OF LEOPARDS AND TIGERS ... AND MINEFIELDS!
II. Assessment, Propaganda Fallout, and Prognostications
Leopard 2A4
e. Assessment of the Performance of the New 47th Mechanized Brigade
The 47th Mechanized Brigade that attacked at Robatyne and Verbove on June 7 is a newly organized formation. It was formed as a heavy brigade and was intended for breaching operations. Therefore, it was equipped with 30 of the heavier Leopard 2A6 tanks and 60 of the up-armored Bradley 2AM2 IFVs. Thus, part of the brigade was trained in the West on the use of the Leopards and Bradleys. While the spine of the brigade was staffed by experienced officers and NCOs from other established Ukrainian brigades, most of the rank-and-file are mobilized recruits. The defeat of the two companies on June 7 was the brigade's baptism of fire. The brigade lost four Leopard 2A6 tanks and 16 M2A2 Bradleys during the attack. [8] What does this setback reveal about its competence and morale going forward?
The attack by the 47th Mechanized Brigade required two companies to maneuver through dense minefields under repeated artillery bombardment towards the Robotyne - Verbove line. A third unidentified company attacked in an easterly direction from the village of Bilohiriya towards the fortress town of Polohy. (Map 2 below) However, there is no indication that it was part of the 47th Mechanized Brigade, nor did the Russians produce video of lost armor from this column. That the first two columns attacked five kilometers apart was proper, considering the need to disperse in order to mitigate the effects of enemy artillery fire. In fact, a series of platoon sized attacks would have dispersed the attack even further and made tracking them by drone surveillance that much more difficult. [9]
The first column attacking from Nova Tokmachka was able to advance seven kilometers while executing numerous changes of direction. (Map 2) That it was able to bring most of its vehicles within direct firing range of Russian forward positions is no small feat. Nonetheless, there are reports that Ukrainian anti-electronic warfare has not been as effective recently while the Russians have improved their jamming of Ukrainian communications. So, it is suspected that the two attacking columns may not have been talking to each during the attack. Furthermore, the company commanders may not have been in continuous contact with battalion headquarters back in Orikhiv.
The lack of coordination notwithstanding, it appears that the commander of column #1 exercised admirable orientation, initiative, and aggression in pushing the attack on his own, instead of waiting for orders from above. He tried to out-flank Russian defenses not once, but three times by leading his troops in enveloping movements to the right. Although the last attack was ultimately stymied by mines and long-range helicopter fire, such initiative and aggression should be encouraged in all good armor commanders.
Where the attack may be subject to major criticism is in the lack of sufficient reconnaissance to identify the minefields before the attack. Had these been identified in a timely manner, sappers could have infiltrated wooded terrain to reach the mines and used line charges to set them off. However, these efforts may have been outside the control of the officers and men of the 47th Mechanized Brigade. Furthermore, the lack of Ukrainian drone surveillance and counterbattery fire, as well as a paucity of short-range anti-air missiles to counteract the Russian K-52 attack helicopters, may have also contributed to the failure of the attack. (See discussion of a Ukrainian shortage of short-range anti-air defenses in Paragraph f)
Keep in mind that the attack by the 47th Mechanized Brigade on June 7 was a reconnaissance in force to test the first line of Russian defenses and to trigger the deployment of Russian operational reserves. Despite its failure to seize Russian positions at Robotyne, the attack partially accomplished its objective. During the following days, elements of the Russian 83d Airborne Brigade were observed leaving their positions near the Dnieper River at Enerhodar and relocating east. Recent drone video showed how Ukrainian artillery caught a column of the 83d Airborne Brigade strung out on the road while on the march, with resulting explosions within the column. At the very least, the Ukrainian General Staff now knows that the 83d Airborne Brigade is on the move towards the Zaporizhzhia front.
Finally, judging from the online videos from Valery Markus, Senior Sergeant of the brigade, morale remains high. The 47th Mechanized Brigade now has experience in performing the most difficult of mechanized maneuvers, a breaching operation through minefields, and will share lessons learned with the other seven companies in the unit. It still has 24 of its Leopards and 34 of its Bradleys intact to continue its offensive and may repair the Leopards and Bradleys that were damaged. Judging from Markus’s Twitter account, the enlisted ranks are proud to be members of the 47th Mechanized Brigade and are eager to apply their combat experience in future operations. [10]
https://twitter.com/Valerii_Markus Jun 19
f. Ukrainian Shortage of Anti-Air Defense Against Russian Helicopters
The photographs of destroyed armor in this article amplify the Ukrainian deficiency in mobile short range anti-air defense missile systems (SHORAD) near the line of contact. SHORAD are weapons systems that have a longer range than man portable air defense systems (MANPADS), like American supplied Stingers or Russian Ihlas (range of five-six kilometers), but a shorter range than medium systems like the BUK (70 kms). This deficiency was evident during the fighting in the Robotyne - Verbove sector on June 8, when Russian K-52 helicopters were able to fire Vikhr anti-tank guided missiles at the advancing Ukrainian armor from long range, up to eight kilometers away, without fear of Ukrainian retaliation. In large measure, the Russian helicopters were able to avoid the shorter-range Ukrainian shoulder fired anti-air weapons like the Stinger and Ihla systems by staying out of range and by hugging the terrain at low altitude, especially at night, where their thermal sights can target armored vehicles. That the Russians are risking their helicopter fleet in repelling the Ukrainian counter-offensive is evident by the relocation of 20 K-52s and older models like the MI-24s to an airfield near the port of Berdiansk. [11]
K-52 Alligator
Ukraine has a number of older Soviet era systems, like the 9K33 Osa, 2K22 Tunguska, 9M337 Sosna-R, 9K35 Strela-10 and Pantsir that qualify as SHORAD, all with a range of between 5-20 kilometers. Moreover, the Ukrainian ground forces have been supplied by over 50 of the excellent German Gepard anti-air cannon that can also engage helicopters at up to 5.5 kilometers. Also, the United States supplied 20 Avenger missile systems, which meet the necessary specifications. However, most of these have had to be pulled back closer to the large cities to defend against the slow flying Iraqi Shahed-136 drones that have been launched at Ukrainian cities almost every night. In the choice between tactical success on the battlefield and protecting the civilian population, the Ukrainians have so far opted for the latter. Obviously, the Russian strategy of bombarding Ukrainian cities and infrastructure has affected the tactical balance on the battlefield. We shall see, if Ukrainian leadership decides to expose its cities in return for greater air security over their attacking armored columns.
Yet another imperfect remedy to the K-52 stand-off advantage is to use long-range S-300 anti-air missiles to fire on the helicopters while they are hovering. After all, one of the few disadvantages of the Vikhr missile is that the K-52 needs to hover in place for up to 25 seconds while its radar tracks the anti-tank missile during its flight of eight kilometers to the target. However, the Russians have stumbled upon an effective countermeasure. Their fixed wing jets fire anti-radar missiles (ARM) at Ukrainian radars when they are switched on to track the helicopters. Thus, the Ukrainians are left with another dilemma between destroying the enemy helicopters or losing their invaluable S-300 long-range anti-air missiles.
The next weeks will reveal if the Ukrainians are able to adjust their tactics to offset this temporary Russian advantage. This may already be happening. During the three previous days, the Russians reportedly lost three of their precious K-52 helicopters on the Zaporizhzhia front. [12]
g. The Propaganda War
Throughout this war, the Ukrainians have held the propaganda advantage against their Russian counterpart. The precise reasons for this phenomenon go beyond the scope of this essay, but it my have something to do with the youth and media savvy of the Ukrainians vis a vis their septuagenarian Russian adversaries. However, beginning on June 7, the Russians have temporarily seized the initiative in the propaganda war by circulating videos and screenshots of the lost Ukrainian armor that we have discussed in this article. By publishing photoshopped video and photographs from the same attack on successive days over the course of a week, they have perpetuated the myth of a comprehensive Ukrainian defeat in Zaporizhzhia oblast. By depicting the same destroyed vehicles from different angles and distances over and over, they have convinced their domestic TV audience that the Ukrainians have lost hundreds of armored vehicles, particularly Leopards, in multiple attacks. Russian bloggers have also spread the rumor that thousands of Ukrainian soldiers have died. In fact, Putin seized the moment and publicly announced that the Ukrainian offensive has failed. What is discouraging is that many in the West, like former U.S. Senator from the Commonwealth of Virginia Richard Black bought into the propaganda, echoing that "Ukraine's offensive hit a steel wall. 7,000 KIA, 160 tanks and 360 armored vehicles destroyed in just one week with trivial gains. It is a pointless bloodbath." [13] That is simply not true. On the contrary, the highly respected Dutch online site Oryx, which tracks destroyed armor based on photographic confirmation, indicates the the Ukrainians lost four Leopard 2A6 tanks and 16 Bradleys in the attack on June 7. As of the writing of this article they lost two more Leopards and two more Bradleys. [14]
Unfortunately, the Ukrainians have not countered with enough of their own drone video, which would invariably show Russian losses during the same period. For purposes of operational security, the Ukrainian General Staff has maintained strict operational silence and, with rare exception, refused to share any drone video of the battlefield. In fact, it circulated a video prior to the counteroffensive where successive Ukrainian soldiers bring their finger to their lips to encourage the Ukrainian people to exercise silence and patience. Whether that is a good thing from a strictly military perspective is subject to debate. However, such a policy has relinquished the initiative to the Russians in the sphere of psychological operations. As I have proposed numerous times in these essays, Putin's center of gravity in this war is the continued support of the Russian people. The lack of a genuine battlefield victory during the previous six months increased the grumbling and disaffection of the Russian pubic. Even the capture of Bakhmut after nine months of brutal fighting received a muted response from the Russians. But now, these recent photoshopped images of destroyed Ukrainian armor byuoed Russian morale and calmed criticism of the management of the war. Moreover, they triggered populist criticism within Ukraine. Armchair strategists were quick to cast aspersions at the feet of Ukrainian commanders and the Zelensky administration for the ostensible "disaster." The situation became so bad as to prompt Valery Markus, Senior Sergeant of the 47th Mechanized Brigade, to publish a tersely worded video urging the dilettantes to "shut your mouth or apologize later," or words to that effect. [15]
Therefore, it is good that no other videos of similar destruction of Ukrainian armor have been recorded since June 7. Either the Ukrainians have improved their engineering reconnaissance and demining efforts, or they have avoided assaulting the strong Russian defense belt in the Robotyne - Verbove sector until they degrade Russian forces and prepare the battlefield.
h. Looking ahead
It is still early in the Ukrainian counteroffensive. The Ukrainian armed forces are currently engaged in preliminary attacks on at least four sectors of front in Zaporizhzhia and southern Donetsk oblasts. These attacks are designed to test the forward edge of Russian defenses and to trigger the lateral relocation of operational reserves. Beginning on June 5, attacks have been launched towards the following objectives in Zaporizhzhia and southern Donetsk oblasts:
(1) Towards Vasylivka along the east bank of the Dnieper River,
(2) from Orikhiv south towards Robotyne - Verbove,
(3) from Velyka Novosilka south towards Novomlynivka, and
(4) from Vuhledar south toward Pavlivka and Mykilske.
Map 1 above is marked with blue arrows, which are numbered according to the above designations. [16] Attacks in these and other sectors will continue until the Ukrainian General Staff identifies a weak spot where Russian reserves are sparse and the Ukrainians can reasonably expect a breakthrough of the main (2nd) Russian belt of defenses. (The Russian defenses are marked in red) Only then can the Ukrainians risk launching a major attack at multi-brigade strength, which can foreseeably penetrate Russian defenses into the rear. A successful penetration of Russian defenses will not mean that this is the main attack. The tactical success may be utilized as a means of forcing the Russians to commit strategic reserves from another sector before the main attack is launched elsewhere where reserves are absent. The Ukrainians hope to seize one or more of the following intermediate operational objectives, going east to west:
(1) Tokmak
(2) Bilmak
(3) Chernihivka
(4) Rozivka, and/or
(5) Volnovakha.
All of these towns are located along the main railroad line that links Crimea with Rostov-na-Donu in Russia. Furthermore, Tokmak, Bilmak and Volnovakha are also heavily fortified and located at the third belt of Russian defenses. Control over even three of these intermediate objectives places the Ukrainians in position to advance towards the strategic objectives of Melitopil, Berdyansk and Mariupil. It may be that the Ukrainians will pause along the Tokmak - Bilmak - Chernihivka - Rozivka - Volnovokha line and entrench, ceding the initiative and inviting the Russians into a counteroffensive in late Summer or early Fall. That way the Ukrainians can assume the strategic defensive behind prepared defenses and degrade Russian manpower even further, before launching a second phase of the counteroffensive towards the Black Sea and Azov coasts late this year, or perhaps next year. Furthermore, control over any part of this intermediate line will allow Ukrainian rocket artillery to bring the "land bridge" to Crimea within range. The land bridge consists of a series of coastal highways that travel east to west along the Azov coast. Of course, the Russians may counter with yet another round of mobilization to regain a numerical advantage in manpower. This would threaten to escalate and prolong the war even further. So far, Putin has hesitated to take such a step because of the risk of internal political turmoil or even disintegration of the Russian Federation.
Furthermore, the Ukrainian General Staff will look to isolate and eventually force the capitulation of Russian garrisons in the towns of Vasylivka and Polohy. Both are near the front lines and far from Ukrainian operational objectives. However, a sizeable Russian presence in these strongholds, particularly in artillery, will trouble the flanks of Ukrainian columns advancing further south.
Moreover, further east in the Donbas, Ukrainian forces are attacking the flanks of Bakhmut to envelop the city from both north and south. (Blue arrow #5 on Map 1) This is a political objective with the goal of embarrassing Putin by forcing the Russians to abandon Bakhmut, after fighting so desperately to capture it over the last nine months. This is also partially a pinning attack to keep Russian reserves from relocating west to Zaporizhzia oblast. Of course, the potential political fallout from the recapture of Bakhmut by the Ukrainians is sure to keep Russian reserves in place. Rumor has it that after the Nova Kakhovka dam explosion, Russian troops were relocated from the Dnieper River to reinforce the wings of the Bakhmut salient.
As of the writing of this article, elements of the 25th Airborne, 35th and 37th Marine, 4th Tank, 93d Mechanized, 110th and 129th Territorial Defense Brigades, and the 68th Jager Brigade have made steady progress south of Velyka Novosilka and have advanced over ten kilometers to the towns of Makarivka and Storozheve. (Map 3) Makarivka is on high ground that will enable Ukrainians to establish overwatch positions from which to support further attacks south with direct fire and artillery. Moreover, the 21st and 31st Mechanized Brigades have seized Levadne to the southwest and are demining the terrain west of Storozheve to cut off the line of retreat for Russian troops in Rivnopil. If they withstand the inevitable Russian counterattacks, they will be positioned to seize Starolmlynivka. This would complete the total eradication of the Russian salient called the Verbovoye Ledge that juts out north towards Velyka Novosilka. In fact, on July 13, Ukrainian success in this sector caused the Russians to commit their operational reserve, the 127th Division, to a counterattack towards Makarivka. This may have been a premature decision. The Ukrainians have repulsed every attack so far and have started infiltrating troops towards Urozhaine from the east. Perhaps, the Ukrainian General Staff may be encouraged to commit more reserves to exploit their advance towards Novomlynivka before the Russians reinforce their positions from other sectors of the front. In fact, a battalion of the elite 25th Airborne Brigade was sent to the Velyka Novosilka area last week to add more punch to the attack. (See Map 3)
The capture of Novomlynivka would be a significant tactical success. First, it will result in the eradication of the northern Russian salient known as the Verebovoye Ledge and enable the Ukrainians to straighten and reduce the frontage between Vuhledar and Hulyaypole, requiring less Ukrainian forces to defend the area and freeing others for offensive operations elsewhere. Two, it will place them in a convenient location from which to launch an attack on the stronghold of Heorhiivka, located ten kilometers south within the main (2nd) belt of Russian defenses. The loss of Heorhiivka would open the door for Ukrainian offensives in three directions; Berdyansk to the south, Mariupil to the southeast, or Volnovakha to the east.
Meanwhile, back at Robotyne, the Ukrainian advance is proceeding slowly. The 47th and 65th Mechanized Brigades are using foot infantry to seize the wooded terrain near the open fields that contain the dense Russian minefields that stymied the attack of the 47th Mechanized Brigade on June 8. The Ukrainians have held their heavy armor back and started using fast mobility vehicles, like the American HMMVW Humvee, to whisk the infantry to the battlefield at speed before returning to their lines after the passengers have disembarked. Nonetheless, the combat engineers are preparing the battlefield for another mechanized attack along this axis, when the time is right.
The area before Robotyne is heavily defended because it is located directly north of the key operational objective of Tokmak. Positions at Robotyne are held by the 291st and 71st Regiments of the Russian 42nd Division. From the very start of the Russo-Ukrainian War of Ukraine, when it advanced out of Crimea toward Melitopil, the 42nd Division has performed competently. Meanwhile, the elite 22nd and 45th Independent Spetsnaz Brigades are entrenched near Verbove. Although, the use of special forces by the Russians as ground troops to defend terrain is a gross misuse of such specialized infantry, this sector is expected to be stubbornly defended. Therefore, the fortifications along the Robotyne - Verbove line shall require further degradation by artillery and HIMARS rockets before its troops can be dislodged.
The operational planning of the campaign in Zaporizhzhia oblast is under the auspices of the operational-strategic group of forces (operatyvno-stratehichne uhrupuvannia viisk) Tavria, under the command of Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavsky. He won acclaim for commanding the operational group Sloboda in its offensive from Kharkiv towards the Russian border last Summer, and then enhanced his reputation after assuming command of the operational-strategic group Kherson, shortly before the Ukrainians forced the Russians to retreat from the west bank of the Dnieper River in November 2022. Operationally, Tarnavsky reports to the Ukrainian General Staff and commander-in-chief General Valery Zaluzhny. Although, his direct boss in the formal chain-of-command is Colonel General Oleksandr Syrsky, over-all commander of Ukrainian ground forces.
It is curious that Syrsky wears two hats. Besides being the over-all ground commander, he commands the operational-strategic group Khortytsia, which is responsible for the Ukrainian brigades fighting further east in Donetsk oblast at Marinka, Avdiivka, Bakhmut and Lyman. Therefore, both Syrsky and Tarnawsky command strategic forces of equal strength. Moreover, Tarnavsky commands on the more important axes of advance even though his rank is three grades below Syrsky's. It appears that the Ukrainian armed forces are adopting the Israeli model, where competence, not seniority, necessarily determines who commands in the field. Nevertheless, it will be for the Ukrainian General Staff to decide whether a particular sector of front is ripe for a larger attack. If such an opportunity arises, we can anticipate an assault of at least three brigades. Such an attack will not necessarily be the Ukrainian main effort but will be designed to force a major commitment of strategic Russian reserves in Southern Ukraine. Either way, such an attack will have to rely on a dispersion of forces in its earlier stages, concentrating briefly for the main effort, and then dispersing to lessen the effects of massed Russian artillery fire. As events in this war have indicated, that is easier said than done.
I reiterate that this Ukrainian counteroffensive is very ambitious and challenging, especially without air superiority. It has the potential to succeed, but at great human and material cost. Large losses in armor are inevitable. Hopefully, Western equipment will keep casualties down, but the attacker is expected to suffer heavy losses. So, the Ukrainians better hope that they have a corps or two of mechanized forces left standing at the end, for that last brutal round of fighting that will lead to victory. A couple dozen Leopard tanks still operating at this late stage would be helpful. Like the final round of a boxing bout between bloodied heavyweights that has gone the distance, it will not look pretty or elegant, nor will it be for the faint of heart. But that is war (se la guerre); that most daunting, demanding, and yet nuanced of human endeavors.
[8] Oryx. https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-ukrainian.html
[9] Wolski o Wojnie. TWARDY PANCERZ #4 RZEŹ "ZMECHU" UKRAIŃSKIEJ 47 BRYGADY. YouTube. 06/13/2023. (@wolski_jaros)
[10] http://twitter.com/Valerii_Markus Jun 19 @valerii_markus
[11] Thomas Newdick, Tyler Rogoway. Ukraine's Armor Appears to Have a Russian Attack Helicopter Problem. The Warzone. June 15, 2023. https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraines-armor-appears-to-have-a-russian-attack-helicopter-problem
[12] David Brennan. Ukraine Downs Russian Helicopters After Armor Losses. Newsweek. 06/20/2023 https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/ukraine-downs-russian-helicopters-after-armor-losses/
[13] http://twitter.com/Senator Dick Black @SenRichardBlack Jun 14
[14] Oryx, ibid.
[15] http://twitter.com/Valerii_Markus Jun 9 @valerii_markus
[16] Map 1, with slight modifications, was taken from the online issue of the Kyiv Independent for 17 May. Igor Kossak. Where does Russia Expect Ukraine’s Counterattack. Kyiv Independent, May 17. https://kyivindependent.com/where-does-russia-expect-ukraines-counterattack-overview-of-defensive-lines/