Whereas strategy and operations are intellectual pursuits at the levels of policy formulation and staff-work, tactics are all about battle. Battle is the realm of direct confrontation between combatants - that horrible place where the sights, sounds, smells and tactile feel of torn bodies, blood, and death threaten to overwhelm the senses.
There are two opposing philosophies to battle - attrition and maneuver. Each seeks to shock the enemy into flight or surrender. One intends to shock through physical destruction or the threat of further destruction; the other overwhelms the enemy psychologically through maneuver from an unexpected direction, like the flank, rear or means of command and control. Of course, in practice it is a combination of the two that leads to victory. Nonetheless, different military cultures emphasize one over the other. Where a military falls on the continuum is a matter of historical experience. The Ukrainian way of war falls more on the attrition side of the ledger than on the side of maneuver. Let us examine this further.
The military cultures which emphasize shock through maneuver historically tended to favor the sabre and the bayonet, what the French call the arme blanche, or the English refer to as "cold steel." They believed that the fear of approaching "cold steel" caused soldiers to run before contact was made. Of the militaries that the Ukrainians encountered over the centuries, the Poles and Austro-Hungarians tended to emphasize "cold steel." The Tatars and Germans were a hybrid of the two schools. Meanwhile, the Russians fall firmly into the attrition school of physical destruction through the application of massed fire.
A characteristic of the "cold steel" school is that it traces its origins to an entrenched feudal nobility. A landed nobility owed its political, social, and economic privileges to its readiness to provide cavalry service to the sovereign. Cavalry depends on the psychological shock of a block of horseflesh thundering towards an opponent concurrently with the threat of the sharp edge of "cold steel" to scare the enemy away before contact is made. In contrast, cannon destroy the enemy with firepower to the point where he no longer resists.
Polish Hussaria in the attack
The Ukrainian national narrative glorifies the Cossack as cavalryman. But in reality, Cossack cavalry was mediocre, and it was the artillery that excelled, particularly in siege warfare. [1] The number of cannon possessed by the army of Bohdan Khmelnitsky was a source of pride. Reportedly his army fielded 62 guns at the Battle of Berestechko in 1651. [2]
By the 19th century, the artillery was traditionally crewed by the burgeoning middle class - artisans and merchants. [3] After all, you need individuals who know how to count to accurately fire cannon. In contrast, the hereditary nobles relied on their lineage and courage, not their brains. They looked down on the developing middle class as a threat to their social position. Thus, in European armies, especially in the Russian imperial army, the disdain of the cavalry for the artillery branch was palpable. [4]
With the start of World War I, Ukrainians were sent to fight each other in the opposing imperial armies of Russia and Austro-Hungary. Both empires were predominantly agricultural with only the early traces of an emerging middle class. Only a few old elite Cossack families were considered equal to the Russian nobility. Of these, some, like the future Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, found their way into the tsar's Guard regiments. A few more Ukrainians in the tsarist empire belonged to the dvoriany, the minor landed gentry, who had access to the less regarded cavalry regiments. However, most Ukrainians were considered commoners. In fact, in Austro-Hungary no Ukrainians were members of the nobility or gentry. Thus, the majority of Ukrainians on both sides were destined for the hapless infantry. However, the better educated and ambitious from the nascent rural bourgeoisie or urban professional class found their way into the artillery or engineers. At the conclusion of World War I, Ukrainian artillery officers from both imperial armies volunteered for service in the Army of the Ukrainian Peoples Republic (UNR) or the Halytska Armiia of the Western Ukrainian Peoples Republic (ZUNR). Given this natural selection, it is no surprise that Ukrainian artillery during the Revolution and Civil War period of 1917-1921 that followed World War I was excellent, particularly in the Halytska Armia.
A Russian artillery battery in WWI
In its war against the Second Polish Republic during the first half of 1919, the Halytska Armia was organized into twelve brigades, each with an attached artillery regiment of approximately 16 guns and howitzers. Thus, each of the three to four infantry battalions in a brigade was supported by at least four artillery pieces. These provided artillery suppression of the Polish adversary on both offense and defense and increased the combat power of the infantry. The artillery regiments were commanded by former officers of the Austro-Hungarian army, who overall, were very experienced. Major Volodymyr Voyevidka, the commander of the artillery regiment of the elite 1st Brigade of the Ukraiinski Sitchovi Striltsi (USS), stood out from the rest. He was given command of upwards to 70 guns of the II Corps during the Battle of Berezhany in June 1919. By dragging his artillery onto high ground north of the town, he extended its range by many kilometers. Voyevidka's calculations brought Polish positions in Berezhany under long-range artillery fire and contributed substantially to Ukrainian victory. In the second half of 1919, he utilized his batteries as horse artillery along the open terrain near the city of Uman to keep Bolshevik and White cavalry at bay through maneuver and long-range gunfire. He died tragically in May 2020 when a Bolshevik commissar shot him for refusing to surrender his horse.
Skill in the artillery art was not limited to the Western Ukrainian army. The former officers of the Russian artillery in the army of the UNR were equally talented. In mid-February 1919 the Dnieper artillery brigade of the UNR under the command of Colonel Volodymyr Bilokrynytskyi was sent to help the Western Ukrainians in their war against the Poles. The accurate fire of its 24 guns contributed substantially to what became known as the Vovchukhiv offensive, which temporarily cut off the city of Lviv from Polish supplies and nearly led to its capitulation. Unfortunately, mistakes by the political leadership of Western Ukraine, which viewed its own military with disdain and suspicion, snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. Of interest is that one of the talented young battery commanders of the Dnieper brigade, Mykola Palienko, would later command an artillery battalion in the 14th SS Division Halychyna during World War II. He died during the breakout from encirclement of the division near the town of Brody in July 1944.
It wasn't only the officers of the Russian imperial army who gained prowess in operating artillery pieces. Evidence of skill by former enlisted gunners is found in the performance of the artillery of the anarchist Nestor Makhno during his breakout out of encirclement at Perehonivka between September 25-28, 1919. In a master class on how to break out of operational envelopment, Makhno maneuvered his four brigades against converging White forces in a series of feints to the northwest, south, and southwest before massing his troops for an attack to the east. His avenue of escape was blocked by the Simferopolskyi Officer's Regiment, one of the finest infantry formations in the White Army. Composed exclusively of former tsarist officers from the city of Simferopol in Crimea, this regiment did not fold easily. However, in brutal fighting Makhno's artillery of more than 30 guns blasted the White officers to bits. Despite their discipline and fighting spirit, the Whites were sent to fight in the open steppe without cavalry and far away from the nearest rail line, where they had the fire support of armored trains. Moreover, without cavalry and with only one battery of four cannon, they were at a clear disadvantage against Makhno's massed forces. After their ranks were decimated by anarchist artillery, the Whites were finished off by Makhno's cavalry. In a unique tactic, Makhno's horsemen would make individual forays into the thinning ranks of the simferopoltsi to toss grenades, which forced the Whites to disperse, making them easy prey for the mounted anarchists, who sabered the officers one-by-one. Two battalions of the Simferopolskyi Officer's Regiment were wiped off the regimental rolls. After the lines of the White infantry were breached, over 600 of Makhno's tachanky [5] with infantry on board poured through the gap and into the open steppe, where they wreaked havoc on the logistics and supply bases of their adversary. [6]
After the failed effort at Ukrainian independence in the Revolution and Civil War period of 1917-1923, Ukrainian artillery could not assert itself until Vladimir Putin's aggression in 2014 and in 2022. Arguably, the Ukrainian excellence in artillery reached its apex in this current Russo-Ukrainian War. Over the course of the last 15 months Ukrainian gunners have astounded military professionals the world over with their accuracy, maneuverability, efficient use of munitions, utilization of observation drones to correct fires, and application of digital networks to quicken the kill chain of target acquisition and targeting. The ability of Ukrainian artillerists to master American technology, like the M777 towed howitzer and the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), was particularly impressive. These contributed substantively to the successful Ukrainian offensives in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts in September and November 2022. [7]
Admittedly, the Ukrainian Armed Forces had to acquire their skills in the school of hard knocks while fighting Russian proxies and regular Russian forces in the Donbas between 2014 and 2018. When Ukraine launched its Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) in May 2014, it had only three tubed artillery brigades (15th, 26th and 55th) and three rocket artillery brigades (19th, 27th and 107th). The below chart illustrates the number of Ukrainian army brigades raised during the hostilities in 2014, including artillery brigades.
The Ukrainian General Staff soon realized that not only were their gunners inexperienced but also outnumbered by Russian artillery. Consequently, the Ukrainian army set off on a project of refurbishing every former Soviet artillery piece in storage to build up is artillery park. In 2015 Ukraine's Armed Forces introduced three new artillery brigades, the 40th, 43d, and 44th Artillery Brigades. That same year, the Naval Infantry fielded the new 406th Artillery Brigade and the 32nd Rocket-Artillery Regiment. This was followed by the introduction of the 45th Artillery Brigade in 2016. Moreover, former Soviet artillery pieces were sent to build up an artillery battalion in each mechanized and motorized infantry brigade, to equip each with 18 howitzers and six multiple launched rocket systems (MLRS). By February 2022, Ukraine had assembled 1,122 artillery pieces and 354 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) - the second largest artillery park in Europe. Russia was the largest. The 43d Artillery Regiment included over 40 of the ancient 205 mm Pion guns, with an effective range of over 50 kilometers, which were withdrawn from storage to outfit the brigade with artillery. These would prove deadly during the Battle of Kyiv in February-March 2022. Since the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War on February 24, 2022, the Ukrainians outfitted yet another artillery brigade - the 47th. The below chart illustrates the rapid expansion of the brigades of the Ukrainian army from 2015 through January 2023, particularly of the artillery.
But the Ukrainian expansion of its artillery park has its downside. The intensity of the artillery fire in this war expends unthinkable amounts of ammunition. Fifteen months into this war Ukraine's Western allies are finding it a challenge to supply Ukraine with the requisite amounts of artillery shells to sustain operations. Please recall that with the beginning of hostilities on February 24, 2022, Ukraine had enough ammunition to sustain a mere six weeks of combat. Thereafter, the United States was able to buy stocks of Soviet era 152 mm and 122 mm artillery ammunition from former Soviet block allies and proxies to make up the shortfall. When these started to run out in July 2022, the Western countries began supplying Ukraine with NATO artillery to allow it to transition to 155 mm NATO ammunition. However, neither the United States nor the Western Europeans have the production capacity to manufacture the artillery rounds and rockets to satisfy the voracious appetite of Ukrainian guns and rocket launchers, which at times reached 7,000 rounds daily. In comparison, in June 2022 the Russians at one point were firing up to 50,000 rounds a day. Eventually both sides began to experience shortages. By 2023 the Ukrainian General Staff has had to impose a "strict diet" on its artillery brigades to sustain operations. This has provided the Russians with a tactical advantage in attritional fights like Bakhmut and Avdiivka. Moreover, the Ukrainians are rationing its artillery fire to accumulate a reserve of ammunition for their upcoming Spring counteroffensive, which will require an increase in the volume of fire support. [8]
Previously, I wrote that continued Western support is the center of gravity for Ukraine in this war. Continued Ukrainian success on the battlefield is a pre-requisite for this support since Western governments must justify the increased financial expenditure on Ukraine to their voting publics. Moreover, the American military establishment has been critical of the Ukrainian fighting style of late, arguing that it is too attritional and should focus more on the application of combined arms, in other words, combining ground maneuver with artillery and air support. The usual Ukrainian retort is that it is easy for the Americans to argue for combined arms, since they typically enjoy total air supremacy, which enables them to attack the enemy from the air without fear of enemy attack from the sky. Regardless, Ukrainian success in the upcoming Spring offensive will depend on the Ukrainian application of combined arms since the supply of Western munitions is limited by their finite manufacturing capacity. [9]
a. Combined Arms in Ukraine's Upcoming Spring Counteroffensive.
In some respects, the breakthrough and exploitation by Makhno at Perehonivka in September 1919 has parallels with the successful Ukrainian offensive near Kharkiv during the first week of September 2022. The Ukrainian army launched feints on both sides of the Dnieper River in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts to divert Russian attention away from their main effort further east where they concentrated an armored group and superior artillery against a weak point in the Russian lines at Balaklia. After bombarding the outnumbered Russian defenders with accurate artillery fire, they achieved a breakthrough. Once the enemy lines were breached by tanks and infantry, elite paratroopers and special forces were launched deep into the Russian rear on light armored vehicles, American Humvees, and commercial SUVs. Like modern versions of the tachanka, these raced ahead and did not stop until they seized the strategic communications hubs at Kupiansk and Izyum, up to 90 kilometers away. Of course, Makhno's breakout from encirclement was on a much smaller scale, whereas the Balaklia operation involved a breakthrough of an extended Russian front. But the operational and tactical principles leading to the breakthrough were the same - multiple feints on secondary fronts before a concentration of forces at the most vulnerable point, with artillery fire the decisive arm.
Unfortunately, the anticipated Ukrainian Spring offensive will face many more obstacles than the previous breakthrough at Balaklia. Balaklia was lightly defended by second-rate Russian troops from the enclave in Kaliningrad, demoralized recruits from the Dontesk People's Republic (DNR), and inexperienced Rossgvardia troops (Russian riot police). Most were sheltering in lightly constructed entrenchments without heavy overhead cover and were supported by only small packets of armor and only one artillery brigade (28th Artillery Brigade). The Russians had few mobile reserves in the area. In contrast, over the course of the previous half-year the Russians have constructed three belts of defensive lines in Zaporizhzhia oblast from Vasylivka in the west to Vuhledar in the east. These consist of tank ditches, tank obstacles known as "dragons" teeth, concrete bunkers with reinforced rebar, connecting trenches, and mortar positions, all within range of massed Russian artillery. A fourth line of entrenchments has been constructed around key objectives, like Tokmak, Polohy and Melitopil. An open source satellite photo from the Black Bird Group depicting the 15-by-20-kilometer zone north of the intermediate objective of Tokmak with three defense belts marked in red illustrates the challenge facing the Ukrainians.
Furthermore, the entire area has been densely sown with both anti-tank and anti-personnel minefields. The defensive system is manned by tens of thousands of Russian recruits who were mobilized following Putin's mobilization order of September 13, 2022. Multiple tank battalions are in tactical reserve to counterattack local Ukrainian incursions. Although questions persist about the battle worthiness of the mobilized troops, most have been at the frontlines for months. Therefore, they may be good enough to man defensive positions. In any case, deep in operational reserve near Melitopil the Russians have located regiments of the elite 7th Guards Mountain Air Assault and 104th Guards Airborne Divisions and the 11th Guards Air Assault Brigade of the vozdushno desantnye voyska (VDV), approximately 15,000 troops. These will move laterally to seal off any major Ukrainian penetration of the defensive belts. Further west near Kherson, they have placed the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade and the 10th and 25th Spetsnaz Brigades to guard against a Ukrainian amphibious crossing of the Dnieper River, but these can also be shifted east to counterattack any Ukrainian penetration towards Melitopil from the flank. Meanwhile, east near Vuhledar, Russian marines of the 40th and 155th Naval Infantry Brigades have been recently involved in attacks on the town. Although they have suffered heavy casualties, these can be expected to put up a respectable showing on defense, if the Ukrainians choose to attack south towards Mariupil. Additionally, the Russians have the 76th Airborne Division in the Bakhmut sector, the 104th Airborne Division near Kreminna in Luhansk oblast, and the 98th Airborne Division in strategic reserve.
I have written about the difficulties of a Ukrainian offensive in Zaporizhzia oblast on multiple occasions. The initial tactical problem remains the breach of the first line of Russian trenches by specially trained detachments, in order to allow for exploitation of open space in the enemy rear. Dispersion of the assault force in the staging areas will be vital in avoiding artillery fire. However, the suppression of Russian artillery in the area of the breakthrough to achieve local dominance will be essential. This is where HIMARS systems will have the advantage in range (80 km) over Russian batteries (25 km). Only then can combat engineers be sent forward with line charges to de-mine channels through the first line of defense, followed by the tanks and armored vehicles transporting the breaching detachments. Moreover, Ukrainian electronic warfare units must achieve dominance in the breaching area to assure a flow of communications between drone video and artillery fire control centers, while concurrently disrupting Russian communications.
Armored fighting vehicles will be crucial in both the breaching phase as well as during the exploitation. The Western supplied Bradleys and Marders infantry fighting vehicles will be important in the first phase, where their added armor will offer breaching infantry and sappers some protection from enemy RPGs and artillery shrapnel, but not anti-tank missiles. These will have to be accompanied by robust demining efforts, to clear a path through thick minefields that the Russians have been sowing for months. Lighter and quicker vehicles, like the American Stryker or the Ukrainian BTR-4 Bucephalus, will be useful during the exploitation phase that follows. Even so, a successful breach of the first line of trenches still creates an operational-tactical problem for the Ukrainians, when they encounter a second line of trenches and bunkers a mere five kilometers further back. This problem was one that they were unable to solve in October-November 2022 during the long and arduous campaign to capture Kherson and to clear the west bank of the Dnieper River. Therefore, the elaborate sequencing and allocation of follow-on breaching units for the second defense line requires careful logistical coordination. The entire effort also requires effective Ukrainian anti-air defense to prevent Russia from establishing local air superiority over the battlefield.
It is unlikely that any initial Ukrainian attack can penetrate further than the second line of Russian defenses before casualties and losses grind it to a halt. Thus, the application of operational art will be necessary to launch sequenced offensives on multiple axis to confuse Russian reserves regarding the final Ukrainian operational objective. No sooner than one attack stalls because of Russian reserves rushing to plug the breach, another will have to start in a sector where the reserves just vacated their positions. Hopefully, one of these attacks will eventually result in a deep penetration of the Russian front.
b. Territorial, Attritional, and Political Strategic Objectives
This concludes my long examination of the influences and cultural traits that have framed Ukraine's way of war. However, this story is far from over. Ukrainians are currently writing the most important chapter in their military history. Never have they fought a war that was so large, intense, comprehensive across multiple domains, and existential. This year will determine whether they achieve strategic objectives that lead to victory, or at least to a favorable ceasefire. These strategic objectives fall into three categories.
One, strategic objectives can be territorial, like the recapture of the Black Sea and Azov Sea coasts. Such an achievement would be optimal, since it would assure unhindered navigation along the Dnieper River to the Black Sea and by extension, to sea routes for the shipping of Ukrainian goods to global markets. For example, the recapture of the west bank of the Dnieper River and of the city of Kherson in November 2022 was a territorial strategic objective.
Two, the outright destruction or further attrition of Russian manpower and weaponry can become strategic if it reaches a level where large parts of the Russian army refuse to fight. Such a result may convince segments of the Russian military leadership to begin a process of passive resistance or even plot against the regime. Please recall, that in March 1917 one of the primary reasons why the Russian Stavka forced tsar Nicholas II to abdicate was because parts of the imperial Russian army were refusing to follow orders. While there have been instances of Russian soldiers at the company or battalion level refusing to fight after extensive losses in this Russo-Ukrainian War, these have not become endemic. Nonetheless, if a Ukrainian offensive succeeds in severely attriting or even destroying enough Russian units, Russian commanders at the operational or strategic level may have to rethink their blind adherence to orders. At the very least, attrition of the Russian army will limit its ability to launch fresh offensives against Ukraine for an extended time.
Three, strategic objectives can also be political. In other words, results on the battlefield may embarrass the Putin regime to an extent that it loses political support amongst the Russian people. For instance, the Ukrainian army's Kharkiv offensive in September 2022, which captured the strategic towns of Kupiansk and Izyum, created such an uproar among the more conservative segments of the Russian public that Putin was forced to order a partial mobilization. While the mobilization supplied the undermanned and hard-pressed Russian army in Ukraine with badly needed manpower, it was highly unpopular with the general Russian pubic. It is no secret that Putin ordered the mobilization unwillingly and limited it to 300,000. At the same time, he exposed his regime and himself personally to significant political risk, if further mobilization sucks more and more Russians into the meatgrinder in Ukraine without tangible victory. An indicator that political embarrassment is key to understanding Putin's management of this war is the decision to retreat from Kherson and the west bank of the Dnieper River in November 2022, before the Ukrainians could destroy the Russian forces located there. The Putin regime went to great lengths to limit the political damage from such a defeat by portraying it as a deliberate tactical redeployment. That is why Ukraine's decision to deny Putin a symbolic victory at Bakhmut for as long as possible is an example of a political strategic objective. Namely, to increase the frustration of ordinary Russians with this war. Obviously, the capture of Crimea or at least its isolation from Russian supply and communications, would be the ultimate political embarrassment for Putin. However, the actual occupation of Crimea will likely result in the Russian use of nuclear weapons, because of the potential loss of the strategic Russian naval base at Sevastopol. After all, the Russians have historically desired a warm-water port from which to access the world's oceans and Sevastopol is the only that fits these requirements. Therefore, a realistic objective in the up-coming Ukrainian Spring counter-offensive is for the Ukrainians to bring the isthmuses and supply routes to Crimea (the so-called "land bridge") within range of their artillery and rocket launchers, in order to sever lines of communication to the peninsula, without outright capturing it.
After suffering strategic defeat during his initial invasion of Ukraine in February-March 2022, Putin is now hoping to outlast American and West European support for Ukraine. In doing so, he is exposing himself to his center of gravity, which is the continued support for the war by the Russian public. The longer the war lasts without a tangible military success, the more likely that Putin will face popular dissatisfaction, which increases the likelihood that he will face a challenger from within his ruling clique. Hopefully, Ukraine's upcoming Spring counteroffensive upsets this Russian center of gravity. Ukraine's armed forces must achieve artillery dominance in an area of front not expected to be attacked by the Russians. Breaching units must then achieve a breakthrough to unleash a modern-day equivalent of the tachanka deep into the Russian rear. Throughout, Ukrainian artillery will need to keep within range of the units exploiting the breakthrough to provide suppressing fires. It may be necessary to achieve limited breakthroughs in a number of sectors in order to spread Russian reserves thin before one finally breaks through into operational depth. Hopefully, this breakthrough achieves a strategic objective, be it territorial, attritional, or political, that shifts this war in Ukraine's favor.
The whole world is watching.
[1] Subtelny, Orest. Ukraine a History. (University of Toronto Press: Toronto - Buffalo - London, 1988), 125-127.
[2] Hrushevsky, Mykhailo. History of Ukraine - Rus'. Vol. 9. Book 1. Translated by Bohdan Struminski. ed. Frank E. Sysyn. (Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press: Edmonton - Toronto, 2012), 280-284.
[3] Gunther E. Rothenburg. The Army of Francis Joseph. (Purdue University Press: Lafayette, Inc., 1998) pp. 15, 43.
[4] Matitiahu Mayzel. The formation of the Russian General Staff, 1880-1917; A social study. Cahiers du Monde Russe et Sovietique. V. XVI- 3-4, July-December,1975. pp. 297, 311-312.
[5] The tachanka was a small open four-wheeled carriage, which was found in great numbers on the landed estates of Southern Ukraine at the turn of the 19th century. When harnessed to four horses, it was capable of moving off-road and had a tight turning radius. It did not take much imagination to fix a Maxim machinegun on the back seat and, overnight, military history had its first off-road infantry fighting vehicle. The anarchist Nestor Makhno was able to mount thousands of his infantry onto tachanky, to significantly increase the mobility of his army during the Civil War period during 1919-1923.
[6] Wrangel Military Collection. Hoover Institution Library. Box 52, folder 8, file 181.
[7] David Hambling. How Ukraine's artillery is doing more damage than Russia's, even with fewer rounds. Insider, 04/26/2023. Reprinted from 1945. https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-artillery-does-more-damage-with-fewer-rounds-than-russia-2023-4
[8] Isabelle Khurshudyan and Kamila Hrabchuk. Facing critical ammuntion shortage, Ukrainian troops ration shells. Washington Post, 04/06/2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/04/08/ukraine-ammunition-shortage-shells-ration/
[9] Franz-Stefan Gady. Ukraine's army must shed its Soviet legacy, says military expert. Economist. 03/17/2023. https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2023/03/17/ukraines-army-must-shed-its-soviet-legacy-says-a-military-expert Franz-Stefan Gady @ HoansSolo. Twitter. 03/21/2023.