III. NATIVE UKRAINIAN CHARACTERISTICS IN WAR
4. Populism and Volunteerism in the Russo-Ukrainian War
Flooded trenches at Bakhmut, reminiscent of World War I.
The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War is a continuation of the fighting that Putin started in 2014, but on a much larger scale. This time, he invaded openly and did not try to disguise the operation as some pro-Russian separatist movement that was limited to the Donbas. The intent was to destroy Ukrainian sovereignty once and for all, in one bold stroke. In pursuit of that objective, the Russians intended to use their air force to full effect to seize control of Ukrainian air space. In 2014, they could not use air power because the conflict was painted by Russian propaganda as a localized internal Ukrainian conflict. Furthermore, the Russian Black Sea Fleet has also added a dimension not seen in 2014 by firing long-range sea-launched missiles at Ukrainian targets inland. The scope of Russian capabilities in 2022 challenged the Ukrainian military and, by extension, Ukrainian society, like never before.
a. Volunteerism
This war is different from any that Ukraine fought previously. For once, Ukrainian resistance is not predominantly a by-product of a populist uprising. This time the Ukrainian regular army was ready and waiting. Whereas the Ukrainian people and its government may have hoped that an all-out attack would never come, its professional military had no illusions. Since the Minsk II accords in March 2015, which froze the conflict in the Donbas, the Ukrainian senior officer corps knew that, sooner or later, the Russians would launch a full-fledged invasion to finish the job that they started in 2014. So, they prepared, as best as they could. Despite a lack of government funding and ongoing corruption in its defense industry, Ukraine's General Staff refurbished every available piece of functional Soviet-era equipment in its inventory and quietly built a force of more than 200,000 front-line personnel, 1,122 artillery pieces, 354 rocket launchers, 720 tanks, 1,500 armored vehicles, and approximately 133 jet aircraft and 35 attack helicopters - the largest military force in Europe, second only to Russia. Admittedly, this large army was equipped with outdated 1990s equipment. But the Ukrainian military leadership channeled its native talent and ingenuity to maximize the lethality of their weapons, particularly its 250 ancient S-300 anti-air defense systems. Events reaffirmed the maxim that high-tech alone is not determinative in war. It is still the high concept of human creativity that decides successful campaigns. As Carl von Clausewitz states in his timeless classic On War, the effective practice of war is an art. [1] The clever implementation of multi-layered anti-air defenses, tweaked and upgraded with modern software and radars, proved deadly in the first weeks of the war, and denied Russian aircraft free access to Ukrainian skies. Concurrently, a strategy of luring Russian armored columns deep into Ukrainian territory to elongate their vulnerable supply lines caused logistical problems, which brought Russian offensive operations to a halt. Contrary to early assessments, it wasn't Western weaponry or satellite intelligence that defeated Russia's initial invasion of February 24, 2022. Rather, the Ukrainian senior officer corps and its grasp of the operational art, which fused the effective denial of airspace with the strategy of attacking vulnerable Russian supply lines, were the X-factor that upset Putin's plan for a quick and easy victory.
Valery Zaluzhny, Ukrainian army commander, and Serhii Shaptala, Chief-of-Staff
Of equal importance is that eight years of fighting in the Donbas gave Ukrainian front-line units the confidence to face the Russians in combat. As general Valery Zaluzhny pointed out in his now famous interview by the Economist in December 2022, before you can fight you have to be ready to kill. [2] Unlike in 2014, when even rumors of approaching Russian paratroopers would cause Ukrainian conscripts or volunteers to flee, in February 2023, Ukrainian infantrymen, tankers and gunners went about their grim task of killing Russians with dispassionate efficiency. From day one of the war, the Ukrainian regular and territorial forces stood and fought. So, does that mean that the old characteristics of populism and volunteerism are gone from Ukrainian warfighting? Not at all! They are still there, but you must know where to look.
Earlier in this newsletter, I described how volunteers in the hastily organized Ukrainian territorial defense brigades were thrown into the forests northwest and west Kyiv during the first weeks of the war. By April 2022 close to 100,000 volunteers filled out 31 territorial defense brigades. These swelled the number of Ukrainian ground forces to over 300,000. Thousands more volunteered for service in the regular armed forces. Thus, within the first month of the war, on paper Ukraine had 400,000 personnel available for disposition by the Ukrainian General Staff. Consequently, Ukraine acquired a numerical superiority over Russian forces during the first seven months of hostilities. As of February 24, 2022, Russian ground forces in the Ukrainian theater of operations barely numbered 200,000.
Moreover, hundreds of Ukrainian civilians in the districts northwest of Kyiv also volunteered their diverse talents to contribute substantively to victory in February-March 2022. Of course, a few brave souls started taking pot-shots at Russian paratroopers from their high-rise balconies with hunting rifles. But there was more tangible aid that volunteers offered to the regular armed forces. What is now becoming apparent is that at first, not all Ukrainian artillery brigades had an established capability to use drones for the correction of fires. A recent interview with Colonel Oleh Shevchuk of the 43d Artillery Brigade revealed that with the start of hostilities, the presence of drones within his unit was almost non-existent. [3] Rather, the accuracy of the fire of the brigade was corrected by civilians behind enemy lines using their cell phones or chat apps. Many were teenagers. These began calling in their observations to phone numbers designated by the Kyiv administration for such a purpose. Moreover, the drones that were available to correct the fire were provided by civilian volunteers. One example is that of a wedding photography business that used drones to film their celebrating customers from overhead. These were offered to help the gunners to adjust their salvos. The results were deadly. The elite Russian airborne vozdushno desantnie voiska (VDV), who were attacking at the heads of the columns moving on Kyiv, suffered frightful casualties. The 43d Artillery Brigade kept firing its guns, especially the ancient 205 mm Pion cannon with a 50-kilometer range, non-stop for days. As it turns out, the VDV were never able to fully recover their pre-war combat effectiveness after defeat at Kyiv. The victory became apparent when the Russians retreated north over the Belorussian border. [4]
203 mm Pion guns of the 43d Artillery Brigade on the streets of Kyiv
b. Positive and Negative Effects of Populism on Combat Effectiveness
The sudden mobilization of hundreds of thousands of volunteers and conscripts also revealed a positive influence of populism at the lower tactical level of the Ukrainian armed forces. In May 2022, military pundits in the West gave the Ukrainian commanders at the junior and company level high marks for the decentralized style of command that they exhibited during the defensive battles against advancing Russian columns during the defense of Kyiv.[5] Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in their article “Ukraine at War. Paving the Road from Survival to Victory,” describe their observations of the Ukrainian army during the early phase of the war. They found that the initial general mobilization of Ukrainian reserves for war brought together people from diverse social strata with a wide range of technical expertise. This phenomenon optimally democratized the army for effective mission command at the lower level. For example, they describe a platoon planning a hasty counterattack through a “council of war” between the regular army junior lieutenant and platoon sergeant, on the one hand, and several respected enlisted with technical and management experience in civilian life, on the other. Such an approach resulted in a creative tactical solution that was highly effective because it was unconventional. The fact, that many of the early volunteers had prior combat experience in the Donbas made such a bottom-up approach to war that more effective. Such a style of command would have been familiar to practitioners of irregular warfare during the Revolution and Civil War period in 1917-1921, when the local chieftains, the otamany, often tolerated input from their subordinates, for fear that they would lose control of their mercurial underlings.
Mission command is a decentralized process where a superior gives subordinates general directives regarding the primary objective, allowing the junior officers to exercise initiative to accomplish their mission. This empowers the junior officers with the flexibility to react to changing conditions at the front and to conduct lateral coordination with fellow junior officers, without waiting for permission from the top. Such a process speeds up decision-making and leaves discretion with commanders who are closest to the situation on the ground. The overall commander retains a modicum of control by delineating the main effort from mere supporting attacks, by allocating supplies where needed, and by holding back a reserve. This structure links all the subordinates conceptually, by focusing their efforts on supporting the main effort. Of course, the commander can adjust to changing circumstances by ordering a shift in main effort, which sets off an adjustment amongst the subordinates.
Regardless, Watling and Reynolds had their doubts whether the Ukrainian free-wheeling approach at the lower tactical level could be effective at the next level up, that of battalion, or even higher, at brigade level. A year into the war, it is evident that some of the better Ukrainian battalion commanders and their staffs are more than capable of practicing mission command, even when on the offensive. During the spectacular breakthrough near Balaklia in September 2022 the battalion commanders of the elite 25th Airborne and the 80th Air-Assault Brigades proved very flexible while driving some 90 kilometers into the Russian rear to capture the strategic cities of Izyum and Kupiansk. What was equally impressive was that the staffs one level up at brigade level were able to coordinate the movement, artillery support, and supply of their subordinate battalions during this fluid operation. Granted, the Balaklia offensive involved only a few of the elite brigades on a lightly defended sector of Russian front and questions remained whether other brigade staffs were as competent in conducting combined arms operations. The subsequent grinding and incremental Ukrainian offensive to expel Russian forces from Kherson in November 2022 confirmed these suspicions when many Ukrainian attacks proved cumbersome and uncoordinated. It became apparent that not all Ukrainian brigade staffs operated as smoothly as those involved in the Balaklia operation.
A year into the war, Ukrainian capacity for mission command is still evident, but its application is uneven. A recent field study by American analysts Michael Kofman and Rob Lee, who visited the Bakhmut battlefront in late February 2023, confirm that Ukrainians continue to practice effective mission command at the platoon, company and even battalion level. In many instances, the more talented company commanders who survived combat were promoted to command at battalion level and are now capable of applying the principles of decentralized command one step higher up. Nonetheless, Kofman and Lee observed a drastic drop-off in performance at the level of brigade. [6] Many of the brigades of the territorial defense, who have reserve commanders and staff-officers, do not measure up to those of the regular army. The sudden and drastic expansion of the Ukrainian armed forces and the territorial defense during 2022 was too large to be fully staffed by the available field-grade officers of the active-duty officer cadre. Consequently, many reserve officers without the necessary training and experience assumed command. Even many of the new regular army brigades that have been raised in 2022 or 2023 simply do not meet the requisite standards for decentralized control, because of a lack of competent mid-level officers. [7]
The sad reality is that during the first year of the war the Ukrainian armed forces have suffered over 120,000 permanent casualties, of which approximately 25,000 have been killed. [8] (A ratio of approximately 1 to 4.8 in killed to wounded, reflecting Ukraine's relatively effective medical evacuation capability and interior lines of communication to hospitals [9]; the Russians have suffered close to 200,000 casualties but lost over 60,000 killed, a 1 to 3 ratio, due to a disregard for the medical care of their wounded and operations on exterior lines of communication from medical facilities) [10] A disproportionate number of the Ukrainian casualties were some of the more experienced officers. They had to be replaced by older inexperienced reserve officers, who were called up to make up the numbers. Most of the latter are products of the top-down Soviet school of command. The net result is that skilled battalion commanders are not supported or given the freedom of action to make independent decisions by their inexperienced brigade commanders. Quite the contrary, the reserve lieutenant colonels and majors seek to impose their will onto their subordinates and issue orders regarding where, when, and how to fight. This negates the Ukrainian advantage of mission command at the lower tactical level by junior commanders who are best situated to assess local conditions. The older brigade commanders oftentimes issue orders based on an examination of a map or grainy drone video without personally inspecting the battlefield. In fact, the mid-level reserve officers are abusing one of the new technologies of this war, which is drone video. Instead of allowing their junior officers to take advantage of the technology for tactical decision making, the reserve lieutenant-colonel and majors are using the video to micro-manage their subordinates. [11]
Reportedly, the Ukrainian General Staff is organizing three new corps of 3-4 brigades each for the long-awaited offensive in the Spring-Summer of 2023. That amounts to approximately 40,000 combat personnel. The new formations will be expected to execute complicated breaching operations of Russian lines and a subsequent exploitation into the enemy rear. A relatively recent historical example of such an operation is the 1991 breach of Iraqi lines by the U.S. Marine Corps during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Of course, Ukraine will not have the air supremacy that the Americans enjoyed during the war in Iraq. Moreover, Russian defenders are expected to be more stubborn than the Iraqis. Ukraine will need its brigade staffs operating at their best to pull off such a feat. Thus, I surmise that staff officers will be cannibalized from some of the older Ukrainian mechanized brigades and assigned to lead the new attacking formations. That means the existing brigades will be further diluted of talent.
c. The Battle of Bakhmut and the Populist Backlash to New Law No. 8271.
So far, the negative influence of populism has been mostly dormant in this war, due to Ukraine's successful rebuff of Russia's initial invasion. Murmurs of dissatisfaction were evident last summer during the bloody battle for Severdonetsk when the killed-in-action began approaching 200 daily. But the complaints quieted after Ukrainian victories at Izyum-Kupiansk and Kherson. Nonetheless, populist hostility may soon rear its ugly head if Ukrainian casualties continue to mount at Bakhmut, and new offensives do not produce the desired strategic results. Glimpses of the potential unrest appeared when President Zelensky signed into law an act that stiffened penalties for military offenses - Law No. 8271. The topic is developed below.
Following Ukrainian victories at Izyum-Kupiansk in September 2022 and Kherson in November 2022, Ukraine had the initiative in this war. Except for the local offensive towards Bakhmut by Evgeny Prygozhin's mercenary Wagner Group, the Russians were forced to go on the strategic defensive. Nevertheless, Putin's mobilization of 300,000 new conscripts on September 13, 2022 and the narrowing of the front by some 250 kilometers following Russian retreat from the west bank of the Dnieper in November 2022, made it difficult for Ukraine to sustain further offensives. The greater density of Russian defenses to area of frontage left few gaps for the Ukrainians to exploit for a breakthrough. Except for a limited operation in Luhansk oblast towards Svatove and Kreminna after the fall of Lyman, the Ukrainian army itself went on the defensive and began reconstituting its forces for operations in Spring-Summer of 2023. The quality of this force is unknown. Even many of the older brigades with experience going back to 2014-2015 are now manned primarily by recently mobilized conscripts. The Ukrainians are also limited by the reality that Western Europe and the United States do not have the capacity to manufacture the volume of ammunition necessary to sustain offensive operations. The Ukrainian General Staff was recently forced to ration artillery ammunition, thereby, degrading the combat power of its brigades. Consequently, by January 2023 Prygozhin's Wagner Group began making slow but steady progress at Bakhmut, despite horrific casualties. But the Ukrainians were suffering terrible losses themselves at the hands of the more numerous and better supplied Russian artillery.
By the Winter of 2022 the Russo-Ukrainian War entered a period of positional warfare with attrition witling away at the strength of both armies but with neither holding the initiative. Both sides were expected to launch new offensives to regain the momentum. Putin's insistence on immediate results forced the Russian General Staff to jump the gun and launch a general offensive on a wide front in late January 2023, but before much of its newly conscripted force was fully trained. The Ukrainians were attacked not only at Bakhmut, but also at Orikhovo, Vuhledar, Marynka, Avdiivka, Bilohorivka, Kreminna, Svatove, and Kupiansk. Except for Bakhmut, the Russian offensive made scant progress but at a cost of up to 10,000 dead in a month's time. For instance, the attack on Vuhledar by the elite 40th and 155th Naval Infantry Brigades in early February 2023 turned into a true debacle, resulting in 130 armored vehicles lost and hundreds of elite Russian naval infantry killed. The Ukrainian General Staff has been content to absorb Russian attacks with the purpose of attriting Russian forces to weaken them for the defense of its own counter-offensive later this year.
Nonetheless, the battle for Bakhmut has acquired a significance that outstrips its negligible strategic importance. (Bakhmut shields the approaches to the politically important twin cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, which sit on defensible high ground and are well defended) It appears that everyone has a stake in the battle. Putin is desperate for a victory, any victory, as proof of the continued progress of his "special military operation." Prygozhin has staked his political career on the fall of Bakhmut, as proof of the military competence of his Wagner Group in comparison to the allegedly incompetent Russian General Staff, with whom he is feuding. President Volodymyr Zelensky is trying to deny Russia a symbolic victory for as long as possible. The Ukrainian General Staff is trying to pin down and bleed as many Russian formations as possible in Bakhmut, while it builds up its assault forces for a counter-offensive elsewhere. Finally, the Russian General Staff is trying to force the Ukrainians to commit the forces that they are husbanding for an offensive into the meatgrinder at Bakhmut, to weaken its potential impact. Meanwhile, recent estimates place average daily losses in the battle at over 750 for the Russians and 250 for the Ukrainians, an exchange rate of 3 to 1. On some days the ratio is closer to 2 to 1.
The war of attrition favors Russia, since its larger resources in population and materiel are conducive to a protracted struggle. Conversely, Ukraine is dependent on continued Western support to sustain its war effort, which is limited in duration and resources. With time on Russia's side, Ukraine is forced into achieving a strategic breakthrough in Zaporizhzhia oblast soon, probably no later than Summer of 2023. The offensive must win back the Black Sea and Azov coast, or at the very least capture enough territory to bring supply lines to Crimea within the range of Ukrainian rockets and artillery, particularly the Kerch Bridge. Ukrainian success in the offensive would assure the continued flow of Western arms in support of the war. It would also threaten Russia's "land bridge" to Crimea, which would translate into tangible leverage against Putin in any peace negotiations. Failure of the counter-offensive would dampen prospects for protracted Western support and force Ukraine into negotiations from a position of weakness.
To achieve its strategic objectives, the Ukrainian General Staff has been forced to throw fresh units into the meat grinder at Bakhmut to hold the city for as long as possible. Given Bakhmut's political significance, it is hoped that the Russians dedicate more and more forces to the attack, where they can be destroyed against Ukrainian defenses. This weakens Russian defenses on other fronts, particularly Zaporizhzhia oblast, where a Ukrainian attack would produce the greatest strategic effect. At the same time, the Ukrainian command is patiently training and building up the actual assault forces allocated for such an operation. Preparations have been delayed while the Ukrainians wait for their crews to be trained on Western tanks and armored fighting vehicles, which will hopefully add punch to the attack. The Ukrainians also await warmer weather to dry the muddy conditions that impede cross-country mechanized operations.
Bakhmut under artillery fire.
The intensity of Russian artillery fire at Bakhmut makes it necessary for the Ukrainians to rotate the units of its garrison frequently, as these quickly lose combat effectiveness after sustaining a high volume of casualties in a short period of time. The garrison at Bakhmut consists of battalions of the less effective territorial defense brigades as well as from some of the better brigades of the regular army. Currently, the staff of the 93d Mechanized Brigade is responsible for defense of the city. It has battalions from several other brigades temporarily attached to its command. For the first time in the war, the high attrition of the fighting near Bakhmut has forced the Ukrainian General Staff to tolerate a drastic personnel policy - many of the replacements sent to Bakhmut to replenish losses from earlier fighting are arriving with practically no prior training. While the vetting and training of new recruits has been a recurring problem in the Ukrainian armed forces, due to the sudden mobilization of hundreds of thousands new recruits, the situation has become more widespread since September 2022, when the Russians mobilized 300,000 new conscripts and decided to place such an emphasis on the capture of Bakhmut. There simply is not enough time to train Ukrainian replacements before operational exigencies necessitate their being thrown into battle. This has resulted in more than a few instances of platoons, even entire companies, abandoning their trenches after being subjected to Russian artillery. Part of the problem is due to the reality that many platoon commanders or sergeants are themselves inexperienced, because of casualties amongst the veteran cadre. Moreover, the new units have not had the time to develop the collective esprit de corps, which is essential to making each soldier accountable to fellow comrades through the sanction of shame and dishonor.
A recent interview in the Washington Post with Anatoli Kozel, a/k/a "Kupol," a battalion commander in the 46th Air Assault Brigade, is illustrative of the problem. [12] The 46th Air Assault is a newly raised unit that first entered combat in the Kherson campaign in September 2022. It was considered a solid formation. After arriving to the Bakhmut front in December 2022, the brigade was credited with a successful counterattack during the battle of Soledar, which cleared part of the town of Wagner forces. Nonetheless, the intensity of the fighting attrited the original ranks of the brigade to such an extent, that it had to be reconstituted from newly mobilized conscripts. According to the battalion commander, the replacements had no prior training and had to be trained at the front during actual combat. It is no surprise that the inexperienced soldiers were unable to withstand more than one or two artillery barrages before fleeing their positions. For the record, "Kupol" was removed from command and assigned to a training center, for unauthorized comments to the press. Moreover, the command of Ukraine's Air Assault Troops, an elite branch of the armed forces, issued a press release rebutting "Kupol's" assertions, stating that the air-assault soldiers all undergo basic training.
As the Russo-Ukrainian War enters its second year, the reality is that it is often being waged by recently mobilized civilians who are led by older reserve officers who have little combat experience, let alone exposure to the NATO-styled principle of mission command. [13] Cognizant of the incidents where entire units abandoned their positions under fire, general Valery Zaluzhny, commander of the Ukrainian armed forces, and other senior military commanders, called for a reform of Ukraine's military justice system. Until recently, cases involving breaches of military discipline were heard by Ukrainian civilian courts, which ignored military exigencies and responded to local populist pressure to dispense justice inconsistently. Moreover, the existing law allowed for judges to treat each prosecution on a case-by-case basis, with wide latitude on sentencing. Convictions for even serious offenses were subject to a reduction of prison sentences to mere probation or avoidance of service altogether, upon payment of a fine (10% deduction of pay). Many who have been charged with desertion or cowardice under fire were acquitted after emotional appeals from family or local politicians.
In response to Zaluzhny's entreaties, on December 13, 2022, the Ukrainian Parliament passed law No. 8271, an amendment to Ukraine's criminal code regarding an increase in penalties for desertion in time of war. Draft Law 8271, with the full title "On Amendments to the Criminal Code of Ukraine, the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses and other legislative acts of Ukraine regarding the specifics of military service under martial law or combat conditions," was registered in the Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, on December 8. [14] On December 13, 2023, the requisite majority of parliament members voted for the law, after which the document was sent to the President for signature. On January 25, 2023, he signed it into law. President Zelensky declined to veto the legislation, despite the signature of 25,000 Ukrainian citizens on a petition requesting that it be repealed. Law No. 8271 increased prison terms for desertion, disobedience of orders, and cowardice under fire to 5-7 years. Moreover, it made sentences mandatory, without the previous judicial discretion to soften the prison term or to order probation. Furthermore, commanders now have the power to accuse subordinates of alcohol abuse or drug use, which is apparently a growing problem.
Regardless, many journalists, lawyers, and some military commanders, primarily in the newly raised regular or volunteer territorial defense brigades, continue to criticize the law as unconstitutional and contrary to Ukrainian practice. By way of comparison, the United States Uniform Code of Military Justice is dispensed through military courts-martial that are convened by military commanders, presided over by military judges, decided by military juries, and subject to review by military appellate courts (although with civilian judges), unless accepted for review pursuant to a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the Russian army is not averse to using "barrier battalions" to keep soldiers from running from the front lines, where they face the possibility of being shot, without a trial. Of course, the Wagner Group shoots anyone who runs, unless they are seriously wounded. I must also mention that any member of Wagner who surrenders to the Ukrainians and is then returned in a prisoner exchange is executed by a blow to the head with a sledgehammer.
The intensity of this horrible war has eaten though many of the Ukrainian volunteers who rallied to the colors following February 24, 2022. A year later 120,000 of these are dead, permanently wounded, or psychologically incapable of returning to the front. The vast numbers of the soldiers who suffer from debilitating combat fatigue that prevents them from being effective upon returning to the front are underreported. Despite the Ukrainian national retort of Slava Heroyam! ("Glory to the Heroes"), Ukraine may be running out of actual heroes who are willing to voluntarily subject themselves to the intensity of Russian artillery and rocket barrages - a condition that few Western militaries have experienced since the Second World War. What remains for further mobilization is a large pool of untrained Ukrainian citizens who are patriotic but circumspect about committing to a struggle that denies them a reasonable chance of survival. These citizen soldiers are also not predisposed to military discipline and subordination. The only way to turn them into effective soldiers is to subject them to eight weeks of basic training where a team-building process develops into a genuine collective esprit de corps that enables individuals to endure difficult conditions for fear of disappointing their comrades. Given the existential nature of this war for Ukraine, the training must be reinforced with the threat of stiff legal penalties for insubordination. By signing Law No. 8271, Zelensky is venturing where only Khmelnytsky, Makhno, and the UPA have gone before. (For the record, the Halytska Armia started shooting deserters during its retreat in the face of a Polish offensive in May 1919) At the same time, the Ukrainian president faces the risk of a populist backlash, especially if the Ukrainian counter-offensives in Spring-Summer fail to achieve strategic results. Moreover, populist pressures will only increase if Zelensky must negotiate a ceasefire on terms that fall short of public expectations, like a return to pre-2014 borders, or the recapture of Crimea.
I thank all who read this long essay for their patience, as the subject matter is painful and difficult to write. I hope to return to lighter topics in my next sub-stack article when I address the issues of mobility and artillery in the Ukrainian experience of war, unless something spectacular happens that calls for immediate comment.
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[1] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 87-89.
[2] "An interview with General Valery Zaluzhny, head of Ukraine's armed forces." The Economist, 12/15/2022.
[3] Volodymyr. Interview: Ukrainian colonel Oleh Shevchuk. Wartranslated.com. https://wartranslated.com/pravda-com-ua-interview-ukrainian-colonel-oleh-shevchuk/
[4] Thomas Grove. How Ukrainian Civilians Risked Their Lives to Help Win Battle for Kyiv. Wall Street Journal. 05/08/2022. https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-ukrainian-civilians-risked-their-lives-to-help-win-the-battle-for-kyiv-11652002200
[5] Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds. “Ukraine at War: Paving the Road from Survival to Victory.” Special Report, pp. 15-17. RUSI, 4 July 2022.
[6] Ryan Evans and Michael Kofman. "How to Think About Bakhmut and a Ukrainian Spring Offensive." War on the Rocks. 03/14/2023. https://warontherocks.com/2023/03/ how-to-think-about-bakhmut-and-a-ukrainian-spring-offensive/
[7] Franz-Stefan Gady. Ukraine's army must shed its Soviet legacy, says military expert. Economist. 03/17/2023. https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2023/03/17/ ukraines-army-must-shed-its-soviet-legacy-says-a-military-expert
[8] Branco Marcetic. The danger of downplaying the Ukrainian battlefield toll. Responsible Statecraft. 3/15/2023. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/03/15/the-danger-of-downplaying-the-ukrainian-battlefield-toll/
[9] Tanisha M. Fazal. Ukrainian Military Medicine Is a Critical Advantage. Foreign Policy. 1/31/2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/31/ukraine-military-medicine-russia-war/
[10] Mathew Luxmoore, Russia's death toll from Ukraine is as high as 60,000, UK says. Wall Street Journal 02/17/2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-death-toll-from-ukraine-war-is-as-high-as-60-000-u-k-says-14305ba5
[11] Franz-Stefan Gady @ HoansSolo. Twitter. 03/21/2023.
[12] Isabelle Khurshudyan, Paul Sonne, Karen DeYoung. Ukraine short of skilled troops and munitions as losses, pressure mounts. Washington Post. 03/14/2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/03/13/ukraine-casualties-pessimism-ammunition-shortage/
[13] Ryan Evans and Michael Kofman. "How to Think About Bakhmut and a Ukrainian Spring Offensive." War on the Rocks. 03/14/2023., supra.
[14] Army regulation or betrayal: what newly adopted law on military personnel responsibility entails. Rubryka, 01/26/2023. https://rubryka.com/en/article/ strengthening-liability-military-staff/