The battle for the town of Izyum is shaping up to be the focal point of Russian efforts in the next, third phase of the Ukrainian-Russian war. I attach a Russian military topographical map (circa 1979) of the zone of operations, in order to better explain the dynamics and issues that will confront both sides in the coming days. At my request, my son Christopher spliced segments of four separate maps together. His impressive final product included parts of the city of Kharkiv to the northwest and the city of Kupiansk in the north, to better depict the lines of communications that will dictate how the battle will be fought. Alas, the document consisted of too many megabytes and had to be reduced in size in order to be downloaded. I will have to refer to locations like Chuhuiv, Rohan and Mala Rohan in my analysis without being able to depict them on a two-dimensional map.
The initial phase of the war began on February 24 with an all-out Russian offensive with the strategic objective of destroying the Zelensky administration and of the operational objective of preventing the Ukrainians from concentrating at any one point. Over the course of the next two weeks, Russia attacked Ukraine from all directions, but was tamed on all fronts, with the exception of the southern sector, where the concentration of troops from the 49th and 58th Russian armies poured out of Crimea and seized Kherson oblast, before diluting their effort with divergent attacks towards Mariupil, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv and Kryvyi Rih. The second phase began approximately on March 11 when Russian attacks on Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy and Mykolayiv ground to a halt because of exhaustion - or simply put, a lack of infantry willing to close with the enemy. It is at that point that the Russians, who initially made some attempt to limit collateral damage, began to apply the Aleppo formula to the major metropolitan centers of Ukraine, subjecting their civilian populations to indiscriminate bombardment and destruction of vital infrastructure. Apparently, the objective was to accelerate a refugee crisis and to intimidate the Zelensky administration into capitulation, while concurrently resuming attacks that had failed in the initial phase. Despite immense pressure, the Ukrainians held everywhere, except in the southern Donetsk oblast, and even launched a few limited counteroffensives. After three weeks of the most brutal siege in memory, the city center of Mariupil is still in Ukrainian hands. Meanwhile, southwest of Donetsk the Ukrainians have had to relinquish Volnovakha and Vuhledar. However, their troops were able to conduct a successful withdrawal while attacked from front and rear, before changing front to face south to form a new defensive line in the vicinity of Kurakhove. As things stand, one month into the war, Putin does not have even one public relations victory to present to the Russian people. Except for Kherson, the Russians have been unable to capture any other oblast center. Presently, with the Russian cupboard of reserves almost barren, someone in the Stavka (Russian High Command) has finally convinced Putin to focus on one sector, while going on the defensive in all others. That brings us to the battle for Izyum.
Izyum is the gateway to the Donbas from the north, as it is located at a convenient crossing point of the Northern Donets River, which has high banks on its south bank and is a significant water obstacle to advancing armies. I direct you to the town of Balaklia in the top left corner of the map, which is labeled in English. The Northern Donets River begins coiling its way to the southeast below Balaklia, before curving back to the southwest and then running east again, only to loop around the southern part of Izyum, like a necklace. Forcing the Northern Donets at Izyum would allow the Russians access to the twin cities of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, to the southeast. (Slovyansk is labelled in English at the bottom right corner of the map) The capture of these cities by the Russians would achieve one of the stated strategic objectives of the war - bringing the entirety of the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts under Russian control. Moreover, it would give Putin a major public relations coup. Slovyansk was in the news during fighting in 2014 and captured the imagination of the Russian public.
The Russians have attempted to force the Northern Donets at Izyum repeatedly over the course of the last two weeks, suffering heavy casualties to men and equipment, primarily to artillery fire under the observation of drones. At least five Russian battalion tactical groups (BTGs) from the 47th and 144th divisions have been rendered combat ineffective while trying to take Izyum. During these attacks the Russians have levelled the city with missiles, artillery, air bombardment and tank fire from three directions, not unlike at Mariupil. Tens of thousands of civilians are hiding in the basements of the rubble of Izyum; up to a thousand have died. Nonetheless, the Ukranian 122nd independent air assault battalion of the 81st air-assault brigade has been able to maintain control of the southern neighborhoods of Izyum, protected on three sides by the banks of Northern Donets, despite the constant shelling and bombardment. Elements of a local territorial defense battalion have also maintained positions in and around the city and helped in repelling Russian attacks. Russian ground forces have been supported by swarms of fixed wing aircraft and attack helicopters. However, at least ten aircraft and a number of helicopters have been shot down by Ukrainian MANPADS (man portable anti-air systems) and Stinger missiles. It is no understatement to say that Izyum is one of the most uncomfortable air spaces in Ukraine today.
After early Russian efforts to take Izyum by frontal attack failed, a BTG set off from Bakalia in a wide enveloping maneuver towards a crossing of the Northern Donets near Hrushevakha, 12 kilometers west of Izyum. (The town is found in the middle of the left side of the map and is labeled in English) The Russians sent patrols from Hrushevakha towards Izyum and to Barvinkove. Barvinkove is defended by a BTG of the Ukrainian 81st air-assault brigade. (It too is labeled in English and can be found towards the bottom left corner of the map) Barvinkove guards the road network that goes west towards Lozova and Pavlohrad, which in turn leads to the Dnieper River. While the capture of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk will create a splash on RT news, a Russian breakthrough through Barvinkove towards Lozova and eventually the Dnieper will have greater strategic consequences. The entirety of the Ukrainian forces in the Donbas would be cut off from escape to the west. The pathway of Izyum - Barvinkove - Lozova - Pavlohrad was important in another war, where in late February 1943 a Soviet tank army attempted to race to the Dnieper River following the German defeat at Stalingrad, hoping to cut off another German army that was trying to escape from the Caucusus. In one of the great operational masterpieces in military history, General Erich von Mannstein turned the tables on the Soviets and trapped the tank army by cutting it off from its communications with a counterattack north through the Pavlohrad - Barvinkove sector. Central to Mannstein’s timing in launching his counterattack was the knowledge that offensives that went too deep risked running out of fuel and ammunition. Furthermore, the Spring thaw, the rasputnitsa, was starting to set in.
Perhaps inspired by a reading of Mannstein’s memoirs, required reading in most military academies, the Ukrainian General Staff launched a small but clever attack that originated from south of Kharkiv and moved laterally in an easterly direction to Husarivka, which is located squarely along the paved road from Balaklia to Hrushevakha. (Husarivka is labeled in English two squares south of Balaklia) On March 26 a BTG consisting of a one mechanized company and one tank company of the 92nd mechanized brigade attacked and destroyed a BTG from the 752nd guards tank regiment from the 3d guards mechanized division. Remnants of the destroyed Russian tank regiment fled north to Balaklia. Artillery support for the mechanized battle group was an important part of their success. Ukrainian reconnaissance elements were able to proceed east to the high ground overlooking the Northern Donets near Zalyman, which also brings the main paved road from the north of Izyum into view. Not only has the 92nd brigade cut off supplies proceeding from Balaklia to Hrushevakha, but it also has placed itself well within artillery range of the main supply route to Izyum.
Ukrainian counterattacks that affected the battle for Izyum occurred in locations that are found off of the map, immediately southeast and east of Kharkiv. The first is the town of Chuhuiv. Elements of the 92nd brigade recaptured Chuhuiv from the Russians on March 7. During the successful counterattack, the 92nd brigade defeated BTGs from the Russian 61st naval infantry brigade and the 11th airborne brigade. Chuhuiv is significant strategically in that it sits astride supply lines from north of Kharkiv to Balaklia. As we know, the paved road from Balaklia goes south to Hrushevakha. With the road to Balaklia and Hrushevakha blocked, the Russians can only supply Izyum from their base in Kupiansk (directly north and off of the map). Since March 7, the Russians had been trying to envelop Chuhuiv from the northwest. In an effort to safeguard Ukrainian control over Chuhuiv, the 92nd brigade launched simultaneous attacks on to the villages of Rohan and Mala Rohan, which sit along a ridgeline east of Kharkiv. In vicious battles between March 25-27, a BTG of the 92nd brigade and elements of a Kharkiv territorial defense battalion routed BTGs of the Russian 59th guards tank regiment and the 138th mechanized brigade, which occupied the reverse slope of a ridgeline that stretches between both villages. Chuhuiv’s northwest flank is now secure.
Meanwhile, on March 27, in a well-rehearsed attack to force a crossing of the Northern Donets and to outflank Izyum, a BTG of Spetsnaz (special forces) from the Rosgvardia (Russian Internal Security Forces) crossed the river just southwest of the town at Topolske, secured the area from attack from the north and enabled Russian engineers to lay a pontoon bridge. Two BTGs from the 254th mechanized brigade crossed the pontoon bridge and proceeded eight kilometers southeast of Izyum to the villages of Kamenka and Sukhaya Kamenka. Instead of proceeding further towards Slovyansk, the Russians began digging defensive position for their armored vehicles, apparently with the intent to create a lodgment in the area until more reinforcements can arrive. The Ukrainians responded with artillery fire and counterattacks by a company each of the elite 95th air-assault brigade and the 25th airborne brigade. The two companies of paratroopers were backed up by a tank company of the 17th tank brigade. The 95th brigade has become the fire brigade of the Ukrainian army. Its battalions are found in all of the hot spots.
Fighting at Izyum has been ongoing for the last three days, without much change in the situation. The Ukrainians still occupy a good chunk of the southern part of the city; the Russians mechanized units sit in their entrenched positions south of the town. The Russians have continued to provide air support to their mechanized units, although another SU-34 fighter attack plane was lost on March 28. The pilot bailed out and parachuted inside Ukrainian lines, where he was questioned on camera, to prove the destruction of the plane. The latest news coming out of Izyum is that the Russians were relocating and rotating their artillery units north of the town. Afterall, the Russian army has always been wedded to heavy fires and mass rather than to maneuver.
The Russians have withdrawn a number of their airborne BTGs from northwest of Kyiv to Belarus and are expected to relocate some of these to the fighting at Izyum. These represent the most battle worthy Russian infantry that the Russians have at the moment. However, the paratroopers will need a few days to rest and regroup after the tough fighting in the wooded terrain near Kyiv over the course of the previous month. Consequently, it may be more than a week before we see these at the front at Izyum. Reinforcements in the form of 2,000 troops are also expected from the Russian garrisons in Armenia, but the fighting quality of these are dubious. In the meantime, the Russians are patching together composite BTGs from the brigades and regiments that were so roughly handled in the fighting near Kharkiv and Sumy during the first week of the war. These are likely from the 3d motorized division (remnants of the 237th tank regiment, 252nd motorized regiment and 752nd motorized regiment) and 4th Kantemirovska guards tank division (remnants of the 12th tank regiment, 13th tank regiment and 423d motorized regiment). Perhaps these cadres will be glued together to create three small BTGs. While the enthusiasm of these composite formations will be rather low, their ranks will at least be wary of some of the tactics that the Ukrainians used against them the first go around.
Regarding what to expect in this sector in the coming days, the Ukrainians have to expect that the Russians will try to push them out of Rohan, Mala Rohan, Chuhuiv and Husarivka. Without control of these towns and villages, Russian supply lines to their units south of Izyum will be perilously exposed, particularly to artillery fire. Of course, the Russians can try seizing the southern part of Izyum through a frontal assault after more preparatory fires. Although that is unlikely, given their lack of success in that regard during the last couple of weeks.
Given that the Russians may not be able to bring up sizeable reinforcements to this area soon, the Ukrainians may decide not to reinforce this sector and to contain the Russian lodgment for as long as possible, degrading their opponent with artillery. The Ukrainians can also withdraw slowly towards Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, thus extending Russian supply lines even further and degrading their mechanized formations with artillery and anti-tank missiles. Slovyansk and Kramatorsk are cities that will be heavily defended and will not fall easily. If the Russians can be induced into fighting for these fortresses in the next two to three weeks, the urban fighting may bleed them dry. That may be the hope of the Ukrainian General Staff, which would hope to accumulate sufficient reserves with which to go onto the offensive elsewhere, when the ground dries up. However, the Ukrainians have to be careful. Some of the best Ukrainian BTGs are fighting to the east of Slovyansk near Lysychansk and Severdonetsk; points furthest to the east of all Ukrainian positions. These have resisted handsomely over the last four weeks but are under constant attack. If the fighting at Slovyansk and Kramatorsk does not go as expected, many fine Ukrainian battalions may find themselves surrounded and mere pawns in peace talks with Vladimir Putin. Or will the fighting near Izyum eat up Putin’s last reserves and leave the Russian army dangerously exposed to a riposte, like at Melitopil?