III. Native Ukrainian Characteristics in War.
5. Unleash the Tachanka [1] but Keep the Big Guns Within Range.
Model of Tachanka
As we await the start of the Ukrainian Spring counteroffensive, comparisons come to mind with the pause before the beginning of the German Operation Citadel in World War II, better known as the Battle of Kursk. Instead of commencing the offensive to reduce the Kursk salient in May 1943, Adolph Hitler chose to wait for the deployment of the brand-new Panzer V Panther tank to beef up his armored force. Consequently, the actual offensive did not begin until July 5, 1943, when 200 brand new Panther tanks arrived at the front straight from the factory. The two months pause gave the Soviets time to dig three to four belts of defenses around the Kursk salient and to concentrate additional armored forces in operational reserve. The Panthers that were rushed through production proved promising in combat, but their teething problems caused many to break down. Others were disabled by the thick minefields that were sown in front and between the Soviet defenses. As the historical record shows, the Soviet defenses proved difficult to traverse and the Germans managed to penetrate as far as the second belt in only one location, where dogged attacks by the SS Corps battered through just short of the town of Prokhorovka. On the morning of July 11, 1943, they were confronted by the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army, which rushed to Prokhorovka from operational reserve. What followed was one of the epic tank battles in history. Although the SS held the battlefield at the end of the day and destroyed many more tanks then they lost, they could advance no further. Consequently, Operation Citadel ended in a major strategic defeat for the Germans. As it turns out, relying on field fortifications in major defensive battles is part of the Russian military legacy going back to Peter the Great's victory at Poltava in 1709. Likewise, Marshall Mykhail Kutuzov built redoubts to confront Napoleon at the Battle of Borodino in 1812.
Currently, the Ukrainian armed forces are waiting for the conclusion of the training of their tank crews on recently supplied German Leopard 2 and British Challenger tanks, as well as American Bradley M2A2 and Stryker armored fighting vehicles. Moreover, they are training up to twelve new mechanized and air-assault brigades for the upcoming attack. That amounts to 1,000 armored vehicles and 40,000 front-line troops that will be available for offensive action. Meanwhile, the Russians have been constructing three defense belts to the east of the Dnieper River in Zaporizhzhia oblast, in anticipation of a Ukrainian attack towards Melitopil, Berdyansk and Mariupil on the Azov coast. These are manned by at least 30,000 Russian conscripts, with 15,000 elite airborne troops in reserve. Will the Ukrainian effort succeed in crunching through Russian defenses on an axis of advance that seems obvious to even casual observers? Or will the Russian defenses hold up the Ukrainian offensive short of its goals? Perhaps the Ukrainian General Staff is engaging in its usual chicanery to deceive the Russians as to their real objective and are preparing to attack elsewhere, like in Luhansk or Donetsk oblasts? In any case, unseasonably wet weather has forced the Ukrainians to wait for the mud to dry up on the likely avenues of advance. What is certain is that the offensive will likely start by late May, unlike the German Operation Citadel eighty years ago, which did not kick off until July.
In the meantime, I take advantage of this interlude to finish my canvas of the Ukrainian way of war by considering how the country's geography and socio-economic history influences tactical approaches to battle.
a. Mobility Without Cavalry - the Tabir.
Ukraine's vast open spaces place a premium on speed and mobility to outmaneuver the enemy. During the advent of Ukrainian warfighting during the peasant uprisings of the 15th to 17th centuries, logic dictated that speed and mobility could best be enhanced by harnessing horsepower to transport soldiers onto the flanks and rear of the enemy. Relying on the endurance of men to march long distance was unsatisfactory because of the much slower pace of foot soldiers and the resulting fatigue when they arrived on the battlefield. Thus, cavalry was the dominant arm in warfighting in Ukraine. However, there is an important prerequisite to fielding cavalry formations. A mounted soldier needs to know not only how to ride but also how to fight in the saddle. Specifically, a cavalryman must be comfortable in communicating his intentions to the horse through use of the bridle, knees, riding crop or spurs to maneuver in combat. Moreover, the shifting of the balance of the rider's body while resting his weight in stirrups to effectively wield a sword or lance, or fire a bow or firearm, is a skill that requires years to master. To borrow an analogy from Canadian all-time ice hockey great Wayne Gretzky, "you need to skate to play this game." [2] Similarly, you need to ride to play the cavalry game.
Ukrainian adversaries and contemporaries during the early campaigns against the Cossacks certainly knew how to play the cavalry game. The Polish nobility and their retainers depended on their ability to fight in the saddle as the basis for their social standing in the feudal order of the Polish Commonwealth. Even the poorest hussar or pancerny [3] trained in the use of weapons while on horseback from childhood. The Polish hussaria were famous for being some of the best heavy cavalry in Europe during the "pike and shot" period of military history. [4] Their competence in the use of the lance, a specialty weapon that was hard to master, extended in time as far as the Napoleonic wars, where the Polish lancers were the finest in Napoleon's Grande Armee. Similarly, the Crimean Tatars, who fought both alongside and against the Cossacks, were raised in the saddle, and their ability to ride their agile steppe ponies while showering the enemy with clouds of arrows fired from bows was legendary. The counterintuitive "Parthian shot," fired from behind the neck to the rear by a rider while retreating from the battlefield at speed, is particularly admired by military historians.
The Parthian Shot
The same cannot be said of the Ukrainian Cossacks. I know the following statement will elicit hostility from some of my readers, since the Ukrainian national narrative envisions the Cossack on horseback. However, the Cossacks, let alone the serfs who rose against their Polish landlords, rarely had an opportunity to get on the back of a horse, let alone a specially bred warhorse. Rather, the Cossacks were considered fine musketeers and pike infantry. [5] They excelled at siege warfare, including the use of artillery to knock holes in fortresses. Most came from peasant backgrounds, where at best, they would encounter lumbering draft horses while riding bareback - without stirrups. So how to offset the clear advantage of Polish cavalry?
One solution was to hire Tatar light cavalry. However, the Tatars proved to be unreliable, always ready to sell out to the highest bidder, abandoning the Cossacks at inopportune moments. Moreover, the Tatars were a light cavalry force, adept at reconnaissance and screening on the flanks and front of an army. However, they would have to relinquish the field in the face of a massed charge of the Polish hussaria, which were heavy cavalry with armor and lances, arrayed into massed blocks of horseflesh with riders arrayed in close order, boot-to-boot. Moreover, after separating from the Cossack army the Tatars would invariably rape, pillage, and plunder undefended settlements on their return south, where the primary objective was to capture civilian prisoners for sale on the slave markets in the Crimean ports.
The second solution was the tabir - the combination of peasant wagons and oxcarts that were chained together in multiple rows to form a mobile fortress. Thus, Cossacks were able to use the obstacle of the tabir to deflect the shock effect of charging Polish cavalry. The ox-powered wagons would transport the Cossack infantry into hostile territory, thereby preserving their stamina for battle on foot, while retaining the capacity to advance as a lumbering offensive platform, from behind which firearms and cannon could be used against the predominantly cavalry armies of the Poles. Cossack reserves would form inside of the tabir, ready to make forays outside of the safety of the wagons before sheltering inside to regroup. Essentially, the tabir was a simple but effective adaptation of the primitive technology of the day to offset the advantage in mobility that was enjoyed by cavalry.
Cossack Tabir
The Ukrainian Cossacks were not the first to use wagons in battle. The fighters of the Bohemian commander Jan Zizka gained fame for using "warwagons" during the religious wars of the Hussites in 14th and 15th century Central Europe. The practice spread to the territories of the Polish Commonwealth and Ukraine. However, the Hussite warwagons were large and unwieldly, used primarily in a defensive posture, usually arrayed in a circle or square on top of a hill to provide a base from which short-range attacks could be launched against the enemy. In contrast, the Ukrainian wagons were smaller, more numerous, and more maneuverable; oftentimes these were pushed up against enemy lines in an offensive posture by Cossacks on foot. For instance, during the third day of the great Battle of Berestechko in 1651, Bohdan Khmelnitsky's army advanced across the Polish left wing in a tabir that stretched several kilometers, with infantry and artillery engaging the Poles with gunpowder from behind the wagons, while the vanguard and flanks were screened by Cossack cavalry. [6]
It was inevitable that after years of campaigning that Khmelnitsky would try to raise his own cavalry. In any case, Polish sources do not give the Cossack horsemen much respect. Regardless, during skirmishing between opposing Polish and Tatar cavalries on the second day of the Battle of Berestechko, somehow a Cossack regiment captured a Polish battle standard. [7] Suffice to say that by 1651 the Cossack cavalry was evolving.
b. The Tachanka
Regardless, the Cossack wars did not solve the problem of how to maneuver sizeable formations of infantry over Ukraine's vast open spaces at speed. The tabir advanced as fast as oxen could pull it or the Cossacks could push it. It is true, that by the time of the First World War million-man armies were being transported to the front by railroad. However, an army, no matter how large, was limited to the narrow confines of the railroad line. Once at the front, infantry marched no faster than it did during the days of Khmelnitsky. Meanwhile, cavalry was sidelined to secondary status by the widespread use of quick-firing breach-loading artillery and the machinegun. It took until the end of the Great War and the succeeding Revolution and Civil War period between 1917-1923 before another adaptation of simple technology appeared to solve the problem, or at least to propel it forward.
The solution was in the small four-wheeled open carriage, the tachanka, which was found in great numbers on the landed estates of Southern Ukraine. Intended for travel along country roads by the landed gentry and rural bourgeoisie at the turn of the 19th century, it consisted of a small front set of wheels that could pivot and two larger rear wheels that were aligned forward. When harnessed to four horses, it was capable of moving off-road and had a tight turning radius. But the high-tech component of the tachanka was its suspension, which consisted of iron torsion bars on each side of the rear wheels of the carriage, which enabled it to absorb the shock of cross-country travel at a pace that was fast enough to keep up with cavalry. It did not take much imagination to fix a Maxim machinegun on the back seat and, overnight, military history had its first off-road infantry fighting vehicle. (A picture of a model appears at the start of this article)
During the Civil War and the Soviet-Polish War of 1920-1921, the tachanka found application as a machine gun platform in the Polish Army, the Red Army and the White Army of General Anton Denikin. [8] For some reason, the Ukrainian Army of the UNR failed to see its potential. Like the other combatants, the Ukrainians were infatuated by armored trains and armored cars; but these were limited to the rails and the few roads. A few British tanks made their way to the White Army, but these were never used against Ukrainian armies.
The Halytska Armia of the Western Ukrainian Republic experimented with a variant of the tachanka. First Lieutenant Saul "Saltso" Rottenberg of the Fourth Brigade organized a company of two-wheeled chaises, which were outfitted with the Austrian Swartzlose machine guns and used as machine gun cavalry. [9] The chaises were native to the former Austro-Hungarian empire. They were lighter than the tachanka and utilized at most two horses, thus capable of even greater speed. Nonetheless, these could transport only one passenger and a machine gun, along with another rider on the horses. In comparison, the tachanka could transport a machine gun, two crew members and a driver, or 4-6 passengers, if no machine gun was attached.
The tachanka was best exploited by the anarchist Nestor Makhno, who not only saw potential in organizing large numbers of tachanky into machine gun companies, but also harnessed their maneuverability as a personnel carrier for his foot infantry. Makhno's machine gun formations would engage the enemy at extreme range along Ukraine's vast open spaces from elevated areas with plunging fire. This made his army dangerous to approach. It also created his primary vulnerability - the voracious expenditure of ammunition. Makhno was always on the lookout for stocks of ammunition that could be captured for use in battle. However, by marshalling large numbers of tachanky for overland maneuver, Makhno freed himself from the shackles of rail lines. Consequently, Makhno was always one step ahead of his adversaries, maneuvering where the trains and armored cars could not go. Due to the small armies that fought during the Civil War period, Makhno had plenty of space to exploit to get onto the flank or rear of his enemies. Furthermore, the extra space enabled the temporary resurgence of cavalry, which had been made obsolete by the static positional war of the World War I. Makhno's breakout out of encirclement by the Don and Kuban Cossack regiments of the White general Yakiv Slashchev at Perehonivka near the city of Uman between September 25-28, 1919, is one of the operational-tactical masterpieces in Ukrainian military history. The use of the tachanka was instrumental in Makhno's ability to maneuver out of a trap set by the White Army and to turn the tables on his adversary by seizing what is today the city of Dnipro on October 8, 1919. He was able to transport 6,000 infantry hundreds of kilometers in just a few days. In contrast, White infantry had to march over the open steppe on foot or stick to the rail lines. [10]
Along with the effective use of the tachanka, Makhno relied on his cavalry. During the 265 years of Russian rule since the Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654, Ukrainians were inducted to serve in the cavalry regiments of the tsar's army. Tens of thousands served in the First World War. All had to undergo formal cavalry training. The Tavria region - located on the east bank of the Dnieper River southeast of Zaporizhzhia - was a steady supplier of cavalrymen. This included the towns of Huliay Pole, Polohy and Orikhiv, where Makhno was born and raised. Makhno organized his best four horse regiments into a mobile reserve of 2,000 horsemen, which would be used in raids or wide-ranging maneuvers onto the flanks or rear of his enemies. Other smaller mounted detachments, oftentimes recruited temporarily from local towns and villages, would be used for screening and scouting. A particular characteristic of Makhno's cavalry was that it contained horsemen armed with Lewis or Colt light-machineguns with drum magazines, which could be fired from horseback by one rider without being belt-fed and by extension, crew served. Makhno's most competent adversary, the White general Yakiv Slashchev, referred to Makhno's cavalry in intelligence reports as "excellent." Slashchev knew what he was talking about. His own cavalry was some of the best of the Civil War period - regiments of Don and Kuban Cossacks, who fought on the side of the Whites.
Both the Don and Kuban Cossacks, as well as Makhno's horsemen, distinguished themselves in riding technique from West European counterparts, like the German, Austro-Hungarian and Polish cavalry. The former rode with shorter stirrups and higher up on the shoulders of the horse, much as a jockey does on a racehorse, relieving pressure and distributing weight away from the horse's spine and hind legs. This made the Cossack cavalrymen more maneuverable and kept their horses fresh. The grainy photograph below of Makhno's cavalry in the city of Uman in September 1919 during a temporary truce with the Ukrainian Sitch Riflemen (Ukraiinski Sitchovi Striltsi) of the West Ukrainian Halytska Armiia, illustrates the technique. The Makhnovite officer in the center who appears in profile sits in the Cossack style, while the former Austro-Hungarian cavalryman on the white horse and his comrades to the right, sit further back in the saddle.
Makhno’s Body Guard and the Cavalry of the USS in Uman September 1919
Nonetheless, technology and mass armies put an end to the long tradition of cavalry and stop-gap technologies like the tachanka upon Ukraine's vast open spaces. With Ukraine firmly under Soviet control by 1924, Ukrainians were not only mobilized into the ranks of the Red Army but engaged in its modernization. Ukrainian engineers contributed to the mechanization of the Red Army, specifically in the development of Soviet tanks - the next step in the linear progression of mobility, lethality, and protection of fighting men in combat. Whereas I have so far avoided comment on the involvement of Ukrainians in someone else's wars, the significant role played by the city of Kharkiv's Malyshev works and the Morozov Design Bureau on Soviet tank development, particularly the revolutionary T-34 and T-64 variants, causes me to examine their influence. After all, even fifty-eight years later, the native-born T-64 tank remains the mainstay of Ukraine's tank park.
c. Kharkiv as the Birthplace of the T-34 and T-64 Tanks.
The city of Kharkiv has a proud tradition of scientific and technological innovation since the beginning of the 20th century. Characteristically, Kharkiv's historical Malyshev works, and the Morozov Design Bureau of Tank Development, have been at the forefront of major breakthroughs in tank design since the early 1930s. They were the birthplace of two iconic Soviet tanks - the T-34 and the T-64.
Tanks are a combination of mobility, armored protection, and firepower. Tank development is divided into generations, the first originating in World War I, when tracked tanks were propelled across the battlefield by gas combustion engines for the first time. The Second-Generation tanks appeared in World War II.
The T-34 is arguably the finest medium tank of the Second World War. With its 60° sloped armor, powerful engine, tracks, suspension, and lethal 76.2 mm gun, it was more than a match in one-on-one combat against German tanks until 1943, when the Nazi regime fielded the heavier Panzer V "Panther" and Panzer VI "Tiger" tanks. Regardless, the mass-produced T-34 underwent constant up-grades that kept pace with German engineering, which turned out to be overly complex and too brittle for extended combat. Over 80,000 of the mechanically simpler but more robust T-34s were built and some even saw service in Korea and the Middle East during the wars of the 1950s. Ironically, just last week, the Victory Parade in Moscow on May 9, 2023, was led by a T-34 tank that was manufactured in Kharkiv.
Besides the fact that Kharkiv was historically the cradle of Bolshevik support in Ukraine, it was no accident that Stalin chose the city as the development center for the new Soviet tank. The Kharkiv Locomotive Plant (KhPZ, No. 183) Kharkivskyi parovozobudivnyj zavod, was famous for producing locomotives and tractors during the first two Five Year Plans of Soviet industrialization. A team consisting of talented engineers led by Mikhail Koshkin contributed to the design of the T-34. These included Konstantin Chelpan, Alexander Morozov and Mykola Kucherenko. [ ] While Kucherenko was the only to be born in Ukraine, the excellence of the Kharkiv Locomotive Plant drew talent from the entire Soviet Union. After Koshkin's death during a test run of the tank in 1941, Morozov assumed command. Hence, the eventual naming of the design bureau after him. Morozov was practically a local of Kharkiv, as he traced his roots just across the Russian border to nearby Bryansk. [11]
Morozov was still in charge when at the height of the Cold War, Kharkiv designed and produced a revolutionary tank - the T-64. The T-64 was a quantum leap forward in tank technology and surpassed the capabilities of contemporary Western tanks, like the U.S. M-48 "Patton" tank. It was the first true main battle tank of the so-called Third-Generation. The Kharkiv designers built a tank that was capable of driving at least 45 kilometers an hour, was armed with a powerful 125 mm high velocity smoothbore gun, and had a low profile, making it difficult to spot and hit. The speed and low profile were possible because of an autoloader in the small turret, which reduced the crew from its usual four to three. (To this day, Western tanks still rely on a fourth crewmember who loads the shells into the gun manually, while Ukrainian and Russian tanks rely on the autoloader). This reduced the size and weight of the turret and by extension the tank to 37 tons, allowing for added speed, without sacrificing armored protection. Regarding armored protection, the T-64 was the first tank to field composite armor, with glass reinforced plastic sandwiched between layers of steel.
Nevertheless, the Red Army found the T-64 overly complex and difficult to produce at scale. While the autoloader was a mechanical marvel, its manufacture could not be duplicated beyond the friendly confines of the Malyshev works, with its cadre of talented and experienced machinists. Furthermore, its compact but powerful 700 horsepower engine also created challenges with quality control. Consequently, in 1972 the Soviet military establishment opted for a simpler tank design, the T-72, which was designed and produced east of the Urals at the Uralvagonzavod Factory in Nizhnyi Tagil, Sverdlovsk oblast. To a large degree, the T-72 was a mock-up of the T-64, with a simpler but slower autoloader and a more conventional engine. Due to Morozov's political influence, the T-64 was still manufactured and sent in smaller batches to the elite Soviet Guard tank divisions, while the more numerous T-72 was destined for the tank and motorized formations of the line. The T-72 was also intended for export to Soviet allies, while the T-64's capabilities were kept a closely guarded secret. Over 13,000 T-64s were manufactured between 1963-1987. [12]
In the 1980s Kharkiv developed a successor to the T-64, the T-80. It sported reactive armor, new sights, and radios. However, by this time Morozov was dead and Kharkiv was no longer the favored child of the Soviet military industrial complex. Concurrently, the Uralvagonzavod designed the T-90 tank as a succesor to the T-72 and was given priority for funding. Kharkiv continued to manufacture the T-80 with a gas turbine engine, which increased its speed to 65 kph, albeit with resulting gas guzzling inefficiency. A promising design for an upgrade of the T-80, the T-84, was thereafter unveiled by the Morozov design bureau, but was not given much attention by the Russian military. In any case, the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 ended the development and mass production of Soviet tanks. Budget constraints imposed on the new Ukrainian state slowed tank production in Kharkiv to a trickle. Most were exported in small batches to the armies in the developing world. The biggest contract landed by Kharkiv was with the Kingdom of Thailand, which in 2000 ordered over a battalion worth of forty-nine T-84 Oplots, a state-of-the-art design. These were equipped with the latest Cuplet reactive armor, Zasin active armor, air conditioning, and modern optics and radios. [13]
However, even the new Russian Federation found the production of tanks at scale a budgetary challenge. Thus, Moscow decided it more fiscally prudent to refurbish its large fleet of old T-72s to the standards of a new T-72B3 model and limited the production run of the more expensive T-90 to 200 units. In 2016 much fanfare was made by Putin's regime over the development of a state-of-the-art "next generation" tank designated the T-14 Armata, which sported a remotely operated and crewless turret and gun. However, teething problems have prevented its introduction into service so far. Consequently, the vast majority of the Russian tanks involved in the Russo-Ukrainian War are upgraded T-72B3s, with a handful of T-80s and T-90s that are found in the Guard divisions.
Ukraine was forced to take a similar approach. The cash-strapped Ukrainian government was able to buy only six of the vaunted T-84s Oplots for its armed forces. In an attempt at a compromise, in 2012 the Malyshev works were contracted to manufacture an upgraded variant of the old T-64 designated the T-64BM Bulat, which received improved Nizh reactive armor, new communications and better sights. Ninety Bulats were supplied to Ukraine's elite 1st Tank Brigade. In 2014 these were soon put to the test in the crucible of combat when fighting erupted in the Donbas between Russian separatists and the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In July 2014 the 1st Tank Brigade sent a battalion of T-64BM Bulats to defend Luhansk airport. In vicious fighting at the town of Khreshchuvate on August 27, 2014, nine Bulats squared off against fourteen T-90s of the Russian 136th motorized brigade. Seven Bulats were destroyed against only one T-90 damaged in the fighting. However, the tally is deceiving. Most of the Bulats were taken out of action by Russian overhead artillery fire, rather than enemy tanks.
The T-72BM Bulat was given the opportunity to redeem itself in fighting in February 2015 at Lutuhyne near Debaltseve. Three Bulats from the 1st Tank Brigade destroyed at least two T-72ABs of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade. The Ukrainian Nizh reactive armor proved that it was able to withstand even Russian kinetic 125 mm tank rounds, while the Russian Kontakt-5 reactive armor was penetrated by Ukrainian tank ammunition. By some accounts, one Bulat fired high explosive shells to detonate the Kontakt-5 reactive armor on the T-72ABs, before a Ukrainian sabot round from another Bulat finished the job through the chink in the reactive armor. Still, the victory is mitigated by the fact that the T-72AB is an outdated model, compared to the more modern T-72B3. Nevertheless, a post-war assessment by Ukrainian tank experts reached the opinion that the Nizh armor was too complicated to replace in the field and required time-consuming rear echelon maintenance before a tank could return to action. Furthermore, the weight of the added protection on the Bulat decreased the tank's original speed and performance and thus, its survivability. Consequently, the Ukrainian military made the brave decision to stop manufacturing the much more expensive T-84 Oplot and T-64BM Bulat tanks and to invest in hundreds of cheap upgrades of the T-64 designated the T-64BV, as the best option to meet the superior numbers of qualitatively and quantitatively superior Russian T-72B3s, T-80s, and T-90s.
T-64 Bulat on the left; T-64BV on the right
The Modernized T-64BVs were equipped with digital radios, new internal encrypted communication and navigation systems, sighting acquisition systems with thermal imaging, and improved reactive armor protection. The old Kontakt-1 armor boxes on the exterior of the tanks were filled with fresh reactive explosive - some had Nizh reactive armor stuffed inside. This enabled the Ukrainian tanks to operate with more confidence and in better communication with each other, especially at night. Previously they were operating blind. 640 T-64BVs were refurbished and sent to Ukrainian tank battalions by the time of Russian invasion on February 24, 2022. They were still afflicted with one of the chief weaknesses of most former Soviet tanks; woeful performance in the reverse gear, which could not go faster than five kilometers per hour. Nevertheless, the Russian T-72B3 and T-90 tanks sport the same defect. (Only the T-84 Oplot is equipped with a fast reverse gear). Therefore, tanks on both sides began adopting a version of the old "Parthian shot" that was used by Tatar light cavalry centuries ago. Namely, when retreat becomes necessary, both Ukrainian and Russian tanks execute a tight about-face and speed away using their much faster forward gears while firing their long guns to the rear. This maneuver is imperfect, since tanks must temporarily expose their softer side and rear armor instead of their thicker frontal plates during the retrograde movement. But, since both sides must live with this weakness, everyone assumes the risk equally.
Suffice it to say that during the Cold War, the T-64 never measured itself against NATO tanks in battle. Because it was never exported, the T-64 never fired a shot in anger at an American M1A1 Abrams or British Challenger 2 tanks in the Iraqi wars. Ironically, the Western tanks were designed to defeat the T-64. The apparent superiority of the American and British tanks over the numerous T-72s that they destroyed in the 1991 Operation Iraqi Freedom has to be subjected to further scrutiny, due to the questionable training of Iraqi crews, the poor tactical decisions of their commanders, and U.S. air supremacy, which made it so difficult for Iraqi armor to maneuver. Ironically, the T-64 was finally called into action not against Western tanks but those of Russian manufacture. The venerable old tank was pressed into action on all fronts when Russia invaded on February 24, 2022. [14]
Counterintuitively, the T-64BVs extracted a toll on the more modern Russian tanks during the opening phase of the war. Since 2017 the 1st Tank Brigade has been training extensively on the T-64BV. It was tasked with defending the strategically vital city of Chernihiv, which blocks all major roads that lead south from Belarus to Kyiv east of the Dnieper River. The Russian invasion force that advanced on Chernihiv outnumbered the 1st Tank Brigade by as much as 10 to 1. Nonetheless, forming a circular defense around the city, the Ukrainian tankers and their supporting territorial defense infantry prevailed. [15] The wooded terrain around Chernihiv reduced most tank engagements to 200 meters, playing to the T-64s strengths. Chernihiv remained in Ukrainian hands. Russian logistics that had to pass through Chernihiv towards Kyiv were blocked and the attacking columns began running out of fuel and ammunition. The Russians retreated north to Belarus by the end of March 2022. A study in July 2022 by the British Royal Uniformed Services Institute (RUSI) regarding the lessons learned from the first six months of the Russo-Ukrainian War summarized the performance of the T-64BV in the Battle of Chernihiv, as follows:
“Better crew training combined with short-ranged engagements where their armament was competitive, and the faster autoloader on the T-64, allowed Ukrainian tank crews to achieve significant damage against surprised Russian units." [16]
So, it would appear that after all these years, the autoloader produced in Kharkiv was faster than the one in Nyzhnyi Tagil. Does that mean that the Ukrainian T-64 won the engineering duel against the Russian T-72? More likely, human high concept, manifested through the clever application of tactics and better training, rather than technology, was the difference in the end. Ukraine's decision to rely on an aging tank was a prudent choice. Fiscal reality dictated that what mattered most was the numbers of an old tank that was good enough, rather than a few tanks that were state-of-the-art.
After the conclusion of this horrible war, a monument with the venerable T-64 perched on top should be erected in every Ukrainian city. Alas, the fighting during the preceding year has seriously depleted Ukraine's supply of T-64BVs. Close to one-half of the original 640 tanks have been destroyed. [17] While it is true that Ukraine has been able to replace many of its losses by pressing captured Russian T-72B3s, T-80s, and T-90s into service, the T-64BV remains Ukraine's mainstay - an aging champion recalled into the ring during Ukraine's hour of need. Regardless, Ukraine will not be able to rely on the T-64BV for much longer. Because the Malyshev works in Kharkiv can no longer mass produce tanks because of its proximity to the front, Ukraine hopes to replace its tank park with Western tanks. Close to 300 have been promised by the United States, Great Britain, Germany and other NATO members. These are expected to be utilized in the anticipated Ukrainian counter-offensive later this Spring.
The anticipated Ukrainian counter-offensive is expected to succeed because Western supplied tanks will supposedly enable an easy breach of Russian defense lines. Non-professionals expect that Russian missiles and shells will bounce off German Leopard-2 tanks like they did off Tiger tanks in World War II. Moreover, the Western tanks are expected to sweep Russian tanks from the field. This is a fallacy!
Ukrainian and Russian tank doctrine does not rely on tanks engaging other tanks. Rather, the tanks are prioritized for breakthrough operations of enemy lines, because of the protection they afford against bullets and shrapnel while engaging entrenched infantry at shorter range. Enemy tanks are engaged at longer range - at five kilometers and beyond - by drone directed artillery and/or anti-tank missles, like the American Javelin, Ukrainian Stuhna or the Russian Kornet. In fact, large tank-on-tank engagements are extremely rare. At most, combat occurs between two pairs of opposing tanks. Because of Ukraine's undulating terrain, tank-on-tank engagements typically occur at less than 2,000 meters, which obviates the need for state-of-the-art tanks.
This approach differs from NATO doctrine. The Abrams, Challenger and Leopard are built to engage and destroy enemy tanks at up to four kilometers. While their heavier armor and superior sights makes it likely that these will have an advantage in tank-on-tank combat, they are just as likely to succumb to top-down artillery and Russian Kornet anti-tank missiles as Ukrainian tanks. Despite added armor on top of the vulnerable crown of the tank turret, the Abrams, Challenger, and Leopard will just as easily be ripped open from the top by weapons that engage beyond the range of tank guns. The major advantage of the Western tanks is that their blowout panels on the turret make it more likely that the crew will survive an explosion of ammunition, which is stored to the rear. In contrast, a direct hit on Russian and Ukrainian tanks usually results in a catastrophic detonation with the turret blown sky high into the air, because the crew sits on top of the self-loading carousel and its ammunition supply.
Despite the public demand for Western tanks by the Ukrainian government, this is not the piece of armor that the Ukrainians need most. Rather, a heavy infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) that can shield infantry against heavy machine gun and artillery shrapnel while traversing broken terrain is what is more important. [18] Ukraine's top priority, in effect, is a better tachanka. Only such an armored vehicle can protect Ukrainian infantry during a breakthrough of enemy lines and then transport it quickly into the enemy rear. Ukraine has such a vehicle, but in insufficient numbers.
d. A Better Tachanka - the BTR-4 Bucephalus
The first tanks in history were used to break the deadlock of trench warfare in World War I. This was achieved by transporting an armored gun platform on tracks across the broken battlefield right up to enemy trenches, where the gun destroyed hardened strongpoints in the defenses, before breaking through into the open terrain beyond. However, it became apparent that a different vehicle was necessary to transport infantry over the battlefield, with the requisite armored protection to deliver it unharmed and fresh on the other side of the enemy positions. The Germans anticipated the problem and produced the Panzer Kampfwagon Sd.Kfz. 251, commonly known as the "half-track," which was introduced in World War II. It was an open troop carrier but with armored sides to protect infantry from small arms as it advanced in trace of tanks towards enemy entrenchments. The vehicle had wheels in front for steering but tracks in back to traverse muddy conditions. Americans copied it by designing a similar half-track, the M3. Nevertheless, neither half-track was designed to protect the infantry from the effects of overhead shrapnel or heavy machine gun bullets, let alone cannon fire.
During the Cold War, both NATO and the Soviets fielded armored personnel carriers, which were entirely armored and designed to protect infantry from small arms and overhead shrapnel as it moved along roads towards the battlefield. The Soviets designed the BTR, an armored wheeled transporter, while the Americans introduced the M113, a tracked personnel carrier. However, these vehicles were only able to bring infantry up to the battlefield, outside of the engagement range of defensive weapons. Therefore, the infantry had to dismount at least 200 meters before reaching enemy lines. Neither personnel carrier was a fighting vehicle that was able to survive the defensive fire of rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) or heavy machine guns and cannon as they approached enemy positions.
The first revolutionary leap forward was in 1965, when the Soviet Union introduced the BMP-1 (boyeva mashina piechotnaya), a tracked armored vehicle that was armed with a turret housing a 30 mm cannon and with a compartment in back that was large enough to seat nine infantrymen. In theory, it was supposed to keep up with the tanks and to disgorge its infantry right in front of enemy emplacements after these were suppressed by Soviet tank fire. Over the next thirty years, the BMP-1 underwent upgrades, the BMP-2 and BMP-3. In response, in 1971 the Germans designed the Marder, a heavier vehicle with a 20 mm gun turret with room for six infantrymen, which was supposed to defeat the BMP. Similarly, in 1981 the U.S. Army introduced the Bradley M-2A1, also a heavy infantry fighting vehicle with a 25 mm gun and anti-tank missiles, with seats for six infantry soldiers.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian armed forces inherited over 2,000 Soviet BMP-1s and BMP-2s. During the fighting in the Donbas in 2014, these proved vulnerable even to heavy machine gun fire and could not be relied upon to shield their occupants from shrapnel. The BMPs proved particularly vulnerable to rocket propelled grenades (RPGs). At best, they protected their passengers from small arms. More than half of the Ukrainian supply of BMPs has been lost since 2014. Moreover, the Soviet legacy left the Ukrainians with another 500 tracked personnel carriers, like the BTR-80, which are even more lightly armored troop carriers and do not mount a gun heavier than a machine gun. Since these are wheeled, they lose traction in muddy conditions. Therefore, it was inevitable that the Ukrainians would try their hand at creating their own version of the infantry fighting vehicle. In any case, Ukraine had approximately 1,000 BMPs remaining when hostilities began on February 24, 2022.
In 2000, the Morozov Design Bureau and the Malyshev works introduced the BTR-3, an eight-wheeled armored vehicle that functions as an armored transporter, moving six infantrymen to the battlefield. It is also amphibious. The BTR-3 is like the Russian BTR-82. While it sports a one-man turret with a 30 mm gun, it does not have the armor to survive enemy fire after its infantry dismounts. Approximately 50 were manufactured for the Ukrainian National Guard.
Nevertheless, in 2006 Malyshev introduced the BTR-4, nicknamed Bucephalus after Alexander the Great's horse. It is also an eight wheeled personnel carrier, but with features that edge it closer in capability to that of a true infantry fighting vehicle, like the U.S. Bradley, German Marder, and the Russian BMP. Early efforts to export the vehicle to the Iraqi army in 2008 revealed shortcomings and shoddy workmanship, which caused part of its contract to be cancelled. Moreover, Indonesia decided against buying the BTR-4 for its army, although more likely because of Russian political pressure rather than quality control. But the problems with the design were identified and fixed at the Malyshev works, leading to a better all-around vehicle. In 2012 one hundred were ordered by the Ukrainian armed forces.
The BTR-4's basic armor and added slatted cage armor increases its survivability against rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), as well as small arms and shrapnel. The engine of the BTR-4 is in the middle of the vehicle, affording the infantry in the back compartment greater protection and the ability to dismount to the rear. The BTR-4s reinforced frontal armor is capable of deflecting even heavy machine gun bullets. With the addition of Kontakt-1 reactive armor, the BTR-4 is even capable of occasionally surviving double tandem RPGs. Moreover, the two distinguishing features of the BTR-4 are its excellent power-to-weight ratio and its remotely-controlled unmanned turret. [19]
MBT-4 Bucephalus of the 92nd Mechanized Brigade
The power-to-weight ratio makes the BTR-4 very nimble, even when driving cross-country. Despite being an eight-wheeled and not a tracked vehicle, it can maneuver in all but the worst muddy conditions. The remote-controlled turret is outfitted with excellent thermal sights for target acquisition, which is controlled from inside the cab of the vehicle by the commander on a computer screen. Moreover, the thermal display on the screen enables the crew to spot and identify the enemy early, enabling it to fire that vital first shot. The remote turret also enables the BTR-4 to remain hull-down behind a berm or wall with only its 30 mm gun exposed to direct enemy fire, without exposing the vehicle and crew.
The BTR-4 first proved itself during the fighting in the Donbas at Sloviansk in 2014. Moreover, gun camera video from the Russo-Ukrainian War indicates that it is excellent in urban combat, using its nimbleness to slip between intersections to spray enemy targets along intersecting streets with its lethal 30 mm gun before hiding again behind urban structures. Footage from the vicious up-close fighting in Mariupil, where the Azov Regiment of the National Guard put up obstinate resistance, revealed multiple kills by the BTR-4 of Russian BMPs and even a T-72 tank. Nonetheless, at least 67 BTR-4s have been destroyed or captured. An indicator that the Russians hold the BTR-4 in high esteem is that several of the captured models have been photographed in Russian service.
Unfortunately, the Malyshev works are unable to manufacture more BTR-4s. Kharkiv is well within range of Russian missile and rocket fire and the factory has been targeted more than once. The Ukrainian ground forces can certainly use at least 1,000 of their native-born Bucephalus, especially in their anticipated Spring offensive. However, the inability to produce greater numbers of the vehicle requires the Ukrainian army to depend on the largesse of its Western partners. Numerous countries have supplied a myriad of armored personnel carriers to the Ukrainian army. It is true that the U.S. Bradleys and German Marders are heavier infantry fighting vehicles and will add weight to Ukraine's attack. 100 of the Bradleys and 50 of the Marders have been provided to the Ukrainians. But others, like the eight-wheeled U.S. Stryker, 100 of which have been supplied to Ukraine's elite air assault brigades, is inferior to the BTR-4 in cross-country performance and more susceptible to adverse field conditions, like dust and mud. Furthermore, its turret requires a crew, compared to the BTR-4's remote controlled turret. How will this effect Ukraine's upcoming offensive? We shall see.
In the end, success of an armored breakthrough hinges on the effectiveness of Ukrainian artillery, which will need to pave the way for Ukrainian operational success. This leads me to my last topic, the centuries old tradition of excellence in Ukrainian artillery. It follows in the next sub-stack.
[1] The tachanka was a small open four-weeled carriage, which was found in great numbers on the landed estates of Southern Ukraine at the turn of the 19th century. When harnessed to four horses, it was capable of moving off-road and had a tight turning radius. It did not take much imagination to fix a Maxim machinegun on the back seat and, overnight, military history had its first off-road infantry fighting vehicle.
[2] Rick Reilly and Wayne Gretzky. Gretzky. An Autobiography. (Harper Collins: Canada, 1990). Introduction.
[3] Richard Brzezinski. Polish Armies 1569-1691 (I). (Osprey Publishing: London, 1987) 14-17.
[4] The “pike and shot” era lasted until the invention of the socket bayonet in the 18th century. Pikemen had to protect musketeers from cavalry attack. Subsequently, an infantryman used his bayonet as protection against cavalry, while also having the capacity to fire the musket. Brent Nosworthy. The Anatomy of Victory. Battle Tactics 1689-1763. (Hippocrene Books: New York, 1990) 10-26.
[5] Subtelny, Orest. Ukraine a History. (University of Toronto Press: Toronto - Buffalo - London, 1988) 125-127.
[6] Hrushevsky, Mykhailo. History of Ukraine - Rus'. Vol. 9. Book 1. Translated by Bohdan Struminski. ed. Frank E. Sysyn. (Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press: Edmonton - Toronto, 2012), 284.
[7] Ibid., 284.
[8] The White Army was formed by former tsarist military officers with a democratic platform, albeit with a very chauvinistic pro-Russian orientation. General Anton Denikin commanded the Volunteer Army that fought to roll back Bolshevik power in 1918-1920.
[9] George M. Farion. Korosten: Mykola Shchors’s Last Battle. Journal of Ukrainian Studies, Summer 2003, Volume 28, No. 1. pp. 33-66.
[10] Frank E. Sysyn. Nestor Makhno and the Ukrainian Revolution. The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution. ed. Taras Hunczak. (Cambridge: Mass., 1977) pp. 271-304, 274-275.
[11] Stephen Zaloga and James Grandsen. Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles of World War Two. (Arms and Armour Press: London, 1984) 46, 110-111, 130-131.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Passive armor consists of the tank’s organic steel and composite outer surface. Reactive armor consists of explosive contained in metal containers that blows out when hit by an anti-tank rocket propelled grenade (RPG) to deflect or deflate it before it penetrates the passive armor of the tank. Active armor fires out up to 10-20 feet away from the tank to destroy or deflect incoming anti-tank missiles or tank rounds before they even reach the tank.
[14] Sebastian Roblin. How a tank the Soviets tried to keep secret became an icon of Ukraine's resistance against Russia. Insider. 1/13/2022
[15] David Axe. How Ukraine's 1st Tank Brigade Fought a Russian Force Ten Times its Size - And Won. Forbes. 12/25/2022. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/12/25/how-ukraines-1st-tank-brigade-fought-a-russian-force-ten-times-its-size-and-won/?sh=4d9204eb6c59
[16] Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi, Jack Watling, Oleksandr V. Danylyuk and Nick Reynolds. Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia's Invasion of Ukraine. RUSI. February-July 2022. https://static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine-Preliminary-Lessons-Feb-July-2022-web-final.pdf
[17] David Axe. Ukraine is Going to Run out of T-64 Tanks. Forbes. 02/16/2023. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/02/16/ukraine-is-going-to-run-out-of-t-64-tanks/?sh=131f6add6b69
[18] Michael Peck. Western countries are speeding up more tank deliveries to Ukraine, but tanks are not what the Ukrainian troops need to get around Russian forces. Insider. 04/04/2023 https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-needs-more-armor-than-tanks-to-counterattack-russian-forces-2023-4?inline-endstory-related-recommendations=
[19] Ukraine's BTR-4 Homemade Vehicle Better Than You Think.