainians have launched local counterattacks west of Kyiv at Makariv near the Zhitomir-Kyiv highway and northwest at Moshchyn, apparently with the intent to threaten Russian footholds at Bucha and Hostomel with envelopment from both flanks. These have been launched over primarily wooded and boggy terrain by infantry with artillery support; tactics well suited for the muddy season. The Russians have launched a limited attack to the west towards Malyn, where fighting has been reported earlier in the day.
The Ukrainians also continue to incrementally squeeze out Russian units near Mykolaiv as well as south of Kryvyi Rih. The Russians are in dire need of reinforcement on the west bank of the Dnieper River. The airfield northwest of Kherson is under constant bombardment by Ukrainian artillery and bombing runs by Ukraine’s remaining SU-35 attack planes. At least 20 attack-helicopters have been destroyed or damaged at Kherson’s airfield in eight separate bombardments. The Ukrainians intend to push the Russians beyond medium artillery range of Mykolaiv and to eventually threaten Russian control of Kherson.
The Russian operational pause should end soon, as Russian reinforcements in the form of naval infantry from the Pacific Fleet and from the Russian garrison in Armenia arrive at the front. However, these will not exceed 3,000 troops. A renewed effort on most sectors will resume, perhaps by this weekend. Regardless, expectations are not high. The Russian offensive is near its culminating point. Without significant results soon, a longer pause will settle over the front. There are not enough reinforcements to make a significant difference in the short term. Mobilizing the Russian population will require at least 120 days, before these undergo the minimum rudimentary training, before being sent to the front. At the very least, the anticipated fighting during the next several days will reveal whether the Ukrainians stopped the Russian recent offensive with their last reserves, or whether they have something in the tank. The first month of the war should have enabled them to build up reserves of sufficient number and fighting power to meet this renewed Russian effort and perhaps go onto the offensive in opportune sectors, when the ground hardens to enable armor to go off-road.