Since my last newsletter on April 1, the Russians have been able to take full control of the city of Izyum and to expand their foothold on the southern bank of the Northern Donets River. They have advanced approximately seven kilometers south in the direction of the city of Slovyansk and a similar distance southwest towards the town of Barvinkove. Nonetheless, the Russians have moved only four battalion tactical groups (BTGs) across the Northern Donets. The blown bridge in Izyum has forced them to cross the river by pontoon bridge, which slows the process. Moreover, two of the BTGs are substantially degraded by battle and unless reinforced by fresh troops, will be unable to advance.
After three weeks of failure, the Russians finally crossed the river because they concentrated more artillery north of Izyum than the Ukrainians could muster south of it. Thus, they were able to suppress the Ukrainian artillery and made it difficult for the Ukrainians to mount counterattacks. Russian tactical air support in the form of attack helicopters and fixed wing aircraft were instrumental in enabling the Russians to gain the upper hand in the artillery battle. Nevertheless, Russian losses in helicopters and jets was steep. Prudently, the Ukrainians moved their artillery out of range and now wait for the Russians to advance again in order to bring them under fire as these move away from the protection of their own guns. Because the Russians have yet to repair the blown bridge in Izyum, they are unable to move their heavier artillery south of the river in sufficient number. For now, the Ukrainians have the artillery advantage when the Russians resume their advance.
Regarding Russian reinforcements, only two BTGs of the airborne troops that were withdrawn from the fighting northwest of Kyiv have been seen near Izyum. One BTG each from the 51st and 137th airborne regiments of the Russian 106th airborne division (approximately 1,600 paratroopers) were reported at the Russian base at Valuyki on April 4, where they were flown from Belarus by air transport. We can assume that as of today, these are in Ukraine at the Russian staging area in Kupiansk, north of Izyum. We do not know how much hard fighting these airborne BTGs did near Kyiv nor do we know their state of combat effectiveness. The Russian command would likely want to utilize them in an urban assault on Slovyansk, since their light armored BDV vehicles are not designed for heavy mechanized combat in open rolling terrain, such as found south of Izyum. Therefore, it is reasonable to anticipate that the Russian paratroopers may be held back in reserve for now, or they will be directed west to screen potential crossing sites of the Northern Donets River near Chuhuiv and Balakliya.
The Northern Donets remains the dominant topographical feature in this theater of operations. Its southern (or right) bank is made up of high cliffs, while its northern (left) bank consists of marshland. Both are serious obstacles to the movement of mechanized forces. Just as the Ukrainians were able to utilize the Northern Donets in beating off Russian attacks on Izyum for three weeks, the Russians can now take advantage of the water barrier to screen their right flank and lines of communications when launching offensives south towards Slavyansk and Barvinkove. As explained in previous posts, Slovyansk is a prestige objective, which Vladimir Putin needs in order to offer the Russian public something to cheer about. Meanwhile, Barvinkove is a strategic objective, which will open the door to the Dnieper River and the potential encirclement of Ukrainian forces in the Donbas. Any prospective Ukrainian counter-offensive from the vicinity of Kharkiv towards Kupiansk, the Russian base of operations, will have to fight through defenses at the crossings of the Northern Donets, before gaining access to this vital lifeline of fuel, ammunition and reinforcements to Russian forces near Izyum. There are unconfirmed claims that the Ukrainians have reconnaissance elements across the Northern Donets at Malynivka east of Chuhuiv and at Savyntsi south of Balaklia. If these rumors are true, then the Ukrainian units will have to be reinforced quickly, before Russian reinforcements, like the BTGs of the 106th airborne division, move west to seal off further Ukrainian advances. A Ukrainian foothold over the Northern Donets would be invaluable.
Of the Russian BTGs that forced the crossing of the river and moved south of Izyum on March 25, the latest reports indicate that these were based on remnants of the 752nd motorized and 237th tank regiments, not the 254th regiment, as first reported. Even so, they have been contained by Ukrainian artillery, airborne infantry and tanks at Kamianka and Sukha Kamianka. Both of these Russian regiments sustained so many wounded since crossing the river on March 25 that a temporary hospital had to be established in a school building in Izyum to treat them all. As far as the 254th regiment is concerned, one BTG was withdrawn on March 21 after three unsuccessful attacks on Izyum, where it lost 400 men. It is possible that another understrength BTG from the same regiment is still performing a secondary role at Izyum.
The Russians expanded their lodgment south of Izyum on April 3 by moving west from Kamianka to seize the village of Velyka Kamyshevakha. Nonetheless, the maneuver hardly packed a serious punch, since the hamlet was occupied by Ukrainian patrols, which quickly withdrew. Therefore, we can make the assessment that as of April 5, the BTGs of the 752nd motorized and 237 tank regiments were understrength and did not project significant combat power. The first Russian reinforcements to appear south of Izyum in force was on April 5, when a BTG of the 1st tank regiment of the 2nd guards Tamanskaya division crossed the pontoon bridge and attacked southwest towards Barvinkove. The Russian tank regiment was able to break through to Brazhkivka, half way towards Barvinkove, but was stopped short when it tried to capture the neighboring village of Suliakhivka. There are also unconfirmed reports on Russian social media that a company of the 13th tank regiment from the 4th guards Kantemirovskaya division was also involved in a tank battle south of Izyum yesterday. However, until confirmed, it will not be identified on the map. In any case, the above regiments of the Russian 2nd and 4th Divisions were roughly handled during the first week of the war near Sumy by the Ukrainian 93d and 30th mechanized brigades. The Russian General Staff withdrew them back across border to Russia in order to regroup before recently sending them back to Belgorod and then south to Izyum.
The Russian artillery north of the Northern Donets River deserves mention. It consists of the towed, self-propelled and “Grad” reactive multiple rocket battalions of the 236th artillery brigade of the 20th Russian army. According to the reports of the Ukrainian General Staff, this brigade has suffered 20% casualties during the fighting over the last three weeks. Nevertheless, this formation is still a formidable force that outnumbers its Ukrainian counterpart, the artillery battalion of the 81st air assault brigade. Once the Russians concentrated superior numbers of artillery at Izyum, the Ukrainians had to retreat out of effective range, 15-20 kilometers out. During the first three weeks of the battle, the Ukrainians had the upper hand and were able to badly maul the BTGs from the 437th motorized and 26th tank regiments (March 17) and 254th motorized regiment (March 18-20) by accurate artillery fire. The Russians lost close to 200 armored vehicles and 600 killed in these attacks.
Recent reports indicate that the sector at Izyum is defended by two Ukrainian BTGs comprised of the 95th and 81st air-assault brigades, about 2,000 men and women. These are mounted on approximately 100 armored personnel carriers of different iterations. The most powerful of the armored vehicles is the BT-4 “Bucephalus”, of which there are at least 20. These are augmented by the artillery of the 81st air assault brigade (18 guns), a battery or two of “Grad” reactive rocket launchers (12) and at least two tank companies, about 20 tanks.
The 95th air-assault brigade is a legendary unit, which gained the reputation as the elite Ukrainian assault formation during the fighting in 2014-2015. Its most famous exploit was the Zabrodsky raid around Russian separatist lines in August-September 2014. The brigade consists of the 1st, 2nd and 13th assault-battalions. We do not know which battalion is fighting south of Izyum. In fact, the 95th acts like the fire brigade of the Ukrainian armed forces and is found in all of the hot spots. For instance, in late February a BTG of the 95th was involved in a timely counterattack into the flank of the Russian forces attempting to outflank Kyiv from the southwest. This intervention stalled the Russian offensive on Kyiv and enabled other Ukranian units to establish an impenetrable front, which eventually led to the recent Russian withdrawal away from the Ukrainian capital. At the beginning of the war, the BTG of the 95th currently at Izyum was placed in operational reserve behind the Ukrainian battalions defending the Donbas. It was reported to have conducted a successful counterattack, which temporarily seized part of the town of Horlivka, something the Ukrainians were unable to do during the fighting in 2014-2015. On March 7 it was redirected to Izyum.
Similarly, the 81st air-assault brigade gained a fine reputation during the fighting for Donetsk airport in the winter of 2014-2015. Its members are considered part of the famous “Cyborgs” who defended the airport for such a long time. It consists of the 122nd air-assault battalion, the 90th air-assault battalion and the 5th BTG, which is responsible for the defense of Poltava. The 122nd air-assault battalion has been the unit fighting in Izyum during the last three weeks.
Obviously, the Ukrainians will need to concentrate more than one battalion at Slovyansk, if the Russians reach its outskirts. Initially, I was under impression that a BTG of the 25th parachute brigade was stationed at Slovyansk, since some of its paratroopers were buried there earlier in the war. However, I was mistaken and am currently unable to identify the unit that currently serves as the garrison of Slovyansk.
Video of Ukrainian artillery attacks taken from observation drones reveals an unbelievable number of direct hits upon Russian armor. Recent reports came to light that this is due to Ukrainian gunners using laser guided artillery munitions that are guided to the target by drones, which “sparkle” or “paint” tanks and BMPs with laser beams of specific wavelengths to guide the shells directly onto the target. Reportedly, the Ukrainians manufacture their own munitions, the “Kvitnyk” for 152 mm shells, and the “Karasuk” for 122 mm shells. However, more than 40 days of campaigning likely exhausted Ukrainian supplies of this high-tech munition, or at the very least, resulted in the rationing of the last pallets of this invaluable weapon. It is unlikely that the nascent Ukrainian industry that manufactures these munitions, undoubtedly a niche enterprise, will be able to make up the shortages during the current war of attrition. Nonetheless, the Ukrainians have plenty of the old regular kinetic munitions. It is reported that the United States has been leaning on former Soviet NATO members to release their old stock of ammunition to the Ukrainians.
At least two Ukrainian tank companies are fighting at Izyum and Barvinkove. One is believed to belong to a battalion of the 17th tank brigade, which has its home base in Kryvyi Rih. It utilizes the latest version of the T-64BV tank, Ukraine’s standard main battle tank. The other tank company, which has been defending the approaches to Barvinkove with some success, belongs to an unknown command. It is comprised of reservists, who have previous combat experience in the Donbas. They fight in refurbished T-72 tanks.
After their overreach in the initial campaign, where they tried to attack everywhere, the Russians are now focusing on seizing the Donbas. That places the Ukrainians at a disadvantage, since Eastern Ukraine is at the furthest end of the line of communications with the Ukrainian base of supplies at the Polish border. Recent Russian ballistic and cruise missile attacks on Ukrainian railroad hubs and fuel depots throughout the country are designed to interdict the flow of supplies to the Ukrainian battalions in the Donbas. The Russians believe that the Ukrainians are ready to break somewhere, because of exhaustion, lack of fuel and ammunition, and an inability to rotate their best troops. Thus, they are trying to press home the attack on Slovyansk and Kramatorsk with every available resource. Nonetheless, the expected relocation of refurbished Russian BTGs that were mauled in the battle for Kyiv to the front at Izyum has not occurred. These units need at least seven days to rest, resupply and regroup. In the meantime, the Russians have brough up no more than three BTGs from the previously mentioned 2nd Tamanskaya and 4th Kantemirovskaya divisions and possibly the two airborne BTGS from the 106th airborne division. That amounts to no more than 5,000 men. Ukrainian intelligence also claims that the 38th brigade from the 35th Russian army is scheduled to arrive in Belgorod within days. It will field no more than two BTGs, or another 2,000 men. Altogether, the Russians can expect no more than 7,000 reinforcements for the expected fighting in the Izyum sector. Will that be enough to score that public relations victory for Vladimir Putin?
Concurrently, the Ukrainians are bringing up reinforcements, fuel and ammunition to the front by rail. We know that Ukrainian efforts at organizing reserves have borne fruit near Kryvyi Rih, where battalions of the reserve 60th infantry brigade entered the line and participated in the capture of several settlements along the west bank of the Dnieper River. Hopefully, more are in route.
The Ukrainian General Staff faces three key decisions at Izyum: (1) whether to rotate the BTGs of the 81st and 95th brigades that have been fighting at Izyum with fresh units, even if these may not be as combat experienced; (2) whether to counterattack the Russian lodgment south of Izyum head on, or to attack Russian supply lines further north near Chuhuiv in an attempt to cut the enemy off from fuel and supplies at Kupiansk; or (3) whether to try to weather the storm and withdraw slowly into Slovyansk, in order to bleed the Russian reinforcements dry through bloody urban combat, despite the inevitable civilian casualties, while nurturing reserves for a counteroffensive elsewhere, like towards Melitopil. The recapture of Melitopil would likely thwart Putin’s designs on seizing the southern cost of Ukraine? Afterall, once the Russians use up the refurbished BTGs that just withdrew from the Kyiv front, they will have nothing else for at least five months, when their new mobilization starts bringing fresh units online. Meanwhile, the Ukrainians will likely have finished the training and outfitting of their reserves within weeks and will have a window of opportunity to outnumber the Russians in manpower. Will they be able to take advantage of this opportunity to go on a campaign-winning offensive?
Air power is the great unknown. How many assets is Putin willing to risk and in what state of repair are they? Ukraine desperately needs strong air defense on this front to protect its limited armor and deflect any air-assisted breakthrough. Ukraine also must increase attacks into Russian railheads, supply depots and air bases.
another great post with both current and historical insight - thanks for this.