2. Populism and Volunteerism
Populism may be broadly defined as the mobilization of ordinary people against central authority in pursuit of political and socio-economic change. The Ukrainian revolts of the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries sought social justice and economic redress for vast numbers of marginalized strata of Ukraine, who were oppressed by the feudal system of the powerful Polish landowners. For reasons that are beyond the scope of this article, these were not attained. Nonetheless, such populist goals continue to permeate Ukrainian politics till this day. These were evident during the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, when Ukrainians gathered in Kyiv by the hundreds of thousands, not only to oppose President Viktor Yanukhovych's pro-Russian policies, but also to limit the political and economic power of the billionaire oligarchs.
During the revolts prior to independence in 1991, local volunteerism worked hand-in-hand with the populist agenda, supplying an insurgency with men and provisions, so long as the fight was not too distant from the home base of the insurrection. Because the rebels were hostile to central authority of any sort, revolts usually stayed local. From a military perspective this had a negative impact on the ability of Ukrainians to raise large armies, since these could not be directed to fight far from the locus of a rebellion. If an army ventured too far from its origins, the rebels would disperse and go home. It took the brutal discipline of the Khmelnitsky military administration to subordinate regular Cossacks and serfs alike to central control while on campaign. But that was the exception to the rule. Most insurrections eventually withered away for lack of reinforcements and supplies. For instance, during the Revolution and Civil War period of 1917-1923, efforts of the nascent Ukrainian government of the UNR to harness the combat power of the various local chieftains to fight under the central direction of professional Ukrainian officers came to naught. Once the fighting shifted away from a particular region, the local chieftains would withdraw their bands of partisans and retreat to their local territory, leaving the small regular army of the UNR to campaign alone.
There have been four exceptions to the temporary staying power of populist revolts that ventured beyond the regional level in recent Ukrainian military history.
a. Nestor Makhno's Ukrainian Insurgent Army
The first is the example of the anarchist Nestor Makhno's vagabond Insurgent Army of Ukraine, which moved across broad swaths of territory in Southern Ukraine during the Civil War period in 1918-1923, as it maneuvered between and around more conventional Austrian, German, Bolshevik, White Russian, and Ukrainian forces. Makhno had an anarchist propaganda detachment attached to his command, complete with printing press and theatrical troupe, which would spread anarchist slogans once he entered a new region. This predominantly populist message resonated with the peasant population of rural Ukraine. New recruits, even entire regiments, volunteered to fight in the ranks of his army, which relied on a permanent core of 8,000 fighters, but which could quickly be reinforced by up to 20,000 local volunteers, many of whom were veterans of World War I. Entire districts on both sides of the Dnieper River donated arms, ammunition, provisions, and spare horses to Makhno's army. Like Khmelnitsky two hundred fifty years earlier, Makhno relied on brutal discipline to keep his subordinates in check. His mounted Black Company (Chorna sotnia) had the authority to conduct summary executions on the spot if his orders were not carried out. It was not until 1923, when the Communists were able to seize control of the countryside in Southern Ukraine and limit the support of the populace for the anarchist army, was Makhno forced to flee Soviet territory. [1]
Makhno and his staff (1919)
b. Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)
The second example of sustained populist support and volunteerism in a Ukrainian war is that of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Ukraiinska Povstanska Armia (UPA), which fought both the Nazis and the Soviet Union during World War Two. Operating primarily, although not exclusively, in Western Ukraine and the northwestern Volynhia region, it managed to sustain operations until at least 1953, despite a lack of material support from outside its theater of operations. Using the example of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and its intelligence chief Michael Collins as a blueprint, the UPA and its political arm, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), maintained iron discipline within its ranks and endeavored to keep the surrounding civilian population loyal. The internal security and intelligence branch, the sluzhba bezpeky (SB), worked tirelessly to root out moles and turn-coats. Even so, populism and volunteerism contributed substantially to the endurance of the UPA/OUN. The Ukrainian Nationalist message of the UPA/OUN contained a populist orientation, which resonated, particularly with the rural youth of Western Ukraine, who saw an opportunity to leave their villages and to improve their social and economic standing. They sacrificed their lives by the thousands. As a result, the UPA continued its bitter struggle well beyond reasonable expectations. It was not until the Soviets seized control of the countryside of Western Ukraine and severed the support of the local populace through brutal repression, was the UPA forced to cease operations. [2]
A detachment of the UPA celebrating Easter in the forest (1946).
c. Volunteer Battalions and Civil Society in Opposition to Putin's Hybrid War of 2014-2015.
The third time Ukrainian populism and volunteerism were harnessed in support of war was following the Revolution of Dignity in 2014. Both positive and negative effects of these social forces were in evidence in the fighting in the Donbas in 2014-2015.
Since 1990, Ukraine has been rocked by intermittent social and economic unrest that periodically boils over into protest at the national level. In contrast to previous uprisings, which were regional, these recent events involved actors from different parts of the country who travelled to Kyiv to air their grievances in unison and to demand fundamental change on the national stage. The most prominent of these were the Revolution on Granite in 1990, the Orange Revolution in 2005, and the Revolution of Dignity in 2014. The origins and consequences of this phenomenon are beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that the pent-up energy from these stunted social forces manifested itself in Ukrainian resistance to Russian aggression in 2014-2015.
On February 28, 2014, as Vladimir Putin's "little green men" began their takeover of Crimea, Ukrainians were still camped out by the tens of thousands on the Maidan, the central square in Kyiv. Emboldened by their recent success of forcing pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukhovych from power, they now aspired to change the prevailing socio-economic order, that was slanted heavily in favor of the billionaire oligarchs of Ukraine. The smell of drastic, if not violent, populist reform was in the air. However, ongoing Russian aggression gave the Ukrainian elites the opportunity to deflect the rising populist wave. When on April 6, 2014, pro-Russian forces took control of the large eastern industrial cities of Donetsk and Luhansk and followed-up on April 12 by seizing the key railroad center at Sloviansk, the interim Ukrainian government ordered it's neglected and unprepared armed forces to roll back Russian incursion. The campaign did not start well. A reserve battalion of the elite 25th Airborne Brigade was routed by civilians as it approached Sloviansk.
In response, thousands of protesters on the Maidan rushed to organize volunteer battalions to assist the outgunned and sometimes reluctant Ukrainian army in a furtive and uneven campaign against the Russian separatists. Moreover, in May 2014 Ukraine held a special election and elected Petro Poroshenko president. It is no secret that Poroshenko, himself an oligarch, channeled the volunteerism of the protesting masses to relocate away from the Maidan to the Donbas, thereby averting the threat of a populist takeover of the Ukrainian organs of political power. Some 36 volunteer battalions were organized on a regional basis by the end of the campaign against the pro-Russian separatists. Although accurate numbers are difficult to come by, approximately 30,000 volunteers joined the battalions, of which close to 10,000 fought in the Donbas.
Moreover, many thousands more of Ukrainian citizenry volunteered to supply the volunteer battalions, as well as the underequipped regular army, with not only food, water, and medical supplies, but also uniforms, helmets, and body armor, all of which were in short supply. It became clear that the Ukrainian military was so neglected and afflicted by corruption that it was incapable of supplying its personnel with rudimentary field kit, except for small arms and ammunition. Crowdfunding by the public paid for everything from thermal night vision goggles, laser range sights, laptop computers, communications gear, and SUV vehicles. It became apparent that Ukrainian civil society was at war with Russian aggression, even more so than many in the Ukrainian government or military.
Although outnumbered, the first Russian-separatist forces in the Donbas were equipped and organized by the Russian military intelligence branch (GRU) around an experienced core of former special forces, airborne and naval infantry. At first, these were more than a match for the Ukrainians. The Ukrainian army, which started the war with no more than 6,000 combat effectives, began to increasingly rely on the volunteer battalions to support its combat operations. As the army suffered casualties and its disorganized mobilization campaign failed to create effective replacements, the volunteers were the only available pool of reserves to draw upon. Although, these were no better than light infantry, with few heavy weapons and armored vehicles, the Ukrainian General Staff began to incorporate them into major combat operations. In August 2014, some of the best volunteer battalions were sent to seize the railroad hub at Ilovaisk, southeast of the city of Donetsk. They made up more than half of the forces tasked with capturing the town. After they entered combat against separatist forces inside of the city, they were surrounded by regular Russian units that attacked surreptitiously from across the Russian border. As many as 400 Ukrainians were killed during a bloody attempt to break out of encirclement.
Encircled Ukrainian Volunteers at Ilovaisk (2014)
The fighting qualities of the volunteer battalions were mixed. A few of the battalions, mostly from the Russian-speaking east of Ukraine, revealed tangible fighting qualities. The "Aidar" battalion became a true assault formation, equal or even superior to the regular formations that it was attached to. It played a prominent role in the Ukrainian offensive to envelop the city of Luhansk in August-September 2014. Meanwhile, the "Donbas" and "Shakhtarsk" battalions fought in the successful operation to capture Severdonetsk and Lysychansk and later entered the battle for Ilovaisk. Moreover, in late August 2014 detachments from the "Donbas," "Dnipro-1," "Dnipro-2", "Kryvbas," "Kherson," "Svitiazh," "Ivano-Frankivsk," and "Myrotvorets" battalions fougth and suffered heavy casualties inside of Ilovaisk and during the doomed breakout from encirclement that followed. Meanwhile, the "Azov" battalion recaptured its native city of Mariupil on June 13, 2014, and fought in the earlier stages of the battle for Ilovaisk. It withdrew along with the "Shakhtarsk" battalion before being encircled by Russian regulars.
To be brutally honest, even the best volunteer battalions had their flaws. Few could put more than 200 fighters into the field at any given time. Furthermore, their commanders, mostly veterans of the peacetime Ukrainian armed forces or the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan, rarely showed qualities above that of a marginally competent company commander. None produced a battalion commander who knew how to fight in the modern conditions that were imposed by the regular Russian battalion tactical groups (BTGs) that intervened in Ukraine at the height of the Ilovaisk battle. Moreover, some elements in the "Azov" as well as the "Pravyi Sektor" battalions espoused extreme nationalist right-wing slogans or displayed insignia reminiscent of the Nazi SS. These created a negative image in Western media that persists to this day, despite attempts to clean up their brand. [3]
Azov Battalion and its symbolism in 2014.
Moreover, in the finest populist tradition of the otamany of the Revolution and Civil War era of 1917-1923, the commanders of the volunteer battalions frequently questioned the decisions of the Ukrainian General Staff or the staff of the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) and were not shy about airing their disagreements in the press and social media. The public grievances of the volunteer battalion commanders resonated with a wide spectrum of the Ukrainian public, who in true populist fashion, were dismissive and resentful of the authority of the generals. Many became hyper-critical of the Poroshenko administration, and particularly general Viktor Muzhenko, commander of the ATO, when the Ukrainian army suffered bloody battlefield defeats at Ilovaisk and Luhansk Airport in August-September 2014. These were punctuated by appeals from families of both regular as well as the volunteer formations that were trapped at Ilovaisk, clamoring for the withdrawal or rescue of their loved ones from the fighting. Family members marched to protest at the permanent headquarters and barracks of the surrounded units within Ukraine and blocked traffic on surrounding roads, to emphasize their concern. Undoubtedly, these good faith efforts were unwittingly encouraged by Russian psychological operations designed to undermine Ukrainian support for the ATO. The despairing families demanded that Muzhenko send relief forces, together with airpower and artillery support, which Ukraine did not possess. Muzhenko resorted to negotiations with the Russian command for safe passage of the surrounded troops through Russian lines. "Armchair strategists" without any combat experience began sounding slogans reminiscent of the British experience in World War One, to the effect that "Ukrainian lions were being led by donkeys." No mention was ever made of the effort of the professional officers to clear the Donbas of Russian separatists with the limited troops and resources at their disposal. It was as if the critics expected the Ukrainian armed forces to transform into the United States Army, Air Force and Marines overnight, with complete air supremacy and state-of-the-art weaponry.
As the incursion of the regular Russian BTGs gained traction in pushing back Ukrainian forces in the Donbas in late-August 2014, enlisted from both regular and volunteer units alike began abandoning their positions and appearing well to the rear. Their usual explanation was that they left their trenches only after being abandoned by their officers. Another familiar accusation was that senior officers were betraying their coordinates to enemy artillery units, resulting in accurate barrages of their positions. Such excuses would have been familiar to officers of the UNR during the Revolution and Civil War period during 1917-1923. "We were abandoned by our officers," was a familiar refrain when troops abandoned their positions in that earlier conflict. Mention must be made that the verifiable rolls of the killed-in-action during the 2014 campaign contain a disproportionate number of Ukrainian lieutenant colonels, majors, and captains, who remained at their posts after being abandoned by their men. This evidence rebuts accusations of the disloyalty or lack of courage of the mid-level Ukrainian officer corps and impeaches the credibility of their accusers.
A jarring example of the unfair treatment of a senior officer by the public is that of Colonel Pavlo Pyvovarenko, commander of the 51st Mechanized Brigade (later reorganized as the 14th Mechanized Brigade). Unpopular within some of the ranks and their families for instilling discipline and combating alcohol abuse, he was accused of betraying his men during the breakout from Ilovaisk and going over to the Russians. Only after the intercession of fellow soldiers who witnessed his final moments, was the true story revealed. Pyvovarenko commanded an armored spearhead during the breakout. On August 29, 2014, his small battle group destroyed two Russian tanks and an armored fighting vehicle near the village of Novoukraiinka during the final stages of the battles near Ilovaisk. He died with all "guns blazing" when his BMP-2 armored fighting vehicle was destroyed by enemy fire shortly thereafter. Even after death, he was subjected to cruelty from some within his command, who found it convenient for him to be "missing" and, supposedly, "alive and well" on the Russian side. Although his body was recovered and identified, for mysterious reasons it was "lost" in the military morgue in the city of Dnipro for months, until the mistake was discovered in the Spring of 2016. Eventually, Pyvovarenko was buried with full military honors. On December 10, 2021, he was vindicated when President Volodymyr Zelensky posthumously awarded him the Gold Star of Hero of Ukraine - Ukraine's highest military honor.
Colonel Pavlo Pyvovarenko
However, the most disturbing example of the adverse effect of populism on the Ukrainian professional military was the criminal trial of Lieutenant-General Viktor Nazarov, the chief-of-staff of the ATO. He planned some of the more successful operations of the Ukrainian army in 2014, such as the famed Zabrodsky raid that traversed around the entirety of the Russian separatist army in August 2014. His loyalty and credentials notwithstanding, in March 2017 Nazarov was accused of negligently ordering the airlift of reinforcements to the encircled Luhansk Airport on June 14, 2014. A Ukrainian IL-76 transport jet was shot down by an Ihla man portable anti-air defense missile (MANPAD) with 49 paratroopers and crew on board while approaching the airport at night. There were no survivors. The public outcry required a scapegoat. Consequently, Nazarov was brought to trial in the city of Dnipro in a civilian court before a judge who had never served in the military. After a "show trial" where exculpatory evidence was excluded, he was found guilty of simple negligence in the performance of military duties, (as opposed to recklessness, which requires a higher standard of culpability), and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. Nazarov had to appear out of uniform, in a cramped courtroom, where the parents of the dead servicemen had free access to heckle and even physically assault him (video exists of a woman swatting him over the head from behind). Fortunately, an appellate court vacated the sentence on May 21, 2021. That Nazarov is still held in high esteem by the Ukrainian officer class is evidenced by his current role as a special consultant to current commander of the armed forces of Ukraine, Valery Zaluzhny. Even if out of uniform, he remains at his post, contributing to Ukrainian operational success.
Major-General Viktor Nazarov at his criminal trial (2017)
No plan in a combat zone is without risk. Nazarov was implementing a standard operational plan to seize all airfields in the Donbas to deny their use by the Russians. Several previous flights had delivered reinforcements to the surrounded Luhansk Airport without incident - one merely minutes before the fateful crash. The pilots and the controllers on the ground were exercising procedures that were designed to disguise the approach of the flights. While there was a risk of anti-air missile fire, it was not inevitable. To punish a commander every time his wartime decision poses a risk to subordinates or results in death will make other commanders risk averse and ineffective. In which case, why even fight? If that be the law, then American General Ike Eisenhower should have been court-martialed for the death of thousands of Allied paratroopers during the unsuccessful Operation Market Ground operation in Holland in 1944. Meanwhile, Ukrainian civilian courts have acquitted ordinary soldiers for desertion or abandoning their positions before the enemy, after listening to emotional appeals from family or local politicians. The Nazarov trial drove home the need for Ukraine to implement a reform of its military justice system. The topic is discussed in the next section. The commanding general of the Ukrainian armed forces, General Valery Zaluzhny, has called for such reform, to maintain discipline during the current high intensity attritional war against Russia.
In the final analysis, Ukraine's military campaign against the Russian separatists in 2014-2015 gained strategic benefits, despite tactical defeats at the hands of regular Russian forces at Ilovaisk and Luhansk Airport in August-September 2014, Donetsk Airport in January 2015, and Debaltseve in March 2015. Stiff Ukrainian resistance dissuaded Putin from deeper incursions into Ukraine. This preserved Ukrainian sovereignty and began eight years of ever closer relations with the West. Even the notorious Russian chauvinist Igor Girkin, a/k/a Igor Strelkov, the GRU operative who led the separatist forces in 2014, conceded that the 2014 campaign resulted in a draw, or even a marginal strategic victory for Ukraine. There is no doubt that Ukrainian populism led to the volunteerism that contributed substantially to this tangible strategic result. Moreover, the combat experience gained in these desperate battles against the more experienced Russian separatists and regulars, planted the seeds for the battle-readiness of the Ukrainian armed forces in 2022. Nonetheless, populist skepticism of the professional military is always around the corner when Ukrainians wage war. All it takes is the next defeat to rear its ugly head. The hope is to channel the populism constructively towards volunteerism in support of the war effort. The only alternative is to impose harsh punitive measures to maintain discipline, like that of Khmelnytsky, Makhno and the UPA. However, the Poroshenko government was too weak to attempt such a drastic step.
Igor Girkin a/k/a “Strelkov,” commander of Russian Separatist forces (2014)
I will continue with the discussion of populism and volunteerism in this current Russo-Ukrainian War in my next sub-stack, to follow shortly.
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[1] Sysyn, F.E. Nestor Makhno and the Ukrainian Revolution. The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution. ed. Hunczak, T. (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), 271-304.
[2] Subtelny, Orest. Ukraine a History. (University of Toronto Press: Toronto - Buffalo - London, 1988) 441-446, 451-452, 473-479, 488-492.
[3] Kacper Rekawek. A Trickle, Not a Flood; The Limited 2022 Far-Right Foreign Fighter Mobilization to Ukraine. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. June 2022, Vol. 15, Issue 6. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/a-trickle-not-a-flood-the-limited-2022-far-right-foreign-fighter-mobilization-to-ukraine/