"...Every military operation is, in one way or another, organized chaos. This is even more true for attackers. At the same time, it is not indicative of any particular outcome. With the exception of the U.S., no other Western-style military can conduct sustained combined operations at scale. So Ukrainian forces are attempting to do something at the tactical level no other European NATO member is currently capable of. And all of these combined operations are being conducted without Ukraine having achieved air superiority, something no Western-style military, including the United States, has any experience in."
Franz-Stefan Gady @HoansSolo Jun 8, 9 Uhr I thought I would add my two cents to the debate over the recent video from Russian military bloggers of destroyed or disabled Western supplied armor near the town of Robotyne in Zaporizhzhia oblast. (See Photo 1 above) The images have been utilized by Russian propaganda in an attempt to demoralize Ukrainians as they begin to ramp up their long-awaited counteroffensive. Indeed, to the uninitiated it looks bad. Images of supposedly impervious Western supplied Leopard 2 tanks, M2A2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) and M1224 MaxxPro MRAP personnel carriers abandoned in bunches of 6-10 vehicles do not project an image of success or progress. Russian comparisons to their own destroyed armor during the ill-fated attacks at Vuhledar in February, as if to say that the Ukrainians are no better in overcoming the hurdles to modern mechanized maneuver, have a kernel of truth. However, please take a deep breath and think...context.
It is still early in the campaign to recapture Ukraine's southern coast. It is true that the Ukrainian counteroffensive has been complicated by the demolition of the dam at Nova Kakhovka, which freed Russian reserves near the Dnieper River for relocation to other sectors of the front. This increases the density of Russian forces in the defense belts that were constructed in Zaporizhzhia oblast. (See red lines on Map 1 above)[1] Nonetheless, the Ukrainian armed forces are currently engaged in preliminary attacks on at least four sectors that are intended to "shape" the battlefield. (See numbered arrows in blue on Map 1) These attacks are designed to test the forward edge of Russian defenses, to trigger the lateral relocation of operational reserves, and to degrade the front line Russian troops and equipment. Moreover, the Ukrainians wish to recapture the initiative from the Russian army, which has been attacking continuously since January 2023. Only two of the newly organized and Western equipped brigades, the 47th Mechanized and 37th Marine Brigades, have participated in these early attacks. The other ten brigades of the newly organized 9th and 10th Corps, remain out of sight. In fact, most preliminary attacks so far have been carried out by older pre-existing brigades. So, the main Ukrainian attack is still far off.
Please read the above quote in the introduction of this article from the respected Austrian military expert Franz-Stefan Gady about the enormity of what the Ukrainian armed forces are attempting to accomplish, especially given their lack of air superiority over the battlefield. With that wisdom in mind, I will attempt to explain what the images show or do not show. I will also use historical examples to illustrate the dynamics of breaching operations, which the Ukrainian army is currently attempting in Zaporizhzhia and southern Donetsk oblasts. In Part II of this discussion I shall also address the serious Ukrainian deficiency in short range anti-air defense (SHORAD) that has been revealed in the early fighting and the propaganda fallout that has resulted from the images of the destroyed armor. Finally, I will attempt to engage in some prognostication about what we may see over the coming weeks in this Ukrainian counteroffensive.
But first, I wish to dispel the common misconceptions of what a real mechanized offensive should look like. This leads me to a discussion of the 1991 Gulf War, which at first glance appears similar to today's campaign.
a. Unfair Comparison to the 1991 Gulf War
There has never been as much video of actual combat as in this Russo-Ukrainian war. In earlier wars, cost-effective technology simply did not exist to gather bird's-eye views of ongoing battle. In comparison, we can find overhead drone video of harrowing close combat daily, with combatants dying with indifferent frequency for our vicarious curiosity. Scores of video clips of exploding armor permeate the internet. With film of mechanized operations now available for the casual observer, any depiction of disorder on the battlefield, like the above isolated image of armor near Robotyne, can be spun as a comprehensive defeat. Perhaps, newsreels from the 1991 Gulf War are most to blame for the unrealistic expectations of contemporary audiences. That was the last conventional war to portray large scale breaching operations on TV screens. (The subsequent 2003 invasion of Iraq was more a lightning quick war of movement, followed by a counterinsurgency) In 1991, Allied armor advanced through minefields in uninterrupted columns miles into the Iraqi rear and then blasted its way through Iraqi mechanized reserves with barely an interruption. But the 1991 Iraq War is the exception to the rule. The United States and its Allies had a month to achieve total air supremacy over the battlefield, and its jets and attack helicopters had free reign to hunt for Iraqi armor and artillery during ground operations, without fear of anti-air defenses. When the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions crossed the line of departure to initiate a breach of Iraqi defenses, Marine combat engineers had to contend with at most sporadic mortar fire as they cleared multiple lanes through Iraqi minefields. Thus, Marine tanks and armored amphibious vehicles went through the minefields with barely a hitch. Moreover, the subsequent breakthrough and exploitation proceeded without fear of artillery bombardment. Allied airpower had chased Iraqi gunners from their guns days before Zero-Hour. Furthermore, the Allies had GPS; the Iraqis did not. What casual observers fail to realize is that unlike the 1991 Iraq War, some of the most famous breaching operations in history experienced significant disruptions and setbacks, similar to what appeared in Russian social media a few days ago. As Stefan Gady states in the introduction to this article, such operations are at best "organized chaos."
Therefore, the 1991 Iraqi War is not a realistic point of comparison with recent drone video from Ukraine. Other historical examples offer much better parallells with what the Ukrainians are experiencing. Large breaching operations that stand out include Bernard Montgomery's counterattack on Erwin Rommel's defenses at El-Alemain in 1942, the German offensive towards Prokhorovka along the southern prong of the Kursk campaign in the summer of 1943, and the breakout out of the Normandy peninsula by U.S. and British armies in 1944. I find the parallels with the Kursk campaign most compelling since the terrain and adversary were very similar to the Russian army that is entrenched in Zaporizhzhia oblast today. Furthermore, both the Germans and the Soviets were relatively evenly matched during the Kursk campaign, as are the Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine. Neither has air superiority. After all, the Allies had distinct numerical, logistical, and qualitative advantages in North Africa and in Normandy, particularly in the air. Moreover, the visual similarity between one of the best tanks that Ukraine has at its disposal, the German Leopard 2A4, has an uncanny similarity to the best German tank during the Kursk campaign - the Panzer VI Tiger. I will use Leopards and Tigers as rhetorical tools while citing examples and reaching conclusions in this essay.
Leopard 2A4
Panzer VI Tiger
b. The Video and Photographic Evidence of the Failed Ukrainian Attacks
The Russians have released drone video of three failed Ukrainian company sized attacks between June 5-8, the first four days of Ukraine's counteroffensive. Two of the attacks are from the Orikhiv sector; one from the Velyka Novosilka sector. (See blue arrows #2 and #3 on Map 1)
A mechanized company typically consists of 10-13 armored vehicles, of which only 2-4 are tanks. The remainder are either armored fighting vehicles (IFVs) or personnel carriers. IFVs have better armor and a 30 mm cannon with which to engage enemy armor and to provide fire support for dismounted infantry. One of the best IFVs in the world is the American M2A2 Bradley, which figures prominently in two of the attacks that we shall discuss. Meanwhile, personnel carriers are mere battlefield taxis and generally do not engage in direct fire support. A good example is the M1224 MaxxPro MRAP, which was involved in the third attack in the Velyka Novosilka sector. The personnel that make up the mechanized company consist of the crews of the vehicles, a squad of 10-15 sappers (combat engineers) to help with demining and the demolition of obstacles, and 100 mounted infantry, about 160 soldiers in total.
M1224 MaxxPro MRAP
The Ukrainian force depicted in Photo 1 at the beginning of the article engaged in an attack towards the town of Robotyne during the early morning hours of Wednesday June 8. Robotyne is located at the forward edge of the first belt of Russian defenses protecting the strategic communications hub at Tokmak. The Polish military analyst Jaroslaw Wolski (@wolski_jaros) went through the painstaking trouble of collecting a multitude of Russian drone videos of the attack and then geolocating the wrecks of Ukrainian armor through special mapping software. I shall rely on his analysis and map of the attack (Map 2; with slight modifications) to explain the screenshots in this article. [2]
The image labeled Photo 2 above represents a wider shot of what we see in the tighter photograph at the beginning of this article. It depicts a lone German Leopard 2A6 tank and four American M2A2 Bradley fighting vehicles of the newly formed 47th Mechanized Brigade. You can also see a Ukrainian BMP-2 with a mine plow in the upper right corner. All or most of the pictured vehicles have been disabled by mines. The Bradley on the bottom left of the photograph has also been hit by anti-tank guided missiles, likely fired from Russian K-52 attack helicopters from over eight kilometers away.
The vehicles in Photo 2 were part of a reinforced mechanized company of the 2nd Battalion of the 47th Mechanized Brigade that performed a reconnaissance in force south of the town of Mala Tokmachka onto the main defenses east of Robotyne and west of the village of Verbove. (See Map 2 above ) We know that this was a reconnaissance in force because the attack was not supported by sizeable follow-on forces after contact with the enemy was made. According to Jaroslaw Wolski, the Ukrainian column attempted to hide its advance from drone observation by beginning its movement inside the urban terrain of Mala Tokmachka, then proceeded single file along roads that were shielded by tree lines, before being forced by the terrain to attack Russian lines in the open. (Marked on Map 2 with a blue 1) The column was spotted by Russian drones and subjected to artillery fire on two occasions before it came out of the tree line into the open fields in front of the Russian entrenchments. The commander of this column exhibited admirable aggression throughout the march by trying to attack the advance positions of Russian defense lines at least twice before being forced to veer off to his right to try outflank the enemy from the west. On the third attempt to outflank Russian lines, the Ukrainian column ran into the minefield as it came within direct firing range of the first belt of Russian defenses between the strongpoints of Robotyne and Verbove. It was there that the armored column was engaged by Russian artillery a third time, before Russian K-52 attack helicopters began firing anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) from long distance. (More about Russian helicopters in Part II of this article.)
Due to the seven kilometers that this column had to negotiate before it came within range of Russian forward defenses, Ukrainian engineering reconnaissance failed to discover the minefield, or more likely, Russian rocket artillery fired special minelaying munitions shortly before the attack. These munitions scatter multiple mines from the air that imbed into the ground. The BMP armored vehicle in the top right corner of Photo 2 with the mine plow was leading the column through the minefield but was eventually disabled. Apparently, the commander decided to push on, come what may. Perhaps he felt that there was no choice. A retrograde movement in a minefield will likely cause just as much damage as an attack forward. Regardless, the thickly seeded minefield disabled the Leopard 2A6 tank and the Bradley IFV's in short order. Thus, the vehicles are bunched up one on top of each other as they tripped mines while attempting to bypass the disabled vehicle to its front. The vehicles had to stay singe file and, in their lane, because of the prolific minefields on each side of the line of advance. Ukrainian on-the-scene video from one of the crew of a disabled Bradley appeared a few days later depicting the turret firing its .20 mm Bushmaster gun towards Russian positions. The column took casualties after two of the Bradleys were hit by anti-tank missiles fired from helicopters. Eventually, the wounded were loaded into the surviving Bradleys and transported back towards Ukrainian lines. Reportedly this company lost two Leopard 2A6 tanks and eight Bradley IFVs destroyed or disabled in the attack, more than half of its strength. [3] The Russians then launched a local infantry counterattack towards the disabled armor, forcing the Ukrainian crews to retreat before they could gather their dead. Russian helmet cam video from one of the counterattacking infantrymen reveals the charred remains of three Ukrainian servicemen near the wreck of one of the Bradleys. Moreover, the engine was still running on one of the disabled Bradleys, which was audible in the video. [4]
Yet a second video released by the Russian Ministry of Defense of this attack shows the same column being blasted by artillery along a road in a tree line as it advances south from, before it even crossed the east-west Highway H-08 south of the staging area at Orikhiv. Screenshots of this video are not illustrative of the action because it was shot from a wide angle at high altitude and the foliage blocks a view of any damaged vehicles. Most of the losses in this incident were caused by Russian artillery, which was able to get a clear look at the attackers through drone video. The losses occurred in the "grey zone," a "no-man's land" far from the front lines during the Ukrainian advance to contact. What is most striking about this bombardment is the clarity of the drone video, indicating that Russian counter-electronic warfare is effectively combating Ukrainian efforts to disrupt the signals between the Russian drones and their fire-control centers. The Ukrainians will need to do a better job in destroying Russian artillery or jamming Russian drone surveillance if they are to prevent heavy bombardment of its attacking columns in this sector.
Another screenshot labeled above as Photo 3 depicts the attack of a second company from the same 2nd Battalion of the 47th Mechanized Brigade, but five kilometers further west. (Marked on Map 2 in blue as 2) This company attacked out of the urban cover of the town of Novodanylivka, before revealing itself on the open road that leads to Russian positions at Robotyne through the Balka Uspenivska (Uspenivska Ravine). The above image indicates that two separate lanes were attempted through the minefields but failed because of extensive mining. (There has been brisk debate online about whether this image has been photoshopped, due to the excessively muddy appearance of the path on the right through the minefield and the lack of track marks near the third disabled Leopard-2R mine clearing tank). Nevertheless, there is no doubt that so far, the Ukrainians have had difficulty negotiating the extensive minefields along the approaches to Robotyne. Please keep in mind, that sappers (combat engineers) cannot simply clear the minefields manually, since the Russians have also planted anti-personnel mines along with the anti-tank mines. Moreover, Russian drone surveillance is likely to direct artillery or mortar fire onto the sappers clearing the fields. Thus, the best solution is to send tanks with mine clearing plows at the head of the armored column. This process would be easier if Russian artillery in the area was suppressed. Thus, the Ukrainians will have to significantly degrade Russian artillery before attempting another breach of the defenses in front of Robotyne. However, artillery is not that easy to spot since it is dispersed within a 20 kilometer radius of the target and quickly displaces after firing a barrage. A concern is that the 47th Mechanized Brigade has already lost three of its Finnish supplied Berger Leopard-2R mine clearing tanks. (See mine plows in Photo 3 identified in red) Hopefully the plows can be quickly repaired or replaced. This second company that attacked from Novodanylivka also lost two Leopard 2A6 tanks and up to eight Bradleys. [5]
The screenshot above labeled as Photo 4 was taken from a fourth video that the Russians released involving an attack on June 5 by a company of the Ukrainian 37th Marine Brigade and a section of T-64BV tanks from the 4th Tank Brigade further east at Novodonetske, southeast of the town of Velyka Novosilka. (Blue arrow marked as #3 on Map 1) This is over 60 kilometers east of the previously discussed attack near Robotyne. A newly organized brigade, the 37th Marines were undergoing their baptism of fire. This attack was also foiled by Russian minefields. The above screenshot of the overhead Russian drone video depicts seven MaxxPro MRAP personnel carriers and two Ukrainian T-64BV tanks that were disabled by mines and then subjected to artillery fire. The M1224 MaxxPro PRAP (Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected) personnel carrier was developed for the U.S. Army to protect its servicemembers from improvised explosive devices (IED) in Iraq. It is very good at protecting passengers from mines. The remnants of the marine company attacking Novodonetske were hit be artillery and retreated to Ukrainian lines. Subsequent fighting for Novodonetske saw it change hands numerous times and neither side has yet to control it.
Suffice to say, that on June 9 the Ukrainian General Staff sent a representative to meet with brigade commanders from the Orikhiv and Velyka Novosilka axes to sort out the demining deficiencies from the first three days of the counteroffensive. On June 14 video appeared of the Ukrainians using special American made M58 MICLIC and UR-77 line charges to trigger the explosion of the minefields in the fields north of Robotyne. Indications are that Ukrainian attacks after June 8 began progressing through the minefields with more alacrity. Apparently, these attacks have been over shorter distance to give engineering reconnaissance more opportunity to discover the location of mines. Beginning on June 14, the 47th Mechanized and neighboring 65th Mechanized Brigades began using foot infantry to infiltrate the tree lines and wooded terrain north of Robotyne at night. This way, they can provide security for the sappers as they attempt to clear the minefields. Proof that the Ukrainians have not experienced losses like on June 8 is that the Russians have not been able to produce video of destroyed armor on the magnitude captured on film near Robotyne. Instead, the Russians are photoshopping duplicated images into the existing video to present new videos as evidence of new fictional losses that are more numerous than in the original.
c. Western Armor is Protecting the Lives of Ukrainian Servicemen
Before summarizing the lessons from the available screenshots, I wish to convey the impression that the images of the destroyed armor establish one good thing. Most of the Ukrainian servicemembers who were traveling in these Leopards, Bradleys and MaxxPros survived the detonations that brought their vehicles to a halt. Valery Markus, the Senior Sergeant of the 47th Mechanized Brigade reported that it lost only five killed in the failed attack on June 8. [6] (Three are confirmed dead on Russian supplied combat footage) That would have been impossible had they advanced in Russian or Ukrainian made BMP-1, BMP-2 and/or BTR-4 IFVs personnel carriers. Many of these would have suffered catastrophic detonations where most occupants would have been killed or gravely injured. The greater protection afforded by Western armor to infantry was the primary reason why Valery Zaluzhny, commander of the Ukrainian armed forces, pushed for their procurement from the West. The Ukrainians are benefitting from the experience of the Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan in protecting their infantry in Bradley fighting vehicles and MaxxPro personnel carriers. The Ukrainian emphasis on preserving the lives of their personnel wherever possible, stands in stark contrast to the Russian indifference to the lives of their servicemen. Equipment can always be replaced; combat experience of the individual soldiers cannot. It is safe to conclude that Ukrainian losses in personnel in this early phase of their counteroffensive have been relatively light, even when factoring in the greater rate of casualties to be expected by the attacker compared to the defender. In contrast, the loss in armored vehicles has been heavy and one fears that at some point these will exceed the capacity of the Ukrainians to repair or replace them.
To go back to the German experience during the start of the southern prong of Operation Citadel on July 6, 1943, the Germans were able to break through the first belt of Russian defenses at Cherkasskoje and Bykove, but at great cost. Close to 50% of their brand-new Panzer-V Panther tanks of the elite Division Grossdeutschland were disabled by mines or bogged down in the mud during the first days of the offensive, when German Pioneers (sappers) were unable to clear minefields while under artillery fire. Even more costly was the loss of the vaunted Panzer-VI Tiger I tanks, of which the SS Corps had but a precious three dozen at the start of the operation. By the time the Germans crunched their way through to the town of Prokhorovka on July 11, the 1st SS Division Leibstandarte had a single platoon of four Tigers remaining. The 3d SS Division Tottenkopf was able to field 10 Tigers on the opposite bank. Meanwhile, the 2nd SS Division Das Reich had but one Tiger remaining. Although these few Tigers exacted a frightful toll on Russian T-34 tanks during the epic Battle of Prokhorovka on July 12, there were not enough of them for the Germans to break through. In effect, the Battle of Prokohorovka was decided one week earlier during the breakthrough of the Russian minefields at Cherkasskoye and Bykove, when too many of the best German tanks were lost to that most effective tank killer, the ubiquitous mine. [7]
Therefore, the Ukrainians will have to find a way of breaching the Russian minefields in Zaporizhzhia oblast without losing too many of their Leopard 2A4 and 2A6 tanks. Otherwise, they will find themselves in the same predicament as the Germans in World War II, with too few of their heaviest tanks available for combat when they need them most, during the breakthrough of the second and third belts of Russian defenses.
d. Ukrainians Can Repair Damaged Armor if they Maintain Control of the Battlefield
Which brings me to the next point. Most of the armor visible in the above screenshots of drone video was not destroyed. Rather, it was disabled. Many tanks and IFVs will be relatively easy to fix, requiring nothing more than a new track. That is why it is important for the Ukrainians to maintain control of the battlefield after an attack. German archival reports from the Kursk campaign in 1943 report the number of available tanks lost at the end of each day's fighting and the available tanks at the start of the following morning. It is evident that the Germans were able to recover and repair many of the lost tanks they were able to control the battlefield from the previous day's action. So too, the Ukrainians have the potential to recover their damaged armor if they retain the battlefield. So far, the lost armor in the above screenshot is located in the "grey zone," or "no man's land." The recovery of some of the damaged vehicles is difficult because it is located within direct firing range of the forward edge of Russian positions. Nevertheless, video has appeared of a Ukrainian Bergerpanzer 2 tank recovery vehicle towing a disabled Leopard 2A6 with one of its tracks missing down an asphalt road through Nova Tokmachka. Moreover, photographs show the damaged turret of a Bradley being welded together in a rear area repair shop. Thus, it is hoped that damaged tanks and IFVs can be repaired and sent back to the front, helping the Ukrainians to keep a sizeable core of armor available for the key breaching operations yet to come. Unlike the Germans in World War II, who lost too many of their prized Tiger I tanks early in the Kursk campaign, the Ukrainians hope to have enough Leopards left over to break through Russian defenses at the decisive breaching point.
My assessment of the attack of the 47th Mechanized Brigade, the Ukrainian deficiency in short range anti-air defenses, the propaganda fallout from the failed attack and a short prognostication of what may come in the coming weeks, follows in Part II of this article.
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[1] Map 1, with slight modifications, was taken from the online issue of the Kyiv Independent for 17 May. Igor Kossak. Where does Russia Expect Ukraine’s Counterattack. Kyiv Independent, May 17. https://kyivindependent.com/where-does-russia-expect-ukraines-counterattack-overview-of-defensive-lines/
[2] Wolski o Wojnie. TWARDY PANCERZ #4 RZEŹ "ZMECHU" UKRAIŃSKIEJ 47 BRYGADY. YouTube. 06/13/2023, @wolski_jaros.
[3] Oryx. https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-ukrainian.html
[4] Wolski o Wojnie, ibid.
[5] Oryx, ibid.
[6] https://twitter.com/Valerii_Markus Jun 13 @valerii_markus
[7] George M. Nipe. Blood, Steel and Myth. (Stamford, CT: RZM Publishing, 2011), pp. 8, 309, 330.