On April 28, the Russian Donbas offensive increased in intensity and is likely approaching its zenith. Artillery and air bombardment is evident all along the front, with mechanized attacks in every sector. The obvious intention is to fix Ukrainian forces in place and to tie up reserves. So far, the front remains static, with the Russians enjoying a few minor territorial gains here and there, but nothing of operational significance. Nevertheless, despite the ubiquitous fog-of-war along the close to 500-kilometers of front, primary and secondary Russian objectives are coming into focus. These were merely the subject of conjecture during the first ten (10) days of the offensive. But now, if you look closely enough, the indications are there.
The primary operational objective of the offensive remains Barvinkove, southwest of Izyum. How do we know? For one, that line of attack is the only one where the Russians have had any success during the previous weeks. Efforts to attack southeast towards Slovyansk through the village of Dovhenke have repeatedly failed. Moreover, the Russians introduced four battalion tactical groups (BTGs) from their much-depleted elite airborne forces into the fighting south of Izyum. After all, they need infantry that is willing to press the attack home and protect the flanks of their vulnerable tanks. Their regular motorized infantry is too few in number and not up to the task. If the Russian Stavka (General Staff) had designs to exploit another sector of the front in this offensive, they would have steered the airborne BTGs somewhere else. Otherwise, it does not appear that any substantial infantry reserves will be introduced into the fighting in this sector during the coming days. Although, the Ukrainian General Staff reports that a BTG each from the Russian 5th tank and 36th motorized brigades have moved from Belgorod into Ukraine, these units were severely bloodied during the fighting west of Kyiv along the Kyiv-Zhitomir highway in March and may be of dubious quality. The Russians also have the elite 27th motorized brigade with its modern T-90M tanks in theater. But its last reported position was on April 27 northwest of Kharkiv in the Kozacha Lopan area, shielding against Ukrainian attacks toward the key Russian logistics center at Belgorod. Thus, the Russians must fight at Izyum with what they have. As final proof of the centrality of Barvinkove in Russian plans, the chief of the Russian General Staff, none other than General of the Army of the Russian Federation Valeriy Gerasimov, arrived at Izyum during the evening hours of April 27, apparently to “take the temperature” of the operation in person.
You, the reader, must understand, that prior to February 24, 2022, Valery Vasilevich Gerasimov was a “rock star” in the professional military world. Translations of his writings on the operational art were devoured by military practitioners in every staff, general officer’s course and military academy in the world. Likewise, Gerasimov’s concepts were parsed through by academics, consultants and pundits in every serious foreign policy publication. The non-military were fixated on his concept of “hybrid war” - the use of stratagems short of kinetic war, such as cyber war or the “little green men” in unmarked uniforms that seized Crimea in 2014. The professionals, on the other hand, were trying to wrap their brains around Gerasimov’s idea that the operational level of war - the level between strategy and tactics where campaigns are planned - was no longer dominant in the age of satellite surveillance, electronic communications and drones. However, Gerasimov’s brand as military thinker was seriously tarnished within five days into this Russo-Ukrainian war, when it became evident to even dilettante observers that the Russian Stavka was seriously underperforming. Now Gerasimov is in Izyum, arguably not as a staff planner but as field commander, not only charged by Vladimir Putin to produce some semblance of victory, but attempting to salvage his reputation.
Regarding Russian secondary objectives, these appear focused on (1) effectuating a breakthrough of the front at Temyrivka, 60 kilometers east of Zaporizhzhia and (2) to force a crossing of the Northern Donets River between Yampil and Lyman, 20 kilometers northeast of the twin cities of Slovyansk-Kramatorsk. Let’s examine these secondary objectives before we tackle Barvinkove.
First, the Russians are attempting to exploit their earlier inroads near Temyrivka, east of the town of Hulyaipole. They are inserting reinforcements in the form of naval infantry that has moved up from the siege of Mariupil and attempting to breach the second line of the Ukrainian defense. A Russian success in this sector would threaten the Ukrainian army with a breakthrough towards the strategic crossing points of the Dnieper River at Zaporizhzhia and Dnipro (formerly Dnipropetrovsk). This would be catastrophic for the Ukrainian units fighting in the Donbas, since they would be cut off from the west bank of the Dnieper. Moreover, a success here would keep Ukrainian operational reserves from reinforcing the Izyum sector. However, the prospect for a major Russian success here is unlikely. Not only do the Ukrainians have BTGs of the dogged 128th mountain and elite 25th airborne brigades in tactical reserve in the second line, but they can also call on the support of the staunch fighters of the 2nd battalion of the notorious Azov Regiment (the first battalion is fighting in Mariupil). Furthermore, the Ukrainians have been very careful not to reveal the identity and location of their operational and strategic reserves. It is likely that they have a few more BTGs behind the second defensive belt.
The second Russian subsidiary objective is a crossing of the Northern Donets River at the towns of Yampil and Lyman. These are labeled in English in the extreme bottom right-hand corner of the attached map. A forcing of the river at this point would open up access towards the twin cities of Slovyansk-Kramatorsk, a mere 20 kilometers to the southwest. As you may recall, Slovyansk-Kramatorsk is a political objective for domestic consumption by the Russian TV viewing public. How else will ordinary Russians know that they have “liberated” the entirety of the Donbas unless they see their forces parading through these iconic locales, which became famous on Russian TV during the fighting in 2014? As explained in my previous newsletter, the threat to Yampil developed unexpectedly on April 19 when reconnaissance elements of the Russian 74th motorized brigade outflanked Ukrainian forces at Kreminna and seized Zarichne. Since then, the Russians have been able to push further towards the outskirts of Yampil and are preparing for a river crossing. The factors that have enabled the Russians to get this far have been superior artillery support and the broken terrain that is partially wooded and cut by small gullies and ravines - conducive to infiltration tactics. Although elements of yet another battalion of the Ukrainian 128th mountain brigade are blocking their way, a Russian crossing of the Northern Donets at this point is a viable threat. So far, the Russian attack on Yampil has been conducted by one reconstituted BTG (600-700 men). For that reason, both sides are rushing reinforcements to this sector. It is known that one BTG each from the Russian 30th and 55th motorized brigades (1,500 men) are closing in from Kupiansk in the north and have engaged elements of the Ukrainian 57th motorized brigade (500 men) at Lozovoe and Ridkodub, as well as companies from the 112th territorial defense battalion and the 24th Aidar volunteer battalion (400 men) at Nove and Zelena Dolyna. If they are able to push the Ukrainians back towards the river, the fighting will come to a head at Lyman. Reportedly, up to four new BTGs (4,000 men) from the 201st military base are also entering the battle. These are fresh but untested formations that have yet to fight in this war. Nonetheless, “quantity has a quality all its own,” as Stalin liked to say. Although the Russians may take Yampil and Lyman, they will then have to perform an opposed crossing of the river - never an easy task. As a precaution, the Ukrainians have already blown the bridge over the Northern Donets between Lyman and Raihorodok. Even if a crossing is successful, these forces would have to continue to fight to the outskirts of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, before being sucked into another bloody urban battle.
Which brings us to an analysis of Barvinkove as the primary operational objective of the Russian offensive. Its capture will not only cut off railroad and primary road connections to Slovyansk-Kramatorsk from the west but will likely hamper the avenue of retreat for the Ukrainian battalions fighting further east in the Donbas - those in the vicinity of the cities of Severdonetsk, Lysychansk, Popasna and Rubizhne. These include BTGs of the 17th armored, 57th motorized, 128th mountain, 24th mechanized, 30th mechanized and 79th air-assault brigades, to name a few. The ability of the Russians to lay siege to Slovyansk-Kramatorsk and to create a cauldron of surrounded Ukrainian troops will present Vladimir Putin leverage in peace negotiations. Of even greater significance, the opportunity for Russian media to amplify the helplessness of the surrounded Ukrainian military, will create the basis for the war to be painted as an overwhelming Russian victory. Afterall, overt humiliation of others is a staple of authoritarian personalities, whether in Russia or elsewhere.
Nevertheless, Russian success on the Barvinkove axis of advance is far from assured. Despite concentrating the cream of Russian armor south of Izyum, namely the guards 1st tank and 1st motorized regiments from the 2nd Tamanskaya motorized division, and the guards 13th tank and 423d motorized regiments from the legendary 4th Kantemirovskaya tank division, the Russians have made scant progress since clearing Izyum of Ukrainian forces on April 1. (The combined strength of all four regiments approximates 3,000 men and 250 tanks) The muddy conditions brought about by the Spring thaw have forced Russian armor to stick close to the paved roads. There are two major paved roads that lead south from Izyum and one that leads west. The first is highway M03, which runs directly south to Slovyansk. This avenue of approach has been blocked effectively by the crack 13th battalion of the Ukrainian 95th air-assault brigade (500 men). Russian efforts along M03 by BTGs of the 1st tank and 1st motorized regiments consisted of at least four attempts to seize the village of Dovhenke, 15 kilometers south of Izyum, but to no avail. Russian armor is typically engaged by Ukrainian artillery and anti-tank missiles as soon as it leaves the protection of its own artillery north of Izyum, which are located approximately 20 kilometers north of Dovhenke. Recent Russian attacks by tank companies from the 1st tank regiment and two airborne BTGs from the 106th airborne division (1,000 men) have fared no better. As a matter of fact, according to the Ukrainian General Staff in its briefing of April 28, one of the two BTGs from the 106th airborne division was withdrawn across the border back into Russia to refit and regroup after sustaining heavy casualties and losses of armor in fighting south of Izyum.
The second road leading south from Izyum is route T2122, which leads southwest to Barvinkove. Similar to proceedings along highway M03, BTGs of the 13th tank and 423d motorized regiments have not been able to push further than 15 kilometers southwest of Izyum. The Ukrainians engage them with artillery just south of the village of Brazhkivka. Furthermore, a Ukrainian strong point in the village of Virnopillya attacks Russian armor from the west of route T2122 with flanking fire from anti-tank missiles. Similarly, a Ukrainian strongpoint in the village of Nova Dmytrivka, engages the Russian armor from the southeast of route T2122. There seems to be a recurring pattern where Russian columns come under artillery fire as soon as they start leaving the protective radius of their own artillery. Access to Barvinkove along this road is blocked by the 122nd battalion of the Ukrainian 81st air-assault brigade (500 men), with the assistance of a few tank companies from the 3d armored brigade, a reserve formation (40 tanks). The Ukrainian tankers engage their counterparts from overwatch positions at extreme range (over three kilometers) in order to limit their own vulnerabilities, particularly from anti-tank missiles (three to five kilometers).
Nonetheless, the Russians have had more success advancing down a secondary road that runs along a southerly depression, which bisects highway M-03 and route P2122. This depression is dotted by the villages of Sulyhivka, Dibrivne, Kurulka and Pashkivka. When airborne infantry has been able to infiltrate along this low ground, Russian armor has had greater success in attacking south. Over the last two weeks, the Russians have made steady progress in seizing three of the above-named settlements. As of April 27, they were able to seize Sulyahivka, Dibrovne and get a toehold in Kurulka. This is 24 kilometers south of Izyum, 13 kilometers northeast from Barvinkove and 13 kilometers northwest from Slavyansk. Of military significance is the fact that Kurulka is 10 kilometers north of the main rail line between Slavyansk and Barvinkove. Gerasimov would love to sever this supply artery in order to isolate Slovyansk-Kramatorsk from the west and to trap the Ukrainian battalions fighting further east in the Donbas. However, Russian inroads so far have been on a very narrow front and subject to Ukrainian artillery fire. It will take a concerted effort to drive a sizeable column of Russian armored vehicles over 30 kilometers through this narrow low ground to the rail line and then deploy in the open on a broader front for attacks towards Barvinkove and Slovyansk, especially under artillery fire. In order to effectuate such a maneuver, the Russians will have to bring their artillery well forward, south of Izyum, in order to bring their mechanized vanguard under the canopy of its own artillery. This will be quite the chore, since the Ukrainian gunners are waiting to saturate the Russian howitzers in transit, before they can set up and send out their observation drones.
The Russians have also explored a third axis of advance by attacking directly west from Izyum along route P79 towards the villages of Velyka Kamyshevakha and Zavody. The Russian intent is to seize Velyka Komyshevakha and to gain access to a third southerly paved road, route T2113, that leads directly to Barvinkove. This avenue of advance is intended to outflank Ukrainian defenses along route T2112 at Virnopillya. The attacks toward Zavody and Velyka Komyshevakha have been carried out by companies of the 13th tank and the 423d motorized regiments. The village of Zavody has changed hands numerous times. As of April 28, the Russians appear to control it. Currently, they also have a toehold in the northeastern outskirts of Velyka Komyshevakha. The Russians have been opposed on this axis by companies of the Ukrainian 81st air-assault brigade, the 93d mechanized brigade and a company of the right-wing Pravyi Sektor volunteer battalion (altogether 1,000 men and 40 tanks). Even if they seize Velyka Komyshevakha and turn south towards Barvinkove, their right flank will be exposed to attack by Ukrainian reserves from the west, which so far have not revealed themselves in the battle.
And what of Ukrainian countermoves? As described in previous newsletters, the Ukrainians have situated elements of the 92nd and 93d mechanized brigades along the right flank of the Russian supply lines leading south from the Russian base at Kupiansk to Izyum. The 92nd mechanized brigade has concentrated forces east of Kharkiv at Chuhuiv and pushed forward advance guards onto the opposite bank of the Northern Donets River as far as Bazylivka and Pechenihy. Similarly, the 93d mechanized brigade is southeast of Kharkiv and has a reconnaissance force across the Northern Donets at Andriivka, while its main body is threatening Russian control of the town of Balaklia. These short range yet clever maneuvers have caused the Russians to redirect no less than five BTGs from Izyum towards Chuhuiv in order to form a defensive line along the line of Balaklia - Shevchenkove - Pechenihy to screen access to their base at Kupiansk. The BTGs in this sector belong to the Russian 26th tank and 752nd motorized regiments, and the 38th and 39th brigades. But for the Ukrainian maneuvers onto Russian supply lines, these units could have been used to support the attacks on Barvinkove.
Moreover, Ukrainian forces have pushed back the Russians northwest of Kharkiv to Kozacha Lopan and northeast of the city to Momotovo and Kuzyntsi. The effect of this northern offensive is to push Russian artillery out of range of Chuhuiv. It is also keeping the elite 27th motorized brigade north of Kharkiv, protecting against an attack towards the Russian city of Belgorod, instead of at Izyum. This is significant if the Ukrainians decide to reinforce the 92nd mechanized brigade and then launch a determined offensive in an easterly direction towards the Russian base at Kupiansk. Such a maneuver will expose the Ukrainian forces to superior Russian airpower and may result in heavy casualties and loss of armor. However, a successful capture of Kupiansk would cut supply lines to some 20 Russian BTGs south of Izyum. Presently, the Ukrainians may be biding their time for the Russians to get bogged down in urban fighting for Barvinkove and Slovyansk, before attempting such a bold but dangerous maneuver.
In the meantime, more Ukrainian artillery has moved southeast of Kharkiv and within range of the Russian right flank at Izyum. If recent video on social media is to be believed, the Ukrainians have had some spectacular successes in destroying Russian armor in the terrain between Balaklia in the north and Izyum in the south. For instance, the artillery from the 93d mechanized brigade made a raid from Husarivka towards the Northern Donets and blanketed a Russian headquarters complex in the village of Zabavne, northwest of Izyum. The Ukrainian public has taken particular satisfaction from viewing video of tanks, armored vehicles, trucks and personnel belonging to the Russian 64th motorized brigade being blown up west of Izyum. The 64th motorized brigade is allegedly responsible for the atrocities at Bucha during the fighting west of Kyiv in March. It has recently relocated to the south and assumed a flanking position along the right flank of the forces at Izyum.
In summary, the Russians have made inroads in their advance on Barvinkove along one secondary road but have been otherwise stymied along all three main paved roads leading out of Izyum. Ukrainian artillery and strongpoints at Virnopillya, Nova Dmytrivka and Dovhenke have exacted a heavy toll on Russian manpower and armor. The Russians can still introduce two airborne BTGs from the 76th airborne division into the meat grinder south of Izyum. Furthermore, they can always bring up more artillery. However, will these reinforcements be enough to finally break through Ukrainian defenses and reach the rail line between Barvinkove and Slovyansk? I don’t believe so. The Ukrainians are bringing up more artillery themselves and at this rate of attrition the Russians will run out of quality infantry soon. The Russians have one more roll of the dice if they introduce the 27th motorized brigade into the battle, with its state-of-the-art T-90M tanks (1,000 men and 40 tanks). However, the Ukrainians are keeping their operational reserves out of sight and may be waiting to spring a surprise. Nevertheless, if the Russians appear on the verge of seizing Barvinkove, the Ukrainians will have to begin a fighting withdrawal out of the eastern Donbas immediately, in order to save the large number of troops that they have concentrated there from possible encirclement.
Valery Gerasimov, famous strategic theorist, is fighting for his reputation by waging a battle of brute attrition on a narrow front with limited infantry resources. Will he meet the operational high standards of a Brusilov and Tukhachevsky* or revert to the Russian traditions of massed fires and frontal attack, as exemplified by Zhukov? Except Zhukov had numbers; Gerasimov does not.
*Aleksei Brusilov was a very successful Russian general in World War I; Mikhail Tukhachevsky made a name for himself as a Bolshevik commander in the Russian Civil War. Georgy Zhukov, of course, was the most famous Soviet commander of World War II.